Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, defendant-appellant Rudy Perez pled guilty to active gang participation under Penal Code section 186.22(a), and unlawful possession of a firearm under section 12025(b)(6). In 2010, defendant pled guilty to residential burglary under section 459, and active gang participation under section 186.22(a). In August of 2018, the State filed a new felony complaint, alleging one of the prior gang participation convictions as a strike prior. In 2018, defendant moved to vacate the two prior gang participation convictions based upon changes in the law that rendered them invalid. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. In 2019, defendant asked for reconsideration, which was again denied. Thereafter, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate the convictions. The Court of Appeal found that defendant pled guilty to street terrorism under Penal Code section 186.22(a) in 2009 and 2010, and it was undisputed that while committing these offenses, defendant acted alone. However, subsequent to defendant’s guilty pleas, in 2012, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant had to act in concert with a fellow gang member in order to be guilty of street terrorism. At that time, defendant could have filed a state habeas petition requesting relief, but failed to do so. "Defendants can lose remedies that are established by law when they fail to invoke such remedies in time." Section 1473.7 became effective in 2017. In defendant’s motion filed in the trial court, defendant failed to state what new evidence was discovered, instead arguing that the trial court was allowed “to vacate a conviction where the defendant is innocent as a matter of law or where vacating the conviction is in the interest of justice, even though the defendant is no longer in custody or otherwise restrained by the conviction.” The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's reason to deny relief, determining that "while the outcome in this case may be unfortunate for defendant, we are not here to rewrite legislation. The Legislature could amend section 1473.7 to address issues raised in this case. However, under the laws, as written, we must uphold the trial court’s order." View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

After a court trial, defendant Jason Broadbent was convicted of five counts of selling an assault weapon (counts 1, 5, 15-17), six counts of selling a large-capacity magazine (counts 2, 6, 13, 18-20), nine counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (counts 3, 7, 11-12, 23- 27), three counts of selling heroin (counts 4, 8, 28), four counts of unlicensed sale of a firearm (counts 9- 10, 21-22), and one count of selling methamphetamine (count 14). The court also found true that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction and three prior prison terms. After denying defendant’s "Romero" motion, the court sentenced defendant to a total term of 53 years eight months in prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) his 2001 conviction could not be used as a prior strike or to enhance his sentence under Penal Code section 667.5(b); (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion to strike his prior strike conviction; (3) all of his sentences for selling a large-capacity magazine and all but one of his sentences for possession of a firearm should have been stayed pursuant to section Penal Code 654; and (4) the court imposed unlawful terms for counts 9, 10, 14, 21, and 22. In supplemental briefing, defendant argued: (1) his convictions for selling large-capacity magazines under section 32310 must be reversed because the statute violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) his prior prison term enhancements should have been stricken based on recent amendments to section 667.5; and (3) he was entitled to a hearing on his present ability to pay various fines and fees pursuant to California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court miscalculated the sentence it imposed with respect to counts 9, 10, 14, 21, and 22; defendant’s sentences on counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 11-13, and 18-20, and all but one of his sentences on counts 23-27 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654; and defendant's prior prison terms enhancements had to be stricken. The case was remanded for resentencing, but affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Broadbent" on Justia Law

In 1993, Shelton was sentenced to a prison term of 19 years to life after pleading no contest to the second-degree murder of his mother-in-law and assault with a firearm on her sister-in-law. Shelton had no prior criminal history. Parole hearings in 2016 and 2018, were his fifth and sixth. Shelton’s “Comprehensive Risk Assessment,” from 2016, concluded he presented a low risk of violence. The psychologist who evaluated Shelton noted “confusion and memory loss secondary to multiple traumatic brain injuries” Shelton had suffered in the military. Shelton, 64 years old in 2019, was permanently mobility impaired and blind/vision impaired. Shelton filed a habeas corpus petition. TIn November 2019, Shelton was again denied parole.The court of appeal ordered a new hearing for consideration of all of the relevant factors. The record suggests Shelton’s cognitive condition will never allow him to demonstrate the kind of insight into his crimes that the panels have been demanding. According to the doctor, Shelton’s neurocognitive disorder was a significant contributing factor in his commission of the offense and “it is unlikely that his disorder will ever allow him to give a coherent narrative about his motivations at the time of the crime.” That lack of insight had not led to violent outcomes in prison. The panel also failed to adequately consider Shelton’s elderly status and the magnitude of his disabilities. View "In re Shelton" on Justia Law

After being convicted of three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, three counts of second degree robbery, three counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and a couple of gang-related offenses, with various enhancements attached to each, the trial court sentenced defendant Corbin Dennis to a total of 23 years 8 months, plus 45 years to life in state prison.The attempted premeditated murder convictions were based on a theory that defendant aided and abetted the actual shooter’s attempted premeditated murders by committing the target crime of unlawfully challenging another person in a public place to fight, the natural and probable consequence of which was attempted murder (not attempted premeditated murder). On appeal defendant contended he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of California Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), which he claimed required reduction of the attempted murder convictions to misdemeanors for disturbing the peace and resentencing to give him credit for time served. He also argued there was insufficient evidence to support his attempted murder convictions. Alternatively, defendant contended the special finding under Penal Code section 664(a), that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, should have been stricken, because the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that in order to make the special finding of premeditation based on a natural and probable consequences theory, it was required to find attempted premeditated murder was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. The Court of Appeal concluded Senate Bill 1437 was not a bar to defendant's convictions for attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences theory. Furthermore, the Court found the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support the attempted murder convictions and the jury instruction concerning the target offense. The Court found merit in defendant's claim of instructional error regarding attempted premeditated murder on a natural and probable consequences theory: the trial court’s instruction constituted a Sixth Amendment violation because it allowed the jury to find the attempted murders were premeditated without requiring the jury to find that attempted premeditated murder was the natural and probable consequence of the target offense. View "California v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Defendant Arnell Williams appealed after a trial court denied his motion to dismiss a petition for revocation filed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Defendant contended the court erred when it confirmed the prerelease determination of CDCR that he was a "high-risk sex offender" requiring him to be supervised by parole under Penal Code section 3000.08(a)(4), and not be placed in postrelease community supervision (PRCS) under section 3450 et seq. After review, the Court of Appeal independently concluded defendant was subject to parole supervision as a result of his 1984 convictions for forcible rape, rape in concert, and robbery, which qualified as serious and/or violent felonies within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) and (2) of section 3000.08, respectively. As such, the Court deemed it unnecessary to determine whether defendant was also subject to such supervision as a result of his high-risk sex offender classification. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court's denial. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ducksworth and Pollock filed suit alleging claims of race discrimination, and Pollock also alleged a sexual harassment claim.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Scotts and Pacific, holding that the staffing agencies were not involved in Tri-Modal's decisionmaking about whom to promote. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Tri-Modal's executive vice president, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Pollock's hearsay objection to a declaration. The court also held that the trial court correctly concluded that Government Code section 12960, former subdivision (d) bars Pollock's claims because she did not file her administrative complaint within one year of March 2017, the time that those claims accrued. View "Ducksworth v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Jeremiah Williams guilty of first degree robbery, four counts of making a criminal threat, two counts of forcible rape, sexual penetration by use of force, forcible oral copulation, burglary of an inhabited dwelling, battery and assault, as lesser offenses of sodomy by use of force, assault with a deadly weapon, and false imprisonment by violence. The first eight counts were committed against Jane Doe 1; the remaining counts against Jane Doe 2. The jury found defendant committed all counts but one: forcible sexual offenses against more than one victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 100 years to life plus 86 years two months. It also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine, and a matching suspended parole revocation restitution fine (and other fees and assessments). Defendant raised six enumerations of error at trial, but finding none, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

Audrie, the Potts’ daughter, was sexually assaulted while unconscious from intoxication. Her assailants distributed intimate photographs of her. Audrie committed suicide. The Potts, as the registered successors-in-interest to “deceased personality” rights for Audrie under Civil Code 3344.1, authorized the use of Audrie’s name and likeness in a documentary. The Potts sued Lazarin under section 3344.1, claiming that Lazarin (who claims to be Audrie’s biological father) had used Audrie’s name and likeness "for the purpose of advertising services” without their consent. Lazarin admitted that he had displayed Audrie’s photograph “to change the law regarding parental rights” but argued that he had not acted to promote “goods or services.” The Potts submitted evidence that Lazarin solicited donations for a suicide prevention group, using Audrie’s name and photograph. Lazarin brought an unsuccessful special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16.The court of appeal reversed. Lazarin made a prima facie showing that the Potts’ suit was based on his “written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” The Potts failed to establish that there was a “probability” that they would “prevail” on their Civil Code section 3344.1 suit; they did not show that Lazarin “misappropriate[ed] the economic value generated by [Audrie’s] fame through the merchandising” of her name or likeness. View "Pott v. Lazarin" on Justia Law

The maternal grandparents of C.P. argued that the absolute statutory bar to placement of the child in their custody, either through approval as a resource family pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 16519.5 or on an emergency basis pursuant to section 361.4, was unconstitutional as applied to them. The bar was triggered in this case by a disqualifying misdemeanor criminal conviction the grandfather had dating to 1991. The child (born 2011) was removed from mother’s custody in May 2017, after he was sexually abused by a maternal uncle; at the time of removal, mother, child, and uncle all resided in the home of the grandparents. The uncle is now incarcerated on a 20-year sentence for child molestation. Mother has been out of contact with CFS, and reportedly has moved out of state. The child was initially placed with a foster family, but in June 2017 he was moved to a group home capable of addressing his special health care needs related to autism. Mother failed to reunify with the child. The child was ordered to remain in the group home under a planned permanent living arrangement, with the goal of identifying an appropriate placement for legal guardianship. The grandparents started the resource family approval process, with the goal of having the child placed in their care, almost immediately after the child was removed from mother’s custody in May 2017. A social worker characterized grandparents as the “only constant” in the child’s life. The Court of Appeal agreed with grandparents that the absolute statutory bar to placement of the child in their custody would have been unconstitutional as to them if they could establish they had a parental relationship with the child, not just a grandparental relationship. The case was therefore remanded to the trial court to make the predicate factual findings and for consideration of the issue anew from that perspective. View "In re C.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Lunada Bay Boys, alleging that defendants, sometimes with the tacit approval of city officials who did nothing to stop them, engaged in what is known as "localism" – a practice of keeping outsiders away from the surf site through threats and violence.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant Thiel and Mowat's anti-SLAPP motions, holding that defendants failed to establish that the cause of action arose from protected activity. In this case, the causes of action against Thiel and Mowat are pursued on a theory of conspiracy – conspiracy being a doctrine of liability and not a cause of action itself. The court focused on the tortious acts in which defendants are alleged to have conspired – the harassment of non-locals, the trail-obstructing, the rock-throwing, the running over with surfboards, the punching, the theft, the vandalism, the sexual harassment, the threats, and the intimidation. The court concluded that none of the actions are protected speech or petitioning activity. View "Spencer v. Mowat" on Justia Law