Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, appellant Terrell Law and his codefendant Brett May committed a home invasion robbery, during which one of them shot and killed one of the residents. They were tried jointly in 2006 before two separately empaneled juries who found them both guilty of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance described in Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17(A) and (d). Though Law's jury found he was not the shooter, they nonetheless concluded he was a "major participant" in the underlying robbery and acted "with reckless indifference to human life." In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of felony murder in Penal Code section 189. The legislation also added Penal Code section 1170.95, which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment that could not be sustained under the new definition of felony murder. Law challenged the trial court’s summary denial of his section 1170.95 petition to vacate his murder conviction, arguing the trial court erred by reviewing his record of conviction and determining the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance rendered him ineligible for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded it was proper for a trial court to review the record of conviction when determining whether a section 1170.95 petitioner had stated a prima facie claim for relief. Additionally, the Court concluded Law "undoubtedly qualifies" as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, a conclusion that rendered him ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. The Court therefore affirmed the order denying his petition. View "California v. Law" on Justia Law

In May 2019, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) recommended that defendant-appellant Tony Torres, be granted a “compassionate release” and his sentenced recalled under Penal Code1 section 1170(e) on the grounds he had less than six months to live and no longer posed a danger to society. Based on the Board’s recommendation, defendant filed a motion for compassionate release, which the trial court denied in July 2019. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court abused its discretion because the trial court found he had satisfied the requirements of section 1170(e), yet denied his motion because he “did not deserve compassionate release” due to his past and lack of remorse for his offense. Because it was undisputed defendant satisfied section 1170(e)’s requirements and the trial court denied his motion for improper reasons, the Court of Appeal reversed. View "California v. Torres" on Justia Law

Jonathan Hampton was convicted by jury of second degree murder for shooting and killing Jonathan Giurbino. After an initial round of state and federal habeas corpus litigation resulted in denial of his petitions, Hampton initiated a second round of state habeas corpus litigation in 2014. Hampton asserted for the first time: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his federal constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, with CALCRIM No. 570 on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; (2) his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to request such an instruction; and (3) his appellate counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to assert this instructional error claim in his direct appeal. According to Hampton, he was unaware of his entitlement to a heat of passion instruction until July 2014, when another inmate handed him a copy of the First Appellate District’s decision in California v. Thomas, 218 Cal.App.4th 630 (2013), holding on facts similar to the facts of this case that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for a heat of passion instruction amounted to federal constitutional error and required reversal. The trial court granted the petition, concluding the original trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 570, and further concluding the "Thomas" decision amounted to a change in the law entitling Hampton to raise the instructional error claim in his habeas corpus petition despite having failed to do so on appeal. The State appealed; the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial court erred in determining there was an intervening change of law. The matter was remanded to the trial court for a determination regarding his remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). On remand, the trial court denied the habeas corpus petition as untimely. In this habeas petition (filed 2018), Hampton reasserted his IAC claims. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order denying the petition and to issue an order to show cause as to why Hampton was not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC). Having done so, and having reviewed the return to the order to show cause, as well as Hampton’s traverse thereto, the Court of Appeal granted the petition, vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded the matter to the Sacramento County Superior Court for further proceedings. View "In re Hampton" on Justia Law

Where, as here, there is a dispute over what facts the previously suing parties knew at the time they brought suit, a trial court faced with an anti-SLAPP motion by those parties must decide whether the malicious prosecution plaintiff has shown that her allegation that those parties lacked probable cause has "minimal merit." The Court of Appeal held that a trial court should do so by (1) resolving all factual disputes regarding what the previously suing parties knew by accepting the plaintiff's evidence as true and (2) through that lens, evaluating whether the prior claim(s) were legally and factually tenable.In this case, the court held that plaintiff has proven that her malicious prosecution claim has minimal merit and that the trial court acted properly in denying the anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss that claim. Plaintiff alleged that defendants filed a 2016 suit against her to, among other things, exact vengeance on her for filing for divorce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motions. View "Gruber v. Gruber" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' complaint against defendant under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.The Court of Appeal held that the Anti-SLAPP statute applies to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims brought in state court. Therefore, the trial court correctly applied the anti-SLAPP statute to plaintiff's section 1983 claims. Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court held that all claims against defendant arose from protected conduct. Under the second prong, the court held that the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of success on their claims against defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Patel v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Emergency Rule 4 established a statewide Emergency Bail Schedule, adopted by the Judicial Council of California in response to the ongoing emergency situation caused by the SARS-Co-Vid-2 pandemic. The Emergency Bail Schedule set bail for all misdemeanor offenses, felony offenses, and violations of postconviction supervision at zero dollars (zero bail), except as specified in the rule. Among other things, the San Diego County Superior Court implemented an order establishing a procedure for handling persons arrested prior to implementation of the Emergency Bail Schedule. These persons were to be released on zero bail, unless the prosecuting agency notified the custodial officer that the agency would be requesting an increase in bail, a " 'no bail' " hold, or the imposition of conditions of release. The order specified that the Emergency Bail Schedule should be implemented in the same manner as the regularly adopted San Diego County bail schedule and asserted that each court "retains the traditional authority in an individual case to depart from the bail schedule or impose conditions of bail to assure the appearance of the defendant or protect public safety." Petitioners challenged the superior court's implementation order as inconsistent with Emergency Rule 4. They contended that bail for offenses and violations covered by the rule should have been set at zero dollars, and the superior court had no authority to increase bail or impose conditions in an individual case. They also contended the implementation order, including the remote hearings contemplated therein, violated various constitutional protections. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the implementation order was not inconsistent with Emergency Rule 4. Furthermore, the Court concluded petitioners did not show the implementation order or its procedures violated any guarantees of the federal or state constitutions. The Court therefore denied the petitions. View "Ayala v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Angel Ashbey briefly lived with two others in a secluded house in a forested area. Ashbey struck one of her roommates in the head with a pipe until he lost consciousness, poured gasoline over him, and threw several lit matches in his direction; none caught fire. After her roommate managed to escape, she set several fires in the house and four more on the forested land around the house. A jury convicted Ashbey of attempted voluntary manslaughter, arson of a structure, and four arsons of forest land. The jury also found true several enhancements relating to these offenses. The trial court sentenced Ashbey to a total of 19 years in prison. On appeal, Ashbey raised seven issues on appeal. Principal among them, as discussed in the published portion of the Court of Appeal's opinion were: (1) she should have been convicted of only one arson of forest land, not four, because she set the several fires on only one parcel of land; (2) even if her four arson convictions were proper, she should have received concurrent, not consecutive, sentences for the four arsons of forest land; (3) the court wrongly instructed the jury about attempted voluntary manslaughter and the right to self-defense; (4) the court wrongly modified one of the jury’s verdict forms; and (5) the abstract of judgment mistakenly referred to each of the four arsons of forest land as an arson of a structure. The Court agreed the abstract of judgment should have been modified for the reasons Ashbey alleged. In all other respects, the Court affirmed judgment. View "California v. Ashbey" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Reyes, Jr., an active Norteno gang member (from the Broderick Boys subset), confronted a former Norteno gang member (from the Franklin Boys subset), "S.," about a physical altercation that occurred between S. and Reyes’s stepfather over a debt. That earlier altercation had taken place in front of Reyes’s autistic younger brother. Reyes pulled out a handgun and asked S. if he had a problem. S., who was riding his bicycle with his wife, "R.," when Reyes confronted him with the gun, stopped briefly, told Reyes to put the gun down if he wanted to fight, and then started to ride away. This angered Reyes, prompting him to fire six rounds at S. from behind. S. Was hit but survived. R. Was a short distance in front of S., but was not hit. Defendants Liberty Landowski and Lisa Humble were with Reyes at the time of the shooting and aided in his efforts to avoid being apprehended by law enforcement authorities. Reyes, Landowski, and Humble were tried together before the same jury. Reyes was convicted of one count of attempted murder (Count 1), two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Counts 2 and 4), one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5), and one count of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon (Count 6). In addition to various firearm and other enhancements, the jury found Reyes committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. The jury convicted Landowski and Humble of being accessories to Reyes’s criminal conduct (Count 9) and also found true gang enhancement allegations attached to that crime. Reyes challenged the sufficiency of the firearm evidence presented to support his conviction, and all defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their gang enhancements. The Court of Appeal determined Senate Bill 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) gave the trial court discretion to strike firearm enhancements in the interest of justice and applied retroactively; and Senate Bill 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) eliminated such enhancements, and also applied retroactively. To these issues, the Court remanded for the trial court's consideration. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "California v. Landowski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against The Regents for gender discrimination based on a series of events that took place while she was a Professor of Medicine at UCLA. The jury found in favor of plaintiff, awarding her economic and noneconomic damages.The Court of Appeal reversed and held that the trial court committed a series of grave errors that significantly prejudiced The Regents' right to a fair trial by an impartial judge. In this case, the trial court delivered a presentation to the jury highlighting major figures in the civil rights movement, and told the jury their duty was to stand in the shoes of Dr. Martin Luther King and bend the arc of the moral universe toward justice; the trial court allowed the jury to hear about and view a long list of discrimination complaints from across the entire University of California system that were not properly connected to plaintiff's circumstances or her theory of the case; the trial court allowed the jury to learn of the contents and conclusions of the Moreno Report, which documented racial discrimination occurring throughout the entire UCLA campus; and the trial court allowed plaintiff to resurrect a retaliation claim after the close of evidence despite having summarily adjudicated that very claim prior to trial. The court held that these errors were cumulative and highly prejudicial, and were evidence of the trial court's inability to remain impartial, creating the impression that the trial court was partial to plaintiff's claims. View "Pinter-Brown v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Defendant Raymond May was found guilty by jury of possessing an assault weapon and a machine gun based on his possession of a single AK-47 assault rifle while guarding a marijuana plantation. He was sentenced to probation, which included an electronic search condition. On appeal, defendant argued there was a lack of sufficient evidence corroborating his accomplice’s testimony and demonstrating he knew of the firearm’s illegal character. He further alleged the trial court erred in instructing the jury: that the accomplice instruction should have included language specifying that the accomplice testimony needed to prove more than defendant’s mere presence or access to the firearm. Furthermore, defendant argued the electronic search condition imposed as part of his probation failed under the standards announced in California v. Lent, 15 Cal.3d 481 (1975). The Court of Appeal agreed defendant’s electronic search condition should have been stricken, but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. May" on Justia Law