Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

E.P., a minor in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, challenged a July 2020, decision by respondent Yolo County Superior Court, which denied his motion to physically appear in juvenile court in the presence of the judge at court hearings. Petitioner claimed the court’s decision, as well as certain temporary local rules (Super. Ct. Yolo County, Temporary COVID-19 Local Rules) issued by the court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, conflicted with Welfare and Institutions Code section 679 and the emergency rules related to COVID-19 adopted by the Judicial Council and contained in appendix I of the California Rules of Court. The Court of Appeal concluded that, consistent with section 679 and the case law interpreting it, the emergency rules required a court obtain a minor’s consent before conducting a hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding remotely. Accordingly, the respondent superior court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to physically appear in court at his juvenile hearings. To the extent the court’s temporary local rules required all hearings in juvenile delinquency proceedings be conducted remotely absent a finding of good cause, the rules were in conflict with both section 679 and the emergency rules. View "E.P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

News outlet Voice of San Diego (Voice) requested records from the Coronado Unified School District (District) under the California Public Records Act concerning its employee Randall Burgess, who had been the subject of unsubstantiated molestation allegations. Burgess sued the District to enjoin disclosure. After Voice intervened, the trial court ordered the District to disclose publicly available court filings and materials submitted to the District at a public hearing. Thereafter, it denied Voice’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, finding the production of these limited materials did not confer a significant public benefit. On appeal of that order, Voice argued the trial court misconstrued the significant benefit requirement under section 1021.5 and abused its discretion in denying its fee request. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Burgess v. Coronado Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

In 1997, defendant Estaban Zarate Bravo pleaded guilty to, and was convicted on a plea bargain agreement of: a felony violation of domestic violence (count 1) and felony violation of child cruelty (count 2). Defendant was a native of Mexico and Spanish was his first language. He appeared in custody at a hearing on June 24, 1997, at which he pleaded guilty to both counts with the use of an interpreter. The immediate advantage of his plea was that defendant was to be released from custody that same day so that he could return to his construction job without being fired and could therefore support his spouse and their child. Of more immediate importance, defendant was informed by counsel and the prosecution that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would conduct a sweep of the county jail where he was being held by the next morning; being released that afternoon allowed him to avoid the ICE sweep and likely deportation. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ incarceration, suspended, and placed him on formal probation for 36 months on terms and conditions including 25 days’ custody, for which he was granted time served. In 2018, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. In 2019, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contended the Court of Appeal should grant his motion to vacate or, alternatively, remand to and direct the trial court to grant the motion, specifically contending that at the time of his plea agreement, he was unaware of future immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant contended his trial attorney’s communication, coupled with the written admonition on the plea, as read to him by the interpreter, would leave any reasonable person to believe that so long as he avoided the ICE agents while incarcerated, he would not confront immigration consequences. The Court of Appeal found that “a defendant’s self-serving statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—that with competent advice he or she would have accepted [or rejected] a proffered plea bargain, is insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to prejudice, and must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.” With no such evidence in the record, the Court declined to vacate the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Bravo" on Justia Law

A decade after his conviction for attempted murder, defendant-appellant Derrick Scott filed an unsuccessful petition to set it aside under Penal Code section 1170.95. On appeal, his counsel filed a brief asserting no grounds for relief. Scott was invited to file a brief of his own but did not. Following the law that the Court of Appeal generally has applied to postjudgment appeals in the last decade, the Court dismissed the appeal as abandoned. "We believe that we typically should issue such a dismissal through a concise unpublished order, but we publish this opinion to explain why that practice is our preferred course for most uncontested postjudgment appeals." View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

Senate Bill 1437, passed in 2018 and signed into law, prospectively amended the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Bill also established a procedure permitting certain qualifying persons who were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the courts that sentenced them to vacate their murder convictions and obtain resentencing on any remaining counts. Defendant-appellant Alexander Palacios felt he was entitled to such relief. He appealed an order denying his petition to vacate his first degree murder conviction and obtain resentencing under Senate Bill 1437. Defendant argued the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition because he established a prima facie case entitling him to a full hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. The Court of Appeal rejected this contention and affirmed the postjudgment order denying defendant’s section 1170.95 petition. View "California v. Palacios" on Justia Law

The City filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish whether Measure P, the Fresno Clean and Safe Neighborhood Parks Tax Ordinance, has been duly enacted through the voters' initiative power. On the same day the City filed its action, FBHC filed its own complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate, seeking a declaration declaring that Measure P had been duly enacted.The Court of Appeal consolidated the cases and endorsed the holdings and reasoning of All Persons City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703, 708. Finding that All Persons was controlling in this case, the court concluded that neither Proposition 13 nor Proposition 218 affects the voters' initiative power, and therefore neither imposes a two-thirds voting requirement on the passage of voter initiatives that impose special taxes. The court rejected the Association's policy argument, noting that the Association's policy concerns are best addressed by the Legislature. The court reversed the judgments; on the City's action, the court ordered the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of FBHC declaring that Measure P has passed; and on FBHC's action, the court directed the trial court to enter a new judgment granting FBHC's request for declaratory relief and declaring that Measure P has passed. View "City of Fresno v. Fresno Building Healthy Communities" on Justia Law

James Stanley Koenig was convicted by jury on 33 counts of securities fraud, mostly involving Corporations Code section 25401, in addition to two counts of residential burglary. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 42 years eight months. On appeal, defendant raised 15 contentions. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by not instructing on mistake of law as to some counts and it erred in failing to define the term “indirect” for the jury as to one count. However, the Court concluded these errors were harmless and found no merit to the other contentions. Accordingly, Koenig's convictions were affirmed. View "California v. Koenig" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Brandon Hines was convicted by jury of illegally possessing firearms while out on bond, as well as spousal abuse and witness intimidation. The trial court sentenced him to 11 years 4 months in prison. During trial proceedings, Hines acted disruptively by making delusional and paranoid comments about the prosecutor. There was also evidence Hines had suffered, and continued to suffer, from mental illness. As a result, defense counsel twice asked to have Hines evaluated psychologically. The evaluations didn’t adequately address Hines’s competence to stand trial within the meaning of Penal Code section 1368. The trial judge declined to declare a doubt about his competence and proceeded to jury selection. In the middle of trial was when defense counsel declared he had come to doubt his client's competence. A psychiatrist examined Hines and diagnosed him as having schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Defense counsel didn’t call the psychiatrist to testify but represented he had offered the qualified opinion that Hines wasn’t competent to stand trial. The trial judge again declined to declare a doubt as to Hines’s competence and refused to suspend the trial on the ground Hines had in fact been assisting in his defense. Hines then testified at some length without further incident, and the jury convicted him as charged. On appeal, Hines argued: (1) the trial judge was required to suspend the trial and hold a full competency hearing under Penal Code section 1368; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain rebuttal testimony. The Court of Appeal affirmed: since the trial judge didn’t declare a doubt about Hines’s competence, the Court felt compelled to affirm unless defense counsel presented substantial evidence to doubt Hines’s competence. "Hines’s conduct and the information defense counsel adduced about him was worrisome but didn’t constitute substantial evidence of his incompetence because defense counsel didn’t link his outbursts and mental illness to any limitation on his ability to understand the proceedings or provide rational assistance to defense counsel." Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, and "in any event, the admission was harmless." View "California v. Hines" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Moore, Sr., was charged in a felony complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol, causing injury, and with driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more, causing injury. The complaint further alleged that Moore had a blood-alcohol content of 0.15 percent or more, personally inflicted great bodily injury on one victim, and proximately caused bodily injury to two additional victims. The offenses allegedly occurred on November 22, 2018, when Moore’s vehicle collided with another vehicle, injuring three occupants of the other vehicle. Moore pled not guilty to the charges and denied the enhancement allegations. Before trial, on November 8, 2019, Moore’s counsel orally moved the trial court to hold a “prima facie hearing” to determine whether Moore met the statutory criteria to qualify for pretrial mental health diversion. The trial court denied Moore’s motion on the ground that Vehicle Code section 23640 rendered all felony and misdemeanor DUI defendants ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. Moore then petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, claiming the trial court’s order was contrary to the plain language of Penal Code section 1001.36, its legislative history, and public policy. The Court of Appeal concluded that the legislative history of Penal Code sections 1001.36 and1001.80 showed that the California Legislature did not intend to make DUI defendants eligible for pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. The Court denied Moore's petition and dissolved the order staying trial court proceedings. View "Moore v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Anthony Maxwell was convicted by jury of possessing methadone, drug paraphernalia, and on two occasions, possessing heroin with the intent to sell it. The trial court found true several allegations that lengthened the sentence for these offenses, including that defendant had a prior “strike” conviction, served a prior prison term, and committed one of the offenses while out on bail on another offense. The court sentenced defendant to 13 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court wrongly denied his two motions to suppress evidence; (2) the court wrongly instructed the jury about “uncharged offenses” (that is, offenses that were discussed but not charged in this case); and (3) the court wrongly imposed several sentencing enhancements: an “on bail” enhancement - which the court imposed because defendant committed one of the offenses here while out on bail on another offense - and a prior prison term enhancement - which the court imposed because defendant served a prior prison term shortly before he committed the offenses here. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant in part. A sentencing enhancement for a prior prison term required, among other things, that the prior prison term be based on a felony conviction. "But that was not true of the prior prison term here." The Court found that although defendant served this prison term after being convicted of a felony, that felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act) before sentencing in this case. The trial court thus had no ground for increasing defendant’s sentence based on his serving this prior prison term. Judgment was modified to address this error, and judgment was affirmed as modified. View "California v. Maxwell" on Justia Law