Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Dominick Humphrey pled guilty to four counts of robbery (counts 2, 3, 4 and 24). For three of these counts (counts 2, 3, and 4), Humphrey admitted that he used a deadly weapon (a knife) during the commission of the offenses, and used a firearm during the commission of one of the counts (count 24). Humphrey also admitted that he was 16 years old when he committed the crimes within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. The trial court sentenced Humphrey to prison for 19 years. Five years into Humphrey's sentence, an employee of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) wrote a letter to the superior court, stating that the abstract of judgment "may be in error, or incomplete[.]" In 2018, the trial court clarified that Humphrey was sentenced to 15 years for count 24 and the associated firearm enhancement and consecutive 16-month terms for counts 2, 3, and 4 (including their deadly weapon enhancements). An amended abstract of judgment was issued showing a sentence of 19 years in state prison. Thereafter, Humphrey moved to strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620. The trial court denied the motion because Humphrey's conviction became final before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620. Appellate counsel filed a "Wende" brief, indicating that he had not been able to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal, but asked the Court of Appeal to review the record for error as Wende mandated. In reviewing the record, the Court discovered an issue to be briefed, and the parties were requested to brief whether the trial court erred in finding Humphrey ineligible for relief under Senate Bill 620 after the trial court acted to correct the abstract of judgment. Find that the trial court only made plain how the original sentence should have appeared on the amended abstract of judgment, the Court of Appeal determined Humphrey did not file a notice of appeal following the original 2011 sentence. His case became final in 2011. Senate Bill 620 took effect January 1, 2018, and Humphrey's was not entitled to retroactive application of the law to his sentence. Therefore the trial court did not err in denying his motion for resentencing. View "California v. Humphrey" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Hipolito Morales was charged with two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under 10, and seven counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14. During his trial, the trial court admitted into evidence, after jury deliberations began and without any limiting instructions, a video and transcript of Morales’s police interrogation. In a pre-Miranda portion of that interrogation, an officer made statements to the effect that children had informed law enforcement that Morales had molested them; the officer knew Morales was lying; the officer could tell Morales was lying from his experience as an investigator; and Morales committed the crimes. Although the officer testified at trial, the parties had agreed to limit questioning to the post-Miranda portion of the interrogation only. The jury found Morales guilty, and he was sentenced to 175 years to life. Morales appealed, contending that because the full interrogation was admitted only after the officer was excused and the jury began its deliberations, he was deprived of the right to confront the officer about the pre-Miranda statements described above, none of which were repeated after Morales was read his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeal found no confrontation clause violation. "In order to implicate the confrontation clause, a statement must be testimonial, meaning that it must be made with sufficient formality and with the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony. Accusatory statements made by law enforcement in an interrogation will, absent unusual circumstances, satisfy neither of these requirements." The Court addressed Morales’s other contentions in the unpublished portion of its opinion, found them without merit and therefore affirmed conviction and sentencing. View "California v. Morales" on Justia Law

The City of Huntington Beach filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a complaint for declaratory relief to “invalidate the unconstitutional mandates of the [CVA] that impermissibly strip the City’s constitutionally protected Charter authority with respect to local ‘municipal affairs.’” Each cause of action alleged the CVA unconstitutionally violated the City’s authority to conduct municipal affairs guaranteed under article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution by mandating how the City operates its police force. The City also prayed for a declaration that the CVA is unconstitutional and preempted by article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution. The trial court granted the City’s petition for writ of mandamus and a peremptory writ of mandate was issued ordering the Attorney General to refrain from enforcing Government Code section 7284.6 against the City. In a statement of decision, the court found: (1) the “constitution, regulation and government” of a police force was a “quintessential municipal affair under [Section] 5(a)”; (2) the “constitution, regulation and government” of a police force was “a municipal prerogative” protected by Section 5(b); and (3) “there was no ‘statewide concern’ justifying the state[’]s regulation of a Charter City’s police force.” The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether charter cities were exempt from compliance with Government Code section 7284.6 on the ground it infringed the authority of charter cities under article XI, section 5(b) of the California Constitution to create, regulate, and govern city police forces. The Court held section 7284.6 was constitutional as applied to charter cities because it addressed matters of statewide concern - including public safety and health, effective policing, and protection of constitutional rights - was reasonably related to resolution of those statewide concerns, and was narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary interference in local government. Because the trial court concluded otherwise, and granted a petition for writ of mandamus brought by the City, the Court of Appeal reversed with directions to deny the writ petition and enter judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Sony, the Estate of Michael J. Jackson, and MJJ Productions appealed from the superior court's order partially denying their motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiff alleged that defendants marketed a posthumous Michael Jackson album in violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). Plaintiff also brought a fraud claim against the Cascio Defendants, alleging that they knowingly misrepresented to defendants that Jackson was the lead singer on the three tracks at issue.Upon reconsideration in light of FilmOn.com Inc. v. Double Verify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, the Court of Appeal held that its prior opinion was correct. In the prior opinion, the court held that plaintiff's claims against defendants arose from conduct furthering defendants' right of free speech in connection with a public issue, and that plaintiff did not show a probability that her claims under the UCL and the CLRA would succeed because the claims concern noncommercial speech that is not actionable under those statutes.The court largely adopted the prior opinion, except that it revised the discussion of the first step of the anti-SLAPP procedure to take into account the FilmOn decision and its application to the circumstances of this case. The court held that defendants' challenged statements were sufficiently connected to an issue of public interest to warrant anti-SLAPP protection. In this case, the representations that plaintiff challenged did not simply promote sale of the album, but also stated a position on a disputed issue of public interest. View "Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law

Defendant Bradley Roles was found guilty by jury of ten counts of making criminal threats (nine counts against Jennifer B. and one count against Heather S.), one count of stalking, and one count of making annoying phone calls. Defendant appealed contending: (1) he could be convicted of only one criminal threats charge against Jennifer B. because she heard all the threats at the same time and experienced a single period of sustained fear; (2) he could not be convicted of a criminal threats charge against Heather S. because there was insufficient evidence to show he intended for Jennifer B. to relay the threats to Heather S.; (3) the criminal threats punishment should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654; and (4) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first three contentions but disagreed with the fourth. Accordingly, the Court reversed the nine criminal threats convictions and stayed the punishment on the remaining criminal threats conviction. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Roles" on Justia Law

Defendant Markeese Brantley committed the crime of possession of marijuana while he was in state prison, but both his guilty plea and sentencing for that crime took place after he was released from prison. Before sentencing on the possession charge, defendant was convicted and sentenced on a domestic violence charge in another case. Finding Penal Code section 1170.1(c) applied to the possession charge, the trial court here imposed a full consecutive three-year term on the possession charge, rather than imposing one-third of the middle term for this offense pursuant to section 1170.1 (a). On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the trial court erred in finding that section 1170.1(c)’s exception to the one-third the base term rule applied to his sentence; (2) the court failed to exercise its discretion to impose a consecutive or concurrent term; and (3) that trial counsel’s failure to object to the consecutive term constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeal concurred section 1170.1 (c) did not apply because defendant completed the prison term he was serving before being sentenced on the possession offense. Defendant's sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Brantley" on Justia Law

Appellant Donald Keene sought, for the first time on appeal, to challenge the trial court's imposition of various fines, fees and assessments as part of his sentence for one count of failure to register as a sex offender. The Court of Appeal found the issue had been forfeited by failure to raise it at the sentencing hearing. Since Keene did not challenge his conviction or any other part of his sentence, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Keene" on Justia Law

Defendants Harquan Johnson and KeAndre Windfield were each convicted of one count of murder and one count of attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm, along with gun discharge and gang enhancement allegations as to the murder and attempted murder counts. The charges arose from the shooting of two members of their own gang, the Ramona Blocc Hustlas, resulting in the death of one of them. Both were sentenced to prison for 90 years to life. They appealed raising various claims. In the original opinion (filed August 19, 2014), the Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions for both defendants, but reversed Johnson’s sentence pursuant to California v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014), because, as a juvenile at the time of the crime, his sentence of 90 years to life was the functional equivalent of a term of life without possibility of parole and the Court directed other modifications of the sentence and abstracts of judgment. On November 12, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied both defendants’ petitions for review, but, on its own motion, issued a grant-and-hold of review as to defendant Johnson, for consideration pending review in In re Alatriste, S214652, In re Bonilla, S214960, and California v. Franklin, S217699. On May 26, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in California v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), and retransferred this case to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its opinion and to reconsider Johnson’s sentence in light of Franklin. The appellate court vacated the original opinion and issued a second opinion on September 28, 2016, affirming those portions of its original opinion relating to issues not subject to the grant and hold, and reconsidered Johnson's sentencing claim in light of Franklin. Defendants again petitioned for review. This time, the Supreme Court granted review, deferring further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in California v. Canizales, which was then pending in that court. Following the issuance of that opinion, the Supreme Court retransferred the cases back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its opinion and to reconsider the cause in light of Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019), and California v. Perez, 3 Cal.App.5th 612 (2016). In so doing, the Court of appeal affirmed convictions for both defendants, affirmed the sentence as to Winfield, but ordered a limited remand for a hearing at the trial court wherein both defendant and the State could make an accurate record of the defendant's characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense. The Court also ordered a limited remand of Johnson’s sentence to provide an opportunity to present evidence of mitigation due to his youth, pursuant to the holding of Franklin. View "California v. Windfield" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendants' anit-SLAPP motion in an action brought by plaintiffs for express indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief. The trial court held that none of plaintiffs' claims arose from protected speech or petitioning activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.The court affirmed and held that plaintiffs' cross-complaint did not arise from defendants' protected petitioning activity. In this case, plaintiffs' cross-complaint arose from the alleged breach of their agreement to indemnify plaintiffs for any liability attributable to information provided by defendants or defendants' representatives and defendants' underlying fault with regard to their decisionmaking. View "C.W. Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a political cartoonist and blogger, filed suit against The Times and others, alleging causes of action for defamation and for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff filed suit after The Times published a "note to readers" and a later more detailed report questioning the accuracy of a blog post plaintiff wrote for The Times. The trial court granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motions to strike plaintiff's complaint.In light of Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, the Court of Appeal again affirmed the trial court's orders. The court held that plaintiff's defamation claims arose from The Times articles and both were published in a public forum, concerning issues of public interest. The court also held that plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims, where The Times articles were fair and true reports of an LAPD investigation that was central to the substance of the articles, and accordingly absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d). In regard to plaintiff's employment claims, the court held that Wilson confirmed that The Times met its burden to show plaintiff's employment claims arose from protected activity. Furthermore, plaintiff could not prevail on the merits of his claims for wrongful termination and breach of an express oral contract. View "Rall v. Tribune 365, LLC" on Justia Law