Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Stanley was charged with sexual intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger with enhancements for prior serious felony convictions. Following an August 2019 mistrial, the court set a new trial for April 2020. Stanley waived his statutory right to a speedy trial until that date. On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19 outbreak,. On March 16, the Contra Costa County Health Officer issued a “shelter in place” order. Days later, the Governor ordered all Californians to stay at home except for limited activities. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency order suspending all jury trials and extending by 60 days the Penal Code 1382 time period for holding a criminal trial, stating that courts cannot comply with health restrictions and that potential jurors would be unavailable.On May 4, Stanley filed an unsuccessful "speedy trial" motion to dismiss. The court determined there was good cause under Penal Code 1382(a) to extend the trial date and set a jury trial for July 13, 2020, and stated the last day for the start of trial under Penal Code 1382 is July 29, 2020. The court of appeal affirmed. While it is unlikely that the orders are unlawful, the court did not address that issue. The severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact it has had within the state independently support the trial court’s finding of good cause. View "Stanley v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Hung Tran was convicted by jury of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (count 1) and mayhem (count 2). With regard to count 1, the jury found true Tran personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. Tran was sentenced to prison for four years; the court struck the great bodily injury allegation and stayed the sentence under count 2. Tran appealed, contending the court erroneously admitted into evidence "doctored" videos used by the prosecution's expert witness during his testimony; substantial evidence did not support his conviction under counts 1 and 2; the court erroneously admitted lay opinion testimony from a prosecution witness; and Tran's trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective. After review, the Court of Appeal determined that none of Tran's claims had merit and affirmed. View "California v. Tran" on Justia Law

In 1993, Richard Lucio DeHoyos was convicted by jury of kidnapping, raping and murdering a nine year old girl, for which he was sentenced to death. In April 2018, DeHoyos petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate after the trial court denied his motion for an order permitting his federal habeas counsel to contact jurors who had served on his trial jury. The Court summarily denied his petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ directing the trial court to either vacate its order and issue a new order granting relief with respect to three jurors DeHoyos identified as having previously discussed the case with his investigators, or to show cause before this court. In its order, the Supreme Court cited Townsel v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1084 (1999). The trial court refused to vacate its order denying the motion. Having considered the arguments made by the Attorney General in support of the court’s refusal, the Court of Appeal granted the petition and issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate its order and to schedule a hearing to establish a reasonable procedure to facilitate contact with the three jurors to ascertain their current willingness to speak with DeHoyos’s counsel. As explained in Townsel, if any of those jurors consent to speak with counsel, the trial court may not prohibit it. If any juror declines contact, the issue with respect to that juror will be resolved. View "DeHoyos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Artemis Whalum, then serving a prison sentence for possessing cannabis in a correctional institution in violation of Penal Code section 4573.8, appealed the denial of his petition to dismiss and recall his sentence. Whalum based his petition on the fact that, after his conviction, California voters adopted Proposition 64, making it legal for persons at least 21 years of age to possess up to 28.5 grams of cannabis except in specifically identified circumstances, and giving persons currently serving a sentence for a cannabis-related crime that was no longer an offense after Proposition 64, the ability to petition for relief in the form of recall or dismissal of their sentence. The Court of Appeal found the crime of possessing unauthorized cannabis in prison in violation of Penal Code section 4573.8 was not affected by Proposition 64. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Whalum was not entitled to relief. View "California v. Whalum" on Justia Law

Appellant Gerry Johns claimed to be an offender previously convicted under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine eligible to have his murder conviction vacated if he couldn’t be convicted of murder under the new Penal Code sections 188 and 189. Johns petitioned to have his murder conviction vacated under the petitioning procedure established under Penal Code section 1170.95. The San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office opposed the petition and moved to strike it, arguing S.B. 1437 was invalid as an unauthorized amendment of two voter-approved ballot initiatives, Proposition 7 and Proposition 115. The trial court agreed, found S.B. 1437 unconstitutionally infringed on the prerogatives of the voters, and struck Johns’ petition. Johns appealed, seeking reversal and remand for the trial court to review his petition on the merits. The Court of Appeal agreed with Johns that S.B. 1437 was constitutional, and he was entitled to have the trial court consider his petition. Proposition 7 addressed the punishment appropriate for murder, not the elements of the offense, and Proposition 115 added predicates for applying the felony-murder rule, which S.B. 1437 left intact. The Court also concluded retroactive application of S.B. 1437 through the petitioning process did not violate the separation of powers doctrine or the Victims’ Bill of Rights of 2008 (Marsy’s Law), as the district attorney argued. View "California v. Johns" on Justia Law

In 1998, Haden pleaded no contest to infliction of corporal injury on a spouse and admitted a special allegation of personal use of a deadly weapon The trial court found true special allegations under the Three Strikes Law and sentenced him to 25 years to life. Haden had two robbery convictions in North Dakota The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the convictions could constitute strikes although the elements of robbery under North Dakota law differed from those under California law. Haden unsuccessfully sought habeas relief several times.In 2015, Haden filed another habeas petition, arguing that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 “Descamps” decision, the court made improper factual findings when treating the North Dakota convictions as strikes. In 2016, the California Supreme Court denied his petition “without prejudice to any relief … after this court decides” Gallardo. The 2017 Gallardo decision rejected the court's own 2006 “McGee” decision and held that a trial court considering whether to impose a sentence enhancement based on a defendant’s prior conviction may not make factual findings concerning the defendant’s conduct to impose the enhancement. In 2018, Haden filed another habeas petition, arguing the imposition of the North Dakota robberies as strikes contravened Gallardo because the court examined the record to determine the factual nature of those convictions. The court of appeal denied relief. Gallardo does not apply retroactively to Haden’s conviction. View "In re Haden," on Justia Law

Michael Bettasso was convicted by jury of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol causing injury, hit and run driving causing death, driving with a suspended license, and second degree implied malice murder. The jury also found true a great bodily injury enhancement associated with the DUI count. Bettasso was sentenced to a total term of 19 years to life. On appeal, Bettasso challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the second degree murder conviction and also contended the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the injury on vehicular manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that vehicular manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of murder. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected Bettasso’s substantial evidence challenge, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Bettasso" on Justia Law

In 1984, petitioner Lionel Scott pleaded guilty to third degree assault in Minnesota and admitted during his plea colloquy that he personally and intentionally pressed a warm or hot iron against his victim's face, inflicting a discernible burn mark that required medical treatment and was still somewhat visible four months later. In 1999, Scott was convicted in California of several sex offenses. The sentencing court imposed a Three Strikes law sentence of 75 years to life based, in part, on the court's finding that Scott's earlier Minnesota conviction constituted a "serious felony" (and therefore a "strike") because Scott "personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon" (the iron) in the commission of the offense. In making this finding, the trial court relied solely on the elements of the Minnesota offense and the plea colloquy establishing the factual basis for Scott's guilty plea. In 2019, Scott petitioned for habeas relief, arguing he was entitled to relief under California v. Gallardo, 4 Cal.5th 120 (2017), which held that a sentencing "court considering whether to impose an increased sentence based on a prior qualifying conviction may not"—consistent with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—"make disputed findings about 'what a trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant's underlying conduct.' " The California Supreme Court issued an order to show cause directing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to show why Scott was not entitled to relief pursuant to Gallardo, and why Gallardo should not have applied retroactively on habeas corpus to final judgments of conviction." Persuaded by In re Milton, 42 Cal.App.5th 977 (2019), the Court of Appeal concluded Gallardo did not apply retroactively. Nonetheless, the Court would have concluded Scott was not entitled to relief under Gallardo because the sentencing court based its findings regarding Scott's Minnesota conviction on undisputed facts "admitted by [Scott] in entering [his] guilty plea," a practice expressly permitted by Gallardo. Accordingly, Scott's petition was denied. View "In re Scott" on Justia Law

A plaintiff can sue police in civil court for excessive force after he has been convicted in criminal court. In this case, plaintiff pleaded no contest to disturbing the peace after interacting with an officer at an airport parking lot. Plaintiff then filed a civil complaint for excessive force against the officer, the City of Los Angeles, and Los Angeles World Police Department. The Court of Appeal held that the past conviction did not establish that the officer used only reasonable force and thus the first criminal conviction is consistent with the second civil case. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and awarded costs to plaintiff. View "Kon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A man parked his car in San Francisco's Sutter-Stockton Garage, leaving his dog in the car. When he returned, he saw his dog had been brutally killed. A security guard viewed video clips from the incident and recognized Best, who was charged with second-degree burglary of a vehicle; killing, maiming, or abusing an animal; and vandalism of the vehicle, plus four misdemeanors. The trial court declared a doubt about Best’s competency; Best apparently refused to face the judge in order to avoid having her image recorded. Experts evaluated Best; the court found Best mentally competent to stand trial.The matter was continued for a Faretta hearing. A different judge confirmed that Best had read and initialed each portion of an “Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel” and inquired into Best’s education and awareness of the charges. The court engaged in extensive questioning. Some of Best’s responses betrayed a lack of understanding of legal concepts and procedures. When the court asked Best about possible defenses, her discussion verged on incoherence. Best gave clear, accurate answers to simpler questions. The court denied her motion. Best was convicted.The court of appeal reversed; the trial court erred in denying Best the right to represent herself on the grounds she had not knowingly and voluntarily made that choice. The court rejected arguments that the Faretta motion was untimely and that Best was disruptive and disobedient and noted that the transcript does not show Best was advised of the maximum punishment she faced. View "People v. Best" on Justia Law