Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Mason Fish was involved in a fatal motor vehicle collision and thereafter charged with (among other offenses) three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Based on Fish's statements to law enforcement officers after the collision that he was under the care of a psychotherapist who had prescribed him certain antidepressant and antipsychotic medications, the prosecution subpoenaed the psychotherapist's (and his medical group's) treatment records. Fish moved to quash the subpoenas on the basis they sought information protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The prosecution countered that Fish had, through his disclosures to law enforcement officers, waived this privilege. Respondent superior court (the trial court) agreed with the prosecution and denied Fish's motion, indicating it would review the psychotherapist's treatment records in camera to determine if Fish and his therapist discussed whether the medications might affect Fish's driving. Contending the trial court erred in finding he waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, Fish petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to prevent the trial court from reviewing his psychotherapy treatment records, and to require the trial court to grant his motion to quash the subpoenas. The Court of Appeal determined the California Supreme Court has held that when no exception to the privilege has been established and there has been no waiver, the state's claimed compelling need for the information to aid criminal prosecution did not justify invasion of the privilege. "Because Fish's disclosures were legally insufficient under our court's precedent to waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege, the trial court erred in concluding otherwise." View "Fish v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

David Gaynor was convicted by jury of: using the personal identification information of another (counts 1, 4 and 7); forgery, possessing a completed check with the intent to defraud (count 2); burglary (count 3); possession of a forged driver's license (counts 5 and 6); and failure to appear while on bail (count 8). In addition, the jury found true the allegation that Gaynor had a prior strike conviction, and the trial court found true an allegation that Gaynor was on bail from another case at the time of the commission of count 8 (failing to appear). At sentencing, the trial court struck the prior strike in the interest of justice and sentenced Gaynor to a total term of five years and eight months in prison. The court sentenced Gaynor to the upper term of three years on count 1, a consecutive eight-month term on count 8, and a two-year consecutive term for the on-bail enhancement. The court also imposed concurrent two-year terms on counts 2, 4, and 7 and stayed execution of the sentences on counts 3, 5, and 6 pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The trial court imposed a restitution fine of $4,500 and a corresponding parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount. On appeal, Gaynor argued the trial court erred in failing to stay execution of the sentences on three of the counts (counts 2, 4 and 7) pursuant to section 654 and also requested the Court of Appeal remand the matter to permit the trial court to reconsider the amount of the restitution fine and the corresponding parole revocation restitution fine, arguing that the court erred in imposing a restitution fine based on a count for which the execution of sentence was stayed pursuant to section 654. The State conceded the trial court erred in failing to stay execution of the sentences on 4 and 7 pursuant to section 654, but contended the trial court properly declined to apply section 654 with respect to count 2. With respect to the restitution fine, the State contended no remand was required because Gaynor did not demonstrate any prejudice. The Court of Appeal accepted the State's concession, and concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court's implicit finding that section 654 did not apply with respect to count 2. In addition, the Court concluded there was a reasonable probability the trial court would have imposed a different restitution fine and corresponding parole revocation restitution fine if the court had properly stayed execution of the sentences on counts 4 and 7 pursuant to section 654. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to stay execution of the sentences imposed on counts 4 and 7 pursuant to section 654, and for reconsideration of the restitution and parole revocation restitution fines. View "California v. Gaynor" on Justia Law

The San Diego County (County) Board of Supervisors approved an amendment to the County's general land use plan, which would have allowed for the development of over 2,100 homes in a previously designated rural area of the County. Residents opposed to the change in land use circulated a referendum petition and gathered enough signatures to have the matter placed on an election ballot. To prevent an election, the land developer filed a petition for writ of mandate, contending the referendum petition was illegal and void as a matter of law. The court denied the writ petition. The issues this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review were: (1) whether the referendum petition complied with the full text requirement under Elections Code section 91471; and (2) the referendum petition's legality in challenging a single legislative act even though the Board of Supervisors executed several concurrent, associated legislative acts. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Molloy v. Vu" on Justia Law

Brian Jennings was convicted by jury on four counts of burglary and one count of attempted burglary. Jennings challenged only his count 3 burglary conviction, which offense involved his alleged entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment was open during regular business hours. Proposition 47, enacted in 2014, created a new misdemeanor offense of "shoplifting," set forth in Penal Code section 459.5(a). On appeal, Jennings contended that because the new section 459.5 shoplifting offense was "carved out" of the general section 459 burglary offense, the prosecution was required, in the circumstances of this case, to prove he intended to take property with a value exceeding $950. Furthermore, he argued there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he intended to take property with a value exceeding $950, therefore his count 3 burglary conviction had to be reversed. Alternatively, he contended the trial court prejudicially erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the prosecution's duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of burglary, including proof that he intended to take property with a value exceeding $950. After review, the Court of Appeal concurred with Jennings, concluding there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Jennings intended to take property with a value exceeding $950 when he entered the commercial establishment in count 3. The Court also concluded the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing sua sponte on the $950 property value requirement for the count 3 burglary charge. In addition, the Court agreed Senate Bill No. 136 applied retroactively to Jennings's case pursuant to In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965), and therefore reversed the court's imposition and execution of a consecutive one-year section 667.5(b) prior-prison-term enhancement. Accordingly, Jennings' count 3 burglary conviction and one-year section 667.5(b) prior prison term enhancement were reversed, and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Defendant Sara Salcido was in the business of providing immigration services — typically, obtaining visas for her clients that would allow them to stay in the United States legally. Defendant failed to comply with the consumer protection requirements outlined in the Immigration Consultant Act, and was ultimately convicted on one count of misdemeanor unlawfully engaging in the business of an immigration consultant. The State argued, however, that each time defendant took money from a client in exchange for providing immigration services, she was committing theft by false pretenses, because she was not a legally qualified immigration consultant under state law. The trial court agreed; thus, it also convicted her on six counts of grand theft, and two counts of petty theft. It dismissed two additional counts of grand theft as time-barred. Defendant was placed on probation for five years. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held federal law did not preempt the application of the Act to defendant. In the unpublished portion, the Court held one of defendant’s probation conditions had to be stricken. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed as modified. View "California v. Salcido" on Justia Law

This appeal involved an effort to "foist" the pension and retiree healthcare costs for city employees who performed redevelopment-related work onto the successor agency to the now-abolished Anaheim Redevelopment Agency (Anaheim RDA). Plaintiff City of Anaheim, in its own right and as the successor agency to the Anaheim RDA, and John Woodhead, who worked for both entities, brought this 2017 petition for a writ of mandate. The petition sought to overturn the determination that an agreement between the City of Anaheim and the Anaheim RDA to reimburse the City of Anaheim for the retirement costs of its employees who worked for the Anaheim RDA was not an enforceable obligation of the Anaheim RDA, and thus payments to the City of Anaheim for this purpose from the successor agency were not permissible. As defendants, the petition identified the director of the Department of Finance, Keely Bosler, in her official capacity; the Department of Finance (a redundant defendant); the auditor-controller for Orange County (a neutral stakeholder); and the oversight board that supervised the operations of the successor agency. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department, "after issuing a lengthy and cogent ruling." On appeal, petitioners reiterated their claims, which focused on their interpretation of what was a “legally enforceable” required payment from the Anaheim RDA, the purported unconstitutional impairment of contractual rights, and estoppel. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "City of Anaheim v. Bosler" on Justia Law

Jones is serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a 1994 murder he committed when he was 19 years old. In 2018, Jones filed a petition to recall his sentence, citing Penal Code 1170(d)(2), which applies to a defendant who is serving an LWOP sentence for an offense committed when the defendant was “under 18 years of age” and who has been incarcerated for at least 15 years.The court of appeal upheld the denial of relief, rejecting an argument that section 1170(d)(2) violates equal protection because it denies LWOP offenders ages 18-25 the same opportunity to petition for resentencing that is afforded to similarly-situated juvenile offenders without any rational basis for doing so. LWOP offenders who were 18-25 years old when they committed their offenses are adult offenders, not similarly situated to juvenile offenders. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly found that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” To determine the age at which the diminished culpability of a youthful offender should no longer result in a categorically different sentence, a line must be drawn. The Legislature could reasonably decide that for LWOP offenders, the line should be drawn at age 18, rather than at some later date when the brain is fully developed. Drawing a bright line at age 18 establishes an objective and easily implemented measure, which has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "In re Jones" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's partial denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff filed suit after defendant posted comments in Facebook that she alleged were, among other things, defamatory.The court held that plaintiff's complaint arose from protected activity, because the comments upon which plaintiff based her claims implicated an issue of public interest. In this case, defendant's comments described a widespread pattern of identity theft and multi-level marketing scams. The court also held that plaintiff met her burden of showing a probability of prevailing on her defamation claim, because her claim had at least minimal merit. The court explained that the statements complained of – that she had been indicted, that she was a convicted criminal, and that she had stolen the identities of thousands of people – were plainly defamatory in character and would tend to expose their subject to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy.The court commented on civility, sexism, and persuasive brief writing, stating that the opening paragraph in defense counsel's reply brief, which commented on the trial judge's personal characteristics and appearance, reflected gender bias and disrespect for the judicial system. View "Briganti v. Chow" on Justia Law

Under the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to Senate Bill 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, eff. Jan. 1, 2019), a defendant who intended to commit a specified felony could be convicted of murder for a killing during the felony, or attempted felony, without further examination of his or her mental state. Independent of the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine rendered a defendant liable for murder if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. Senate Bill 1437 restricted the application of the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as applied to murder, by amending Penal Code section 189. Real parties in interest Allen Gooden and Marty Dominguez were convicted of murder in unrelated proceedings: Gooden was convicted of first degree felony murder in 1982 for the death of a neighbor during a burglary; Dominguez was found guilty of second degree murder in 1990 after a companion killed a pedestrian under facts suggesting the jury may have relied on the natural and probable consequence doctrine. Real parties in interest filed petitions requesting vacatur of their murder convictions and resentencing. The State moved to dismiss the petitions on grounds that Senate Bill 1437, which voters did not approve, impermissibly amended two voter-approved initiatives, Proposition 7 and Proposition 115. According to the State, these alleged amendments were unconstitutional. The trial court consolidated real party in interests' cases and denied the motions. The court found Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 7 because it did "not reduce sentences for first or second degree-murder." Further, the court found Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 115 because it did not "in any way modif[y]" the predicate offenses on which first degree felony-murder liability may be based. Therefore, the court found Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid legislative amendment. Like the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid amendment to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115 because it neither added to, nor took away from, the initiatives. Therefore, the State's petitions for writ relief were denied. View "California v. Superior Court (Gooden)" on Justia Law

Under the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to Senate Bill 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, eff. Jan. 1, 2019), a defendant who intended to commit a specified felony could be convicted of murder for a killing during the felony, or attempted felony, without further examination of his or her mental state. Independent of the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine rendered a defendant liable for murder if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. Senate Bill 1437 restricted the application of the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as applied to murder, by amending Penal Code section 189. Patty Ann Lamoureux appealed an order denying her petition to vacate a first degree murder conviction and obtain resentencing under the procedures established by Senate Bill 1437. The trial court denied the petition after concluding the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7, a voter initiative that increased the punishments for persons convicted of murder. The State urged the Court of Appeal to affirm the denial order on grounds that: (1) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7; (2) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 115, a voter initiative that augmented the list of predicate offenses for first degree felony-murder liability; (3) the resentencing provision violated the separation of powers doctrine; and/or (4) the resentencing provision deprived crime victims the rights afforded them by the Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy's Law). In California v. Superior Court (Gooden), ___ Cal.App.5th ___ (Nov. 19, 2019, D075787) a companion case issued with this case, the Court of Appeal concluded Senate Bill 1437 did not invalidly amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. Like the Gooden opinion, the Court reached the same determination here. Further, the Court concluded the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 did not contravene separation of powers principles or violate the rights of crime victims. Therefore, the Court found "no constitutional infirmity" with Senate Bill 1437, and reversed the order denying Lamoureux's petition. View "California v. Lamoureux" on Justia Law