Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Azcona fired multiple shots at a man sitting on a porch, hitting the victim in the arm, while riding past on a bicycle. Police recovered 13 nine-millimeter casings from the scene. Two weeks later, Robles was a passenger in a car when Azcona rode up on his bike, pulled out a gun, and started firing, killing Robles. The driver was also hit. Police found 15 nine-millimeter casings in the area. Two days later, someone matching Azcona’s description, riding a bike, approached a car occupied by two men and brandished a gun. Days later, Azcona tried to rob a teenager, hitting the boy with a gun on the face. Azcona’s final victim was Herrera, whose body was found on a Chinatown road with nine bullet wounds. Most of the surviving victims either identified Azcona in a photo lineup or provided a description consistent with his appearance; surveillance videos placed Azcona near the Chinatown murder around the time of the shooting.Azcona was convicted of premeditated murder, attempted premeditated murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, negligent discharge of a firearm, and attempted robbery, with multiple enhancements. The court of appeal reversed in part. The trial court committed multiple errors related to the firearms expert testimony, allowing the expert to testify to conclusions not supported by the material on which he relied, and violating Azcona’s constitutional right to confrontation by allowing the expert to testify that his findings were reviewed and approved by a supervisor. Those errors were prejudicial as to one of Azcona’s attempted murder convictions and the related convictions for negligently discharging and possessing a firearm. View "People v. Azcona" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held in California v. Schaffer, 53 Cal.App.5th 500 (2020) that a parolee exposed to a 180-day jail term for a parole violation resulting from non-criminal conduct was not entitled, under United States v. Haymond, 139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019), to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether he had violated his parole. Defendant and appellant Tyrel Martin was convicted in 2014 of committing a lewd and lascivious act with a child by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear, for which he was sentenced to a 5-year prison term. He was released on parole in 2018. In August 2019, the Division of Adult Parole Operations of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DAPO) petitioned to revoke Martin’s parole, alleging that he failed to report to his parole agent upon release from custody, that he failed to register as a sex offender, and that he did not participate in electronic monitoring. As part of a compromise with the DAPO, Martin admitted the allegations regarding failure to report and failure to participate in electronic monitoring, and he was ordered to serve a 180-day jail term with credit for time served. A month later, the trial court set aside Martin’s admissions, vacated the sentence, and set a formal revocation hearing, having been notified that the case should have been governed by Penal Code section 3000.08 (h), providing that, for certain parolees, a parole violation meant that the parolee will be sent back to prison, with the Board of Parole Hearings responsible for determining future parole consideration. Following a contested revocation hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated parole by failing to report to his parole agent upon release from custody. Martin was ordered to return to prison. Martin contends on appeal, as he did in trial court, that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Haymond entitled him to have a jury determine whether he violated parole beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal concluded Martin was not entitled to have a jury make findings using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard under Haymond, despite the possibility he faced a lengthy prison sentence for his parole violation. View "California v. Martin" on Justia Law

In Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1012, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment rendered in the Court of Appeal's prior opinion filed on February 26, 2019, remanding with directions to reevaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in light of its clarification of how an appellate court should review a finding made by the trier of fact pursuant to the clear and convincing standard. In this case, O.B., a person with autism spectrum disorder appeals from an order establishing a limited conservatorship of her person and appointing her mother and elder sister as conservators.As directed, the court reevaluated the sufficiency of the evidence and concluded that substantial evidence supports the establishment of a limited conservatorship of O.B.'s person. In this case, the record as a whole contains substantial evidence, in the form of mother's testimony, from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that O.B. lacks the capacity to perform some of the tasks necessary to provide properly for her own personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter, or to manage her own financial resources. Furthermore, additional evidence supports the trial court's findings, such as the regional center evaluation recommending a limited conservatorship and the probate court's personal observations of O.B. during the proceedings. The court also held that the probate court did not violate principles of conservatorship law, and the probate court did not prejudge the case. View "Conservatorship of O.B." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant D.H. (minor) had a history of defiant and criminal behavior, resulting in him being placed on formal probation in two juvenile delinquency matters. Throughout his probationary period, D.H. violated the law and the terms and conditions of his probation. While still on probation, the juvenile court dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions and terminated D.H.'s probation as unsuccessfully completed based on a joint request from the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) and the probation department to transfer jurisdiction to the dependency court under section 300. D.H. requested the juvenile court seal his section 602 juvenile delinquency records, and the juvenile court denied his request. On appeal, D.H. argued the juvenile court was required to seal his records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 (e). Alternatively, he contended the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion to seal his records under section 786(a). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment denying plaintiff's request for leave to amend and granting Aerospace's motion for summary judgment, in an action alleging that plaintiff was selected for a company-wide reduction in force (RIF) because of his age.The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. In this case, plaintiff's original and first amended DFEH complaints cannot support class and disparate impact theories of recovery, and thus the new allegations in his second amended DFEH complaint are untimely. As a result, plaintiff cannot show he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his proposed class and disparate impact claims. The court also held that the trial court did not err in granting Aerospace's motion for summary judgment where the trial court properly sustained Aerospace's objections to certain exhibits and plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact to withstand summary judgment. Aerospace submitted evidence showing it instituted the company-wide RIF after learning it faced potentially severe cuts to its funding, and plaintiff failed to offer substantial evidence showing that Aerospace's reasons were untrue or pretextual. View "Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp." on Justia Law

In May 2014, George Gonzalez pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts of using his premises without a permit or variance, and one count of maintaining an unauthorized encroachment. The trial court placed Gonzalez on probation for three years, subject to various stipulated conditions, including that he must bring all properties up to code. Gonzalez violated probation on five separate occasions; each time, the court revoked and then reinstated Gonzalez’s probation, with terms to which Gonzalez expressly agreed, including stayed terms of custody of increasing lengths. During a hearing on the third of these violations, Gonzalez agreed to additional specific probation conditions relating to property that he owned on Aldine Drive. Gonzalez specifically agreed to a probation condition that required he sell the Aldine Property for fair market value if he failed to comply with various probation conditions mandating that he undertake specified corrective work on the property. In March 2017, after admitting a fourth probation violation, Gonzalez agreed to an extension of the probationary period and to modify the stayed term of custod. After a hearing concerning the Aldine Property, the trial court found Gonzalez in violation of probation for a fifth time. Gonzalez was again given an opportunity to cure the violations prior to the next hearing; when conditions were not cured, the court ordered Gonzalez to sell the Aldine Property. Gonzalez challenged the order to sell the Aldine Property, arguing, among other things, the order to sell the Aldine Property was invalid because it was entered after the expiration of the maximum three-year probation period as authorized by his 2014 guilty plea, and an order directing the sale of real property was not specified as a potential punishment for municipal code violations in the San Diego Municipal Code. The Court of Appeal determined: (1) the order to sell the Aldine Property was a condition of probation, not a punishment; (2) Gonzalez’s takings claim was without merit; and (3) Gonzalez forfeited any challenge to the reasonableness of the probation condition by failing to raise such a challenge in the trial court or in his opening brief on appeal. The trial court’s order directing the sale of the Aldine Property was affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

After being informed he was not eligible for early parole consideration, Luther Haynes filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging he was unlawfully precluded from Proposition 57 parole consideration because of his status as a sex offender registrant. Haynes was required to register as a sex offender due to: (1) two prior felony convictions for sex offenses committed in the 1980’s; and (2) a felony conviction for annoying or molesting a child, for which he presently was serving an indeterminate third strike sentence. The trial court granted the habeas petition, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) appealed. Whether the CDCR may exclude from Proposition 57 parole consideration otherwise eligible inmates, who have prior convictions requiring sex offender registration, was under review by the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal concluded that based on the language of article I, section 32 of the California Constitution, Proposition 57 parole consideration had to be based on Haynes' current offense, not past convictions. Haynes did not show the challenged regulations were unconstitutional as applied to an offender whose sole current offense was a Penal Code section 647.6 conviction. The Court declined to resolve the broader issue of whether the CDCR could categorically exclude from eligibility for early parole consideration of all inmates currently serving sentences of having prior convictions for any offense requiring sex offender registration "because there are unquestionably violent crimes which require sex offender registration." The Court reversed the trial court's order granting Haynes' habeas petition. View "In re Haynes" on Justia Law

When Hall was pulled over for a vehicle equipment violation in 2018, a police officer observed in the car “a clear plastic baggie” of what appeared to be marijuana. Based on this observation, two police officers searched Hall’s car and found a gun in a closed backpack, resulting in criminal charges against Hall for carrying a loaded firearm in a public place, carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle, and having no license plate lamp.The trial court denied Hall’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the search. The court of appeal reversed that denial. Since the passage of Proposition 64 in 2016, it has been legal for persons 21 years of age and older to possess and transport small amounts (up to 28.5 grams) of marijuana, Health & Saf. Code 11362.1(a)(1). The lawful possession of marijuana in a vehicle does not provide probable cause to search the vehicle. Under Proposition 64, a driver is not permitted to “[p]ossess an open container or open package of cannabis or cannabis products” but there was no evidence in this case that the plastic baggie observed by the officers was an “open container.” View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the constitutionality of Public Resources Code section 25531, which limits judicial review of decisions by the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission on the siting of thermal power plants. Section 25531(a) provides that an Energy Commission siting decision is “subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court of California.” The plaintiffs contend this provision abridges the original jurisdiction of the superior courts and courts of appeal over mandate petitions, as conferred by California Constitution Article VI, section 10. Section 25531(b) provides that findings of fact in support of a Commission siting determination “are final,” allegedly violating the separation of powers doctrine by depriving courts of their essential power to review administrative agency findings (Cal. Const., Art. III, section 3; Art. VI, section 1).The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The Article VI grant of original jurisdiction includes the superior courts and courts of appeal and may not be circumscribed by statute, absent some other constitutional provision. Legislative amendments to section 25531 have broken the once-tight link between the regulatory authority of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and Energy Commission power plant siting decisions, such that the plenary power Article XII grants the Legislature over PUC activities no longer authorizes section 25531(a). Section 25531(b) violates the judicial powers clause by preventing courts from reviewing whether substantial evidence supports the Commission’s factual findings. View "Communities for a Better Environment v. Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission" on Justia Law

After receiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were “acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one. Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery. The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed. In a consolidated appeal, two of the minors, Edgerrin J. and Jamar D. challenged the denial of their motions to suppress, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual, and claimed the citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed on both points. However, the Court found conflicting evidence as to whether officers knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address these other issues, judgment was reversed and remanded for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance. View "In re Edgerrin J." on Justia Law