Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal challenges the legality of lease-leaseback agreements used by school districts for construction and modernization projects. The trial court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's remaining conflict of interest claims because the challenged projects had all been completed, which it held rendered the reverse validation action moot.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal, holding that allowing plaintiff's claims to proceed long after the projects have been finished would undermine the strong policy of promptly resolving the validity of public agency actions. In this case, the lease-leaseback agreements were subject to validation, and plaintiff's conflict of interest claims necessarily challenge the validity of the agreements, regardless of label or remedy. Because the projects were completed, plaintiff's claims are moot. View "McGee v. Torrance Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal summed up the issue before it on appeal in this matter: a fight between the tax entities who negotiated favorable passthrough agreements before their redevelopment agencies were dissolved, and those who did not, for their pro rata share of the residual pool of money in the redevelopment property tax fund left for distribution after the successor agencies first paid the passthrough agreements in full, enforceable obligations, and administrative costs. Seven cities filed a petition for mandamus and declaratory relief against Tracy Sandoval, the auditor-controller for the County of San Diego (Auditor) challenging the methodology the Auditor used to distribute the residual pool of former tax increment, a method that favored San Diego County and, at least, three community college districts, all of whom had passthrough agreements with their former redevelopment agencies. The trial court agreed with Cities and granted their petition. Auditor appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded there was no plain meaning to be attributed to the applicable statutory language. The Court felt compelled nonetheless to construe the "mangled" statutes as it found them, and offered direction to auditor-controllers throughout California. The Court accepted nearly all of Cities’ contentions, including their premise that the fundamental purpose of Health & Safety Code section 34188, was to include passthrough payments as part of a taxing entity’s Assembly Bill No. 8 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) pro rata share and thereby equalize the tax distributions to those taxing entities with favorable passthrough agreements and those without. The Court reversed the trial court's decision to grant the Cities' petition for a writ of mandate. "Without deciding on the constitutionality of Cities’ interpretation of the statutes, we can say their interpretation raises substantial doubt as to the constitutionality of Cities’ methodology, adding support to our conclusion the trial court erred and Auditor’s methodology must prevail." View "City of Chula Vista v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Defendant Manuel De Jesus Prado filed a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition, stating that he was convicted of murder and was entitled to a dismissal because of the Legislature’s amendments to Penal Code sections 188 and 189. The court denied defendant’s petition, finding the Legislature violated the constitutional limitation on amending or repealing initiative statutes when it passed Senate Bill 1437. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding "Sections 188 and 189 were enacted by the Legislature; ergo, sections 188 and 189 are legislative statutes. The Legislature did not violate the constitutional limitation on amending initiative statutes when it passed Senate Bill 1437 and amended sections 188 and 189 because they are not initiative statutes." Section 1170.95 was a new statute that established a procedure for eligible defendants convicted of murder to petition for relief. The Court determined the Legislature did not violate the constitutional limitation on amending or repealing an initiative statute when it passed Senate Bill 1437 and enacted section 1170.95 because it was itself a legislative statute that neither amended nor repealed any other statute. View "California v. Prado" on Justia Law

A jury found petitioner Tom Smith guilty of first degree murder, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, dependent adult abuse, conspiracy to commit murder, custodial possession of a weapon, custodial manufacture of a weapon, and misdemeanor damage to prison property, along with various enhancements, arising from an attack on a fellow inmate at Patton State Hospital. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 168 years to life. He appealed, raising, among other issues, the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel based on defense counsel’s closing argument, in which he conceded petitioner’s guilt of the crime but asked the jury to find him guilty of second degree murder, rather than first degree. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner did not seek review by the California Supreme Court. However, he did file multiple petitions seeking to collaterally attack the judgment. One such attack, filing a habeas petition in light of the federal Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___ (2018). When that petition was denied, he raised the same issue to the Court of Appeal, which denied the petition. Petitioner then pursued the issue with the California Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause to the Court of Appeal as to why petitioner was not entitled to relief based on McCoy, and why McCoy should not have applied retroactively to final judgments on habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal disagreed McCoy applied to this case; according to petitioner, his trial testimony demonstrated his intent to assert his innocence of the murder, as did his statements made in open court after counsel’s closing argument. The Court found the record did not show petitioner made an express and unambiguous intent to maintain factual innocence at that time. Thereafter, defense counsel made his closing argument, conceding petitioner’s involvement in the murder, at which point petitioner objected. "While petitioner did object during closing argument, it was after the concession had been made, so it cannot be said that at the time counsel made the concession, it was over petitioner’s intransigent and unambiguous objection." View "In re Smith" on Justia Law

Joshua Palmer was convicted by jury of first degree murder. The jury found true Palmer committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of rape, sodomy, and sexual penetration by force, fear or threat. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Palmer contended he was entitled to a new trial under McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018), which prohibited counsel from conceding guilt when a defendant insisted on maintaining innocence. He also claimed he was entitled to an additional 10 days of custody credit. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Palmer's contention he was entitled to relief under "McCoy." The State conceded, however, Palmer was entitled to ten days of custody credit. Except for instructing the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to capture the additional 10 days of custody credit, the Court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Palmer" on Justia Law

The Contra Costa County Public Guardian was appointed as the conservator of J.Y.’s person in 2004. The conservatorship was continued 12 times. The guardian filed a petition for reappointment in November 2018. J.Y. objected, requested a jury trial, and objected to the guardian calling her as a witness at trial, arguing that such compelled testimony would violate her due process and equal protection rights. The court overruled that objection. A jury trial was held and J.Y. testified. A psychiatrist testified that J.Y. suffered from schizophrenia; a licensed psychologist testified that J.Y was gravely disabled. The court reappointed the guardian as the conservator of her person and imposed special disabilities depriving J.Y. of the rights to refuse treatment, enter into contracts, and possess or own firearms. The court also designated her current placement in a skilled nursing facility, where she had lived for 10 years, as the least restrictive alternative placement.The court of appeal dismissed an appeal as moot because the one-year conservatorship has terminated but agreed that conservatees are similarly situated to persons found not guilty by reason of insanity in proceedings to extend their civil commitment. Considering the serious liberty interests at stake in involuntary civil commitments, the guardian did not offer a compelling reason why conservatees’ procedural protections should not include the right against compelled testimony. View "Conservatorship of J.Y." on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Valles got into a fight with the victim Michael Carmona, after Carmona pushed defendant’s girlfriend down at a river-side homeless camp. Defendant had to break off the fight when he felt a seizure beginning and left the camp. In the meantime, his tent-mate and one-time codefendant, Jesus Renteria, attacked the victim with a knife, inflicting multiple serious wounds. When defendant returned to the camp, he saw a piece of carpet covering the victim where he lay on the ground. Defendant obtained a firearm from his tent and shot the victim in the head, claiming he did so to put the victim out of his misery, although he thought the victim was dead. After a trial, the jury returned verdicts convicting defendant of first-degree murder and finding that in the commission of the murder defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the death of the victim. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 50 years to life and appealed arguing: (1) his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a theory of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; (2) the court erred in imposing the minimum restitution fine and other fees and assessments without determining if defendant had an ability to pay; and (3) the term imposed for the gun discharge enhancement must be remanded to allow the court to exercise discretion to consider a lesser included enhancement. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Valles" on Justia Law

Defendant Sung Jue Seo was convicted by jury of misdemeanor carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, and felony possessing counterfeiting equipment. Imposition of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on formal probation for three years with the term, among others, that he serve 240 days in county jail. Defendant appealed the possession charge, arguing the basis for the charge was the possession of “ordinary office supplies,” he contends the jury should have been instructed that the offense required possession of counterfeiting materials with a “fraudulent intent” rather than a “criminal intent.” He claimed the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on the mens rea element of the offense was prejudicial error. In the alternative, he argued that if the jury was correctly instructed, the offense required proof of “criminal intent” then the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court's instruction was based on language used in a 154-year old California Supreme Court case, California v. White, 34 Cal. 183 (1867). "Thus, we cannot say the instruction was legally erroneous, but it surely lacked clarity." The Court published its decision in this case to offer a suggestion on how a jury should have been instructed on the elements of a Penal Code section 480(a) offense. Though offering a clearer jury instruction, the Court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court's instruction constituted prejudicial error. "If the lack of clarity constituted error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court similarly rejected defendant's assertion that section 480(a) was unconstitutionally vague. View "California v. Seo" on Justia Law

Defendant Benjamin Prowell’s was convicted for misdemeanor making harassing electronic communications. The the trial court placed him on three years’ probation with conditions prohibiting him from using or accessing social media websites and allowing warrantless searches of his communication devices. The trial court also imposed a variety of other probation conditions under Penal Code section 1203.097, conditions mandated for crimes of domestic violence. On appeal, defendant contended the social media probation conditions were overbroad, and that there was no substantial evidence he and the victim were in a dating relationship to support domestic violence conditions. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal struck the communication device search condition and remanded for the trial court to consider whether the condition could be narrowed. Otherwise, the Court affirmed judgment. View "California v. Prowell" on Justia Law

Victor Sanchez was charged with first degree murder, but pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. He filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 to vacate that conviction. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Sanchez was ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder. After review, the Court of Appeal joined other courts that held section 1170.95 did not apply to defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Court also rejected Sanchez’s argument that section 1170.95 violated equal protection. View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law