Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Eun Sung Jung appeals from an order denying her two motions to vacate plea and conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7. Jung was born in South Korea and brought in 1998 (at age three) by her parents to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor and has continuously lived in this country since then. She was not a United States citizen and did not have permanent resident status. In 2014, Jung was charged with one count each of second degree commercial burglary, obtaining drugs by a forged prescription, possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia, and misdemeanor identity theft with intent to defraud. A second felony complaint, filed in Orange County Superior Court in March 2015 charged Jung with two counts of felony identity theft, and one count each of sale or transportation of a controlled substance, possession for sale of a controlled substance, misdemeanor receiving stolen property, and misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia. Striking a plea bargain, Jung was sentenced to 180 days in jail and three years of probation. On plea forms, she initialed a provision implicating she understood the immigration consequences of her pleas. In January 2016, Jung was released from jail and entered the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In May 2016, Jung, through retained counsel, filed motions pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.2 and 1016.3 to set aside her convictions, filing petitions for habeas relief. Jung's habeas petition averred she did not ascertain the immigration consequences arising from her guilty pleas to the criminal charges against her in Orange County. After review of order denying her motions to vacate the pleas, the Court of Appeal determined Jung was entitled to relief under section 1473.7: Jung met her burden of proof by submitting her own declaration and a declaration from her then trial counsel showing that, at the time of the pleas, she did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of pleading guilty and would not have pleaded guilty if she did. Furthermore, the Court determined Jung’s earlier petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, did not bar Jung from seeking relief under section 1473.7 once she was no longer in criminal custody. View "California v. Jung" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Larry Brand was convicted by jury of possessing metal knuckles, one count of misdemeanor possession of heroin, and one count of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed a split sentence of two years in local custody, and one year of mandatory supervision. Brand challenged three of the conditions of mandatory supervision ordered by the trial court: (1) the condition requiring that he submit to a search of his computers, recordable media, and cell phones; (2) the condition that he report his contacts with law enforcement; and (3) the condition requiring him to comply with a curfew if directed by his probation officer. Finding that Brand’s challenges lacked merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment. View "California v. Brand" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Oliver Panozo was convicted by jury of various offenses in connection with two domestic violence incidents involving his former girlfriend. At sentencing, the court rejected Panozo’s request to be placed on probation and enrolled in Veterans Court. Instead, it imposed a three-year middle term on the principal aggravated assault count. Panozo appealed, arguing the trial court was unaware of its statutory obligation to consider his service-related PTSD as a mitigating factor under Penal Code sections 1170.9 and 1170.91. He therefore sought remand for resentencing. Tracing the relevant statutes and considering the record, the Court of Appeal agreed remand was necessary: sections 1170.9 and 1170.91 obligated a court to consider a defendant’s service-related mental health issues, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as a mitigating factor in evaluating whether to grant probation and in selecting the appropriate determinate term. Although there was ample evidence of Panozo’s service-related PTSD presented at sentencing, by all indications the court was unaware that it was required to consider this mitigating factor when it denied probation and imposed a three-year prison term. Accordingly, the Court remanded for a new sentencing hearing to permit the court to exercise its statutory obligations under sections 1170.9 and 1170.91. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Panozo" on Justia Law

William Morse petitioned for habeas relief from a superior court order which found under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), there was probable cause to believe petitioner was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory behavior without treatment or custody. The court sustained petitioner’s objection based on California v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016) to portions of the experts’ psychological evaluations, but nonetheless found the remaining evidence was sufficient to support a finding that petitioner met the criteria of a sexually violent predator (SVP). Petitioner argued the court correctly found Sanchez applied at the probable cause hearing; that, after sustaining his hearsay objection to the experts’ evaluations, there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s probable cause finding; and that the State “waived” their right to assert Welfare & Institutions Code section 6602 was an implied exception to the hearsay rule by failing to raise this specific ground at the hearing. Therefore, petitioner argues the petition had to be dismissed. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the court erred in sustaining petitioner’s hearsay objection at the section 6602 hearing. The Court found the SVPA as a whole, and section 6602 in particular, evinced a legislative intent to allow a court to consider hearsay in the experts’ evaluations when making a probable cause determination. "In our view, requiring an evaluator to rely on nonhearsay only in preparing his or her evaluation of a person, or requiring the People to produce at an interim probable cause hearing independent foundational evidence to support the historical information relied on by evaluators, would undermine the purpose of such a hearing and the SVPA in general. . . . At an SVP trial, the People must still proffer nonhearsay evidence in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is an SVP subject to civil commitment." The Court concluded there was ample evidence in the record to support the court’s probable cause finding. Petitioner's writ petition was denied. View "In re Morse" on Justia Law

Defendants Harquan Johnson and KeAndre Windfield were each convicted of one count of murder and one count of attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm, along with gun discharge and gang enhancement allegations as to the murder and attempted murder counts. The charges arose from the shooting of two members of their own gang, the Ramona Blocc Hustlas, resulting in the death of one of them. Both defendants were sentenced to prison for 90 years to life. They appealed raising various claims. In the original opinion, filed August 2014, the Court of Appeal affirmed both defendants' convictions, but reversed Johnson’s sentence pursuant to California v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014), because, as a juvenile at the time of the crime, his sentence of 90 years to life was the functional equivalent of a term of life without possibility of parole and we directed other modifications of the sentence and abstracts of judgment. In November 2014, the California Supreme Court denied both defendants’ petitions for review, but, on its own motion, issued a grant-and-hold of review as to defendant Johnson, for consideration pending review in In re Alatriste, S214652, In re Bonilla, S214960, and California v. Franklin, S217699. In May 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Franklin (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)), and retransferred his case to the Court of Appeal with directions reconsider Johnson’s sentence. The appellate court issued a second opinion in September 2016, affirming those portions of the original opinion pertaining to issues not subject to the grant and hold, and reconsidered Johnson's sentence. Defendants again successfully petitioned for review; the Supreme Court retransferred the cases to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the case in light of California v Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019), and California v. Perez, 3 Cal.App.5th 612 (2016). Judgment was modified per direction, and defendants again appealed. In April 2020, the Supreme Court again transferred this matter to the appellate court to reconsider in light of Senate Bill 620 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682). After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal affirmed both defendants' convictions. As to Windfield, a hearing was warranted for both defendant and the State to make an accurate record of defendant’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense, and to amend his abstract of judgment fix a date error. As to Johnson, the case was remanded for the limited purpose of a fitness hearing: if not fit, Johnson's convictions were to be reinstated; if the juvenile court found it would not have transferred Johnson to be tried as an adult, it should treat his convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate "disposition" within its discretion. In addition, the court could exercise its discretion whether to strike or dismiss any of the firearm enhancements within the meaning of Senate Bill No. 620. View "California v. Windfield" on Justia Law

A felony complaint alleged that on seven different dates in 2014, Martinez committed a felony under Insurance Code section 1814 by entering into an agreement and having an understanding with a person incarcerated in jail, to inform and notify Martinez, a bail licensee, of the fact of an arrest in violation of California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2076. Martinez was associated with Luna Bail Bonds.The court of appeal reversed her subsequent conviction, finding the regulation facially invalid. Section 2076 prohibits bail licensees from entering, indirectly or directly, any arrangement or understanding with specified types of people— including a “person incarcerated in a jail”—“or with any other persons” to inform or notify any bail licensee, directly or indirectly, of information pertaining to (1) an existing criminal complaint, (2) a prior, impending, or contemplated arrest, or (3) the persons involved therein, which impliedly includes arrestees and named criminals. The section is not unconstitutionally vague but is a content-based regulation, which unduly suppresses protected speech and fails to survive even intermediate judicial scrutiny. While section 2076 might indirectly deter unlawful solicitation of arrestees, an indirect effect is not enough to survive intermediate scrutiny. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Bryant Ruiz appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a petition to revoke parole filed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) for lack of jurisdiction. Even though the parties stipulated Ruiz was not convicted of a serious felony and should have been placed on post-release community supervision (PRCS) rather than parole when he was released from prison, the trial court denied Ruiz’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under Penal Code section 3000.08 (l), because he did not challenge his supervision placement within 60 days of his release. To the Court of Appeal, Ruiz contended the application of section 3000.08 (l) in this instance infringed his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The Court of Appeal concluded the application of the 60-day limitation in this case indeed violated Ruiz’s procedural due process rights. Therefore, the order was reversed and the trial court was directed to enter a new order granting Ruiz’s motion to dismiss and transferring Ruiz from parole supervision to PRCS. View "California v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Five Asian-American residents sued the City of Santa Clara (City) contending that at-large elections for the office of city council violated the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (Elec. Code, 14025-14032). The trial court agreed that occurrences of racially polarized voting impaired the ability of Asian-American voters, as a result of vote dilution, to elect their preferred candidates to Santa Clara’s seven-member city council. It ordered the City to implement district-based city council elections and awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs totaling more than $3 million.The court of appeal affirmed. Racially polarized voting in five of 10 city council elections satisfied the standard for a cognizable voting rights claim, which required a showing that the majority voting bloc in Santa Clara’s electorate “usually” voted to defeat the candidate preferred by Asian-American voters. The trial court did not err in assigning more weight to certain elections and appropriately used statistical evidence to support its findings of racially polarized voting. The imposition of “race-based districts” did not violate the Equal Protection Clause nor did it impinge the City’s plenary authority as a charter city under the California Constitution to control the manner and method of electing its officers. View "Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

The District appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, a former employee of the District, on her Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims. Plaintiff's claims were based on the District's alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodations for and/or engage in an interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations for two injuries, each of which was sufficient to render plaintiff disabled for the purposes of FEHA.The Court of Appeal agreed with the District that a Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) plaintiff must prove an available reasonable accommodation. The court also concluded that the evidence presented is sufficient to establish only that a reasonable accommodation of plaintiff's wrist injury, not her shoulder injury, was available. In this case, the jury did not indicate whether it relied on the District's response to one or both of these disabilities in reaching its verdict, and the record does not permit the court to make such a determination. Therefore, the court reversed with instructions that the trial court conduct a new trial on plaintiff's failure to accommodate and interactive process claims based solely on the District's handling of her wrist injury. The court also concluded that the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar such claims, because they seek recovery for a harm that is distinct from the harms for which the Workers' Compensation Act provides a remedy. To the extent plaintiff prevails on limited retrial, the trial court must reassess attorney fees. View "Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Robert Dziubla and Linda Stanwood claimed defendant Ignatius Piazza II, owner of a Nevada firearms training facility, harassed and threatened them by publishing defamatory statements along with their personal identifying information, and sending associates to invade their home. Piazza retorted that plaintiffs conned him out of thousands of dollars and are now attempting to steal his property and "chill his constitutional rights." The trial court granted in part and denied in part Piazza’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. With one important clarification as to the scope of protected activity, the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion. That clarification involved so-called “doxing” allegations in the complaint: plaintiffs’ claim that Piazza published private personal identifying information about them to thousands of gun enthusiasts as a thinly-veiled threat about what could happen if they continued to litigate the business dispute. Although it was included in an otherwise-protected litigation “alert” that discussed the pending lawsuit, the doxing information was entirely extraneous to the court proceedings that were the ostensible subject of the communication. The Court of Appeal thus rejected Piazza’s assertion that plaintiffs could not meet the “minimal merit” standard on the anti-SLAPP motion because the doxing allegations would necessarily be barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47(b). The order granting the special motion to strike was reversed in part as to two of plaintiffs’ cause of action ‒ the tenth, seeking an injunction, and the twelfth, alleging a civil rights violation ‒ but only as to the claims included in these causes of action that alleged injury from the publication of their personal information, i.e., the doxing allegations. In all other respects, the order was affirmed. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Dziubla v. Piazza" on Justia Law