Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

On a Saturday night of a long July 4th holiday weekend, defendant Shane Warner took a semiautomatic hand gun, concealed in his waistband into a bar. He shot across the bar’s semidark dance floor, illuminated by a strobe light, at I. Smith, who had attacked him a few weeks earlier. Defendant emptied the gun’s clip of 10 bullets and wounded, but did not kill his primary target, Smith, and wounded, but did not kill an innocent bystander, N.C. Defendant claimed to have acted in self-defense, but there was no evidence that Smith was armed. The prosecution charged defendant with two counts of attempted murder and one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, the latter predicated on a "kill zone" theory. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder of Smith, acquitted him of the attempted murder of N.C., but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 22 years in prison. Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter; he argued it was error to allow the prosecution to infer intent from a “kill zone” theory, and to so instruct the jury. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to argue defendant intended to kill N.C. under a “kill zone” theory, and in so instructing the jury. Even though the sentence for attempted voluntary manslaughter was stayed, defendant petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, raising the issue of the “kill zone” instruction. The Supreme Court granted review, and directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its decision and reconsider the case in light of California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019), decided after the appellate court's opinion was filed. After reconsidering the matter, judgment was again affirmed, and the case remanded to allow the trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the sentencing enhancement. View "California v. Warner" on Justia Law

Stephen Taylor was convicted by jury of numerous sex offenses against his adopted daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. In total, the jury convicted him on 12 counts. The trial court sentenced him to prison for a one-year determinate term and an aggregate indeterminate term of 165 years to life. On appeal, Taylor argued the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, and instructing the jurors that they could use that evidence to evaluate the victims’ credibility. He also claimed the court made several sentencing errors: (1) by imposing two indeterminate terms under the former “One Strike” law for two offenses that occurred during a single occasion; (2) by imposing multiple punishments for four counts of aggravated sexual assault and four counts of lewd acts arising from the same facts; and (3) by imposing a restitution fine and court operations and facilities fees without an ability to pay hearing. The Court of Appeal agreed that the court erred by imposing multiple punishments on four counts of aggravated sexual assault (counts 1 through 4) and four counts of forcible lewd acts (counts 5 through 8) that arose from the same conduct. Accordingly, Taylor’s sentence was stayed on counts 5 through 8. The Court also agreed the court should hold an ability to pay hearing, at least as to the court operations and facilities fees. Therefore, the Court reversed the order imposing those fees and remanded for a hearing on Taylor’s ability to pay them. As to the restitution fine, Taylor forfeited his contention. The Court otherwise rejected Taylor’s arguments and affirmed. View "California v. Taylor" on Justia Law

East Palo Alto Police Sergeant Simmont received an alert of shots fired in a high-crime neighborhood where Simmont had responded to murders. Simmont and other officers spoke with witnesses at the address, who reported seeing flashes from behind a boat in the driveway. Officers found spent shell casings near the garage. Simmont testified that he began “investigating whether or not we had a victim or a shooter [who] was hiding out.” He pounded on a garage door and announced police presence. No one responded. Officers spoke with people at the residence's front door. Simmont claims Rubio’s father granted permission to search the house and the garage. Rubio emerged from the garage, locking the door behind him, then approached, yelling for the officers to shoot him. After detaining Rubio, Simmont and another officer kicked the door open and entered the garage, which was a converted apartment. The officers observed an explosive device and a pistol on the shelf, then obtained a warrant, reentered, and found another handgun, bullets, body armor, spent shell casings, and methamphetamine. Surveillance video showed Rubio walking down the driveway, pulling out a revolver, and firing into the air.The court of appeal first affirmed Rubio’s convictions, relying on the community caretaking exception to uphold the search. Based on a subsequent California Supreme Court decision, the court granted rehearing and reversed. The need to render emergency aid justifies warrantless entry only where officers have “specific and articulable facts” showing that an intrusion into the home was necessary. It is not enough that officers seek to rule out “the possibility that someone . . . might require aid.” View "People v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Donald Clark of human trafficking of a minor (count 1), attempted pimping of a minor (count 2), and pandering (count 3). The court sentenced defendant to a total state prison term of 16 years as follows: (1) the middle term of eight years on count 1, which was doubled to 16 years pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law; (2) the middle term of two years on count 2, which was doubled to four years pursuant to the Three Strikes law; and (3) the middle term of four years on count 3, which was doubled to eight years pursuant to the Three Strikes law. Sentences on counts 2 and 3 were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The court also struck defendant’s prison prior, ordered defendant to register as a sex offender, and required defendant to pay a $300 sex offender fine, $120 in court operations fees, and a $90 criminal conviction assessment. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for human trafficking of a minor because the victim was not a real person or minor; (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for attempted pimping; (3) the court improperly admitted prejudicial evidence that he was pimping and pandering other women; (4) the State's expert witness improperly opined defendant was guilty of the charged crimes and usurped the jury’s fact-finding function; (5) his confrontation and due process rights were violated because he could not effectively cross-examine the State's expert witness; and (6) the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of human trafficking of a minor. After careful consideration, the Court of Appeal disagreed with all of defendant’s contentions on appeal and affirmed the judgment in full. View "California v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Vivar pled guilty to possession of materials with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant was placed on probation for three years, and as a condition of probation was to serve one year in county jail. He also received a referral to the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program. Shortly after his release, defendant was removed from the country as a consequence of his plea. Over a decade later, defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and advise defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea and for failing to defend or mitigate the judgment. Defendant also argued that his plea must be vacated because it was legally invalid. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Vivar" on Justia Law

In May 2007, police responded to a 911 call. Something resembling the lower half of a person was in the middle of Millar Ranch Road. The victim, R.J., lay partially in the bushes. Part of his brain and skill fragments were scattered in the road by his feet. A lighter, cigarette butt, gum wrapper and saliva were found near the victim's body. An autopsy revealed R.J. died from a shotgun blast to the head, likely fired within three feet. He had methamphetamine in his system. R.J. had last been seen alive by a grocery store; cell phone records showed the last number called belonged to defendant Marlin Royal. A mutual friend introduced Royal to R.J. A patchwork of physical evidence and testimony from one of Royal's ex girlfriends was presented at trial. After a jury deadlocked and the trial court declared a mistrial, a second jury was empaneled and convicted Royal of first degree murder. The jury also found true that Royal personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder, and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. Royal subsequently admitted a serious felony prior as well as two prior strikes. The court sentenced Royal to prison for 100 years to life, plus five years. Royal appealed, contending: (1) the prosecution did not exercise due diligence in securing the key witness to testify during Royal's second trial (leading the prosecution to read the transcript of the witness's testimony at the second trial); (2) the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence as past recollection recorded; and (3) the trial court improperly limited the scope of the cross-examination of the prosecution's expert witness. Although the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule, it concluded such error was harmless. Additionally, the Court found Royal's other claims of error without merit, and affirmed judgment and conviction. View "California v. Royal" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the school district's cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. In the underlying action, Margaret Williams and her LLC filed suit against the school district, alleging that her termination was retaliatory. Williams also alleged that the school district unlawfully caused her arsenic poisoning.The court explained that, if the court were to enforce the school district's request, the indemnity provision would require Williams LLC to fund the school district's defense against the very litigation the LLC and Williams brought against the school district. Therefore, the school district's cross-complaint arose from that litigation or the LLC's refusal to sabotage it -- each of which was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Furthermore, the school district sought to require the LLC not only to fund the school district's defense, but also to reimburse the school district for any award secured by Williams or the LLC. The court explained that such a bar to meaningful recovery embodied a high degree of substantive unconscionability, sufficient -- when combined with the procedural unconscionability shown through Williams LLC's unrebutted evidence of adhesion, oppression, and surprise -- to establish that the indemnity provision was unconscionable. The court limited the provision to avoid an unconscionable result, and held that the school district failed to show error in the dismissal of the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims, as well as the dismissal of the school district's other cross-claims. View "Long Beach Unified School District v. Margaret Williams, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against actor Shia LaBeouf for assault, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after LaBeouf confronted plaintiff and called him a "racist" after plaintiff refused to serve LaBeouf and his companion alcohol. LaBeouf filed a special motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of LaBeouf's anti-SLAPP motion, holding that LaBeouf's conduct did not fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute because his statements and conduct did not involve a matter of public interest or concern. In this case, LaBeouf's statement was not directed at someone in the public eye and there was no evidence that LaBeouf's comments addressed an ongoing controversy or an issue that had garnered any public interest. Rather, the court held that the statement concerned an isolated dispute between a bartender and an inebriated client over the bartender's refusal to serve the client alcohol at a restaurant. The court reasoned that, although footage of the altercation was later disseminated to many people on the internet and television, a private dispute does not become a matter of public interest simply because it was widely communicated to the public. Furthermore, the fact that LaBeouf used the word "racist" did not convert the statement into the type of speech entitled to anti-SLAPP protection. View "Bernstein v. LaBeouf" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed a malicious prosecution action against defendant, who was the attorney for the opposing party in a prior litigation, defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not demonstrate a reasonable probability plaintiffs would prevail on the merits of their claim, because plaintiffs' action was time-barred. In this case, the four-year provision of the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of the complaint, and a later discovery could not extend that period. Finally, the court noted that plaintiffs' plea for justice did not fall on deaf ears, but that the court was constrained to follow the law and to enforce the statute of limitations. View "Garcia v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

Todd Schuster petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking early parole consideration under Proposition 57. At the time, an emergency regulation of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) rendered those who had a conviction for a sex offense requiring registration under Penal Code section 2901 ineligible for such consideration. The petition pointed out that under Proposition 57, all “nonviolent” offenders were eligible for early parole consideration. The only statutory definition of nonviolent was the definition of violent felonies in section 667.5, which did not include section 290 registrants. The trial court appointed counsel for Schuster; counsel then narrowed his argument to the claim that Schuster could not be declared ineligible for parole based only on his prior conviction for a sex offense. Whether a current conviction would render him ineligible for parole was not discussed. The trial court granted the petition and invalidated the regulation. In doing so, the court found that “nonviolent” felonies under Proposition 57 included only those felonies not listed as violent in section 667.5. The Department sought a stay and reconsideration, arguing the matter was moot because Schuster had been released from prison and the regulations had been revised. The court found the petition was not moot because it affected important issues of continuing public interest that may evade review and denied the stay. The court modified its order sua sponte to declare invalid two revised regulations that denied early parole consideration to those convicted of an offense requiring registration under section 290 or serving life terms for a violent offense. Ralph Diaz, Secretary of the Department, appealed that judgment. The Court of Appeal concluded the matter was not moot because it posed an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur. Further, the Court concluded the trial court erred when it invalidated the unchallenged revised regulations. The judgment was modified to invalidate only the challenged regulation and then only to the extent it was applied to inmates like Schuster who were section 290 registrants solely due to a prior conviction. View "In re Schuster" on Justia Law