Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Dwayne Hubbard was convicted by jury for felony indecent exposure for exposing himself in front of a student leaving class at Cosumnes River College. On appeal, he argued, amongst other things, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly referring to his decision to not testify, in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on attempted indecent exposure as a lesser included offense. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal disagreed with these claims. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court disagreed with an additional claim of prosecutorial misconduct and agreed with defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by admitting certain photographs into evidence. That error was harmless, however, so the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Barton was convicted by jury on five counts of forcible oral copulation, and one count of forcible sodomy. The jury reached its verdict only after the trial court discharged a holdout juror, Juror No. 12, after it found she was refusing to deliberate. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Barton to a prison term of 48 years. Barton, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by discharging Juror No. 12 on the basis that she was refusing to deliberate. Barton contended the other jurors' testimony demonstrated only that Juror No. 12 disagreed with the other jurors, who found her to be unfriendly and unable to offer persuasive explanations for her opinion, not that she was unable or unwilling to deliberate. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: under the heightened standard of review that applies to a trial court's decision to discharge a holdout juror for refusing to deliberate, the Court concluded the trial court's decision to discharge Juror No. 12 was not manifestly supported by evidence. Accordingly, the Court did not reach Barton's other contentions on appeal and reversed judgment. View "California v. Barton" on Justia Law

Bowen was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. With count one, the information alleged personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, and that Bowen committed the attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. With respect to both counts, the information alleged a great bodily injury enhancement. A jury found Bowen guilty and the enhancements to be true. He was sentenced to seven years to life imprisonment for attempted murder plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and one year for the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon enhancement. On count two he was sentenced to four years plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court stated the time imposed for count two.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that evidence (knives) should have been excluded because they were the product of a warrantless search in which the police requested that Bowen’s mobile service provider “ping” his phone and provide location data. The court cited exigent circumstances. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing arguments, so Bowen’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to object. There was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation and Bowen’s sentence for attempted murder was authorized. View "People v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shaun Smith filed, as an indigent defendant representing himself in propria persona (pro. per.) in a pending criminal action, a petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief against respondent Sacramento County Superior Court, challenging respondent’s policies and procedures pertaining to pro. per. defendants then in effect. Central to petitioner’s grievance were the duties the court assigned to the pro. per. coordinator -- an individual hired and supervised by, and subject to the control and direction of, Sacramento County (the county). The court revised its policies and procedures pertaining to pro. per. defendants in response to a Court of Appeal order to show cause. The revisions did not quell petitioner’s concerns pertaining to the pro. per. coordinator’s role in the disposition of investigative and ancillary defense services requests and the review of subpoenas. Considering the nature of those duties delegated to the pro. per. coordinator, as provided in respondent’s revised policies and procedures, the Court of Appeal concluded respondent impermissibly delegated its judicial powers in contravention of the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal thus issued a writ of mandate directing the respondent-trial-court to cease and desist from applying and implementing the pertinent portions of its revised pro. per. policies and procedures, and directed the trial court to revise those policies and procedures in a manner consistent with the Court of Appeal's opinion in this case. View "Smith v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Raymundo M. was charged in juvenile court with assault with a deadly weapon, making a criminal threat, and brandishing a weapon after he raised a switchblade-like knife head-high and chased another minor while orally threatening him. The juvenile court found the charges and certain of the enhancement allegations true, declared Raymundo a ward of the court, and placed him with his mother under the supervision of the probation department. On appeal, Raymundo contended: (1) insufficient evidence supported the true finding on the assault count because he never got within striking distance of the victim or made stabbing or slashing motions with the knife; (2) the juvenile court failed to expressly declare whether it was treating the "wobbler" assault count as a felony or a misdemeanor, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702; and (3) the court erred by imposing duplicative punishment on the criminal-threat and assault counts, in violation of Penal Code section 654. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Raymundo M." on Justia Law

Appellant-defendant Joanna Gomez appealed an order summarily denying her petition to vacate her 2009 murder conviction and to be resentenced on any remaining counts under Penal Code section 1170.95. She argued: (1) the summary denial of her petition was error because she made the required prima facie showing that she was entitled to relief under section 1170.95; and (2) the court violated state law and her constitutional right to due process by summarily denying her petition in her absence and without giving her the opportunity to file a reply to the prosecution's response to her petition. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gomez" on Justia Law

After police found thousands of photographs and videos containing child pornography, defendant Joseph Hishmeh was eventually charged in an information with two counts of using his finger to sexually penetrate the victim (a female child between two and three years of age at the time the crimes were committed)(counts 1 and 2), and five counts of touching her in a lewd or lascivious way while photographing and/or videotaping her (counts 3 through 7). After being instructed with CALCRIM No. 3517, the jury asked the trial court how to address lesser included offenses. In its response, the court twice instructed the jury that unless it found the defendant not guilty of the charged crimes, it could not consider the lesser included offenses. By doing so, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred. Under the circumstances of this case, the error was prejudicial, and convictions were reversed for the charged crimes in counts 1 and 2 of the information. View "California v. Hishmeh" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured while performing work in the Adult Offender Work Program (AOWP), he filed suit against the county for its failure to accommodate his preexisting physical disability and failure to engage in the interactive process under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county. The court held that an individual sentenced to perform work activities in lieu of incarceration in the absence of any financial remuneration, is precluded, as a matter of law, from being an "employee" within the meaning of the FEHA. The court explained that, while remuneration alone is not a sufficient condition to establish an individual is an employee under the statute, it is an essential one. Because plaintiff earned no sufficient financial remuneration as a result of participation in the AOWP, he could not be deemed an employee under the FEHA. The court did not reach plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Talley v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

In May 2020, the chairs of the California Assembly and Senate committees that consider election-related matters prepared a formal letter to Governor Gavin Newsom indicating they were working on legislation to ensure Californians could vote by mail in light of the emergency occasioned by COVID-19. The Governor issued Executive Order No. N-64-20 on May 8, 2020, which required all voters to be provided vote-by-mail ballots. That order affirmed, however, that the administration continued to work “in partnership with the Secretary of State and the Legislature on requirements for in-person voting opportunities and how other details of the November election will be implemented” and “[n]othing in this Order is intended, or shall be construed, to limit the enactment of legislation on that subject.” The order was signed on June 3, 2020. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review concerned an order of the Sutter County Superior Court, entered on June 12, 2020, granting a temporary restraining order against the Executive Order, finding it constituted “an impermissible use of legislative powers in violation of the California Constitution and the laws of the State of California.” The Court of Appeal determined there was no basis for the superior court to grant real parties in interest relief using ex parte procedures prescribed by California law. "The hearing on the ex parte application, conducted only one day after the underlying action was filed in superior court, was held without proper notice to the Governor or his appearance. Apart from these procedural deficiencies, real parties in interest also failed to make the requisite substantive showing for use of an ex parte proceeding. In short, the real parties in interest failed to present competent evidence establishing imminent harm from the Governor’s executive order requiring immediate action." View "Newsome v. Superior Court (Gallagher)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City of Santa Monica's system of at-large voting to elect its City Council discriminated against Latinos. The trial court agreed and ordered the City to switch to district-based voting.The Court of Appeal reversed and entered judgment for the City, holding that the City violated neither the California Voting Rights Act nor the Constitution. In this case, the City correctly notes that plaintiff offered no valid proof of dilution in order to prove that the City's at-large method impaired Latinos' ability to elect candidates of their choice or to influence the outcome of an election as a result of the dilution of Latino voting rights. Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to prove that the City adopted or maintained its system for the purpose of discriminating against minorities. View "Pico Neighborhood Assoc. v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law