Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At 11:20 p.m., Gosuwin, carrying a pursed and holding an iPhone, saw two “young black men” wearing hoodies coming around the corner. One pushed her to the ground. The assailants pulled her bag and phone away, then continued on Market Street toward the Embarcadero. Gosuwin went to a nearby building, where a security guard called the police. Gosuwin did not see any weapons on her assailants. An officer used the “Find My iPhone app.” Gosuwin’s phone was “pinging” on the Embarcadero. Officer found Gosuwin’s purse there. At 11:29 p.m., officers received a dispatch call and went to the area to look for the “robbery suspects.” They noticed Jeremiah and J.A., both juveniles. One was wearing a hoodie. During the ensuing stop, an officer instructed Jeremiah to face a wall with his legs spread and his arms above his head. He did so. There was nothing about Jeremiah’s appearance, behavior, or actions to indicate that Jeremiah was armed and dangerous. A pat-down search revealed two phones in Jeremiah’s pocket. One phone’s background picture and password matched Gosuwin’s phone. The juvenile court denied a motion to suppress and ordered Jeremiah transferred to Alameda County where a previous wardship petition alleging second-degree robbery was pending. The court of appeal reversed the jurisdiction and disposition orders. The officer who conducted the pat-down did not present specific and articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Jeremiah was armed and dangerous. The court declined to recognize a rule that would validate essentially any “pat-search” of a suspected robber who is lawfully detained following a report of a fresh robbery. View "In re Jeremiah S." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the trial court's denial of a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, in a driveway dispute easement action brought by Starview Property.The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an anti-SLAPP motion may be brought within 60 days of service of an amended complaint if the amended complaint pleads new causes of action that could not have been the target of a prior anti-SLAPP motion, or adds new allegations that make previously pleaded causes of action subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. In this case, Starview's three newly pled causes of action in its amended complaint plainly could not have been the target of a prior motion, even if they arose from protected activity alleged in the original complaint. Therefore, the trial court erred by dismissing defendants' motion as untimely. View "Starview Property, LLC v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant Jovan Felix contended the trial court abused its discretion in his trial for attempted murder by introducing evidence of a prior crime and by denying his motions for retrial and to reopen the evidence. Charges arose from a night of drinking and a fight at a midtown Sacramento bar in August 2013. Defendant was with another man, later identified as Cornelius Jones. Defendant and Jones were tried jointly before separate juries. Jones was convicted of premeditated attempted murder and other serious crimes. However, the court declared a mistrial in defendant’s case. After retrial, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term of 28 years and four months. On appeal of the convictions and sentence, defendant contended the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of an armed robbery he committed with Jones in 1994. He claimed the robbery was too dissimilar to the current crime to be admitted: it was remote in time, it shared no characteristics with the current crime other than the identity of the perpetrators, and it occurred when defendant was a young teenager. Defendant argued that admitting the evidence was prejudicial error. The trial court reached the opposite conclusion than the first trial court which had refused to admit the evidence. Defendant claimed prejudice was shown because the first trial ended in a hung jury without hearing the evidence, yet the jury in the second trial which heard the evidence convicted him. The Court of Appeal found defendant was not convicted "merely because the second court admitted the 1994 robbery evidence." It therefore found admitting the evidence was harmless error, and thus affirmed the second trial conviction. View "California v. Felix" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Wehr was convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle under Penal Code section 496d(a). Before his sentencing, Wehr moved to designate his conviction a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The trial court denied his motion and sentenced him to a total of nine years in state prison, including sentence enhancements. Wehr challenges the court’s denial of his motion. He argues that his offense was eligible for misdemeanor treatment under section 496 if the value of the stolen vehicle did not exceed $950. The Court of Appeal agreed with Wehr that, after the passage of Proposition 47, receipt of a stolen vehicle was eligible for misdemeanor treatment under section 496, assuming that the vehicle was worth $950 or less. The Court thus reversed his felony conviction for violating section 496d. On remand, the State could: (1) accept reduction of this conviction to a misdemeanor; or (2) retry him for a felony violation of section 496d. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "California v. Wehr" on Justia Law

Defendant Cesar Meneses appealed after a jury found him guilty of four counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age and found true, as to each count, the multiple victim sentencing enhancement allegation. Meneses argued: (1) the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding consideration of evidence of charged sex offenses with CALCRIM No. 1191B; and (2) the prosecutor committed error in her closing and rebuttal arguments. Meneses further argued, to the extent his trial counsel’s failure to object on these grounds results in forfeiture of these arguments on appeal, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed as to all issues. View "California v. Meneses" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the California Coastal Commission's permit condition, which requires a certain construction set back, for the remodel of their beachside residence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' petition for writ of administrative mandate, holding that substantial evidence supported the commission's determination that the remodel would have an adverse impact on the public's access to the beach. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies on their unconstitutional taking argument. View "Greene v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Franswa Merchant was convicted by jury of kidnapping, battery, and dissuading a witness after he careened down the freeway refusing his girlfriend’s, Lisa S., pleas to stop or let her out. He allegedly pulled Lisa’s hair, and flung her cell phone out the window as she tried to call 911. Lisa did not appear at trial. Applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, the court admitted her statements to law enforcement on the day of the incident. It further allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of Merchant's prior acts of domestic violence against Lisa and his former girlfriend, J.C. Merchant challenged the admission of both categories of evidence. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Merchant" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant O.C., appealed an order denying her petition to seal her juvenile court records and related records in the custody of law enforcement and other agencies. She claimed the court was required to seal her records under Welfare & Institutions Code section 786 because she satisfactorily completed her juvenile court probation in April 2011. The Court of Appeal affirmed denial. O.C. was not qualified to seal her records under section 781 because: (1) she was convicted of six felonies in May 2018, after the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over her terminated in April 2011; and (2) in denying O.C.’s sealing petition, the court found that O.C. had not obtained rehabilitation since April 2011, based on the facts underlying her six felony convictions. View "In re O.C." on Justia Law

An employer can sue for declaratory relief to enforce a superior court judgment unfavorable to the Labor Commissioner without violating the anti-SLAPP statute where, as here, the lawsuit does not arise out of activity protected by the statute. In this case, Supershuttle filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the the Labor defendants, seeking a declaration that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the Labor Commissioner from considering wage claims filed by drivers of Supershuttle vans because the Sacramento Superior Court previously found the drivers were independent contractors, not employees.The court found that the gravamen of Supershuttle's complaint was the harm it will suffer from the intended decision of the Labor defendants to deny collateral estoppel effect to a final decision of the Sacramento Superior Court, not from the Labor defendants' writing or statements preceding or communicating that decision; the Labor defendants have not identified speech or writings made in connection with a public issue or issue of public importance from which the causes of action arise; and the trial court did not conclude that the Labor defendants acted illegally as a matter of law within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP law. The court held that, most importantly, the trial court did not rely on any illegality to deny the Labor defendants' motion to strike, and the court did not rely on any illegality to affirm the trial court's order. View "Supershuttle International, Inc. v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency" on Justia Law

Michael Damion Jude Medrano was convicted by jury on one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second degree robbery, and one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily harm. Medrano was 19 years old when he committed the offenses. He was sentenced to 25 years to life, plus seven. Medrano was sentenced in December 2017, one and one-half years after the California Supreme Court decided California v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), which held that when a juvenile offender receives an indeterminate life sentence, the offender must be “given adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth.” The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the juvenile offender had been given an adequate opportunity to make such a record. Medrano asked the Court of Appeal to give him the same relief that was granted in Franklin. But because Medrano was sentenced one and one-half years after Franklin, and because nothing in the record indicated Medrano lacked an adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating youth-related evidence, the Court found no basis to order the same relief that the Supreme Court granted in Franklin. It noted, however, that the Supreme Court recently held that a juvenile offender whose conviction and sentence were final could file a motion under Penal Code section 1203.01 for the purpose of making a record of mitigating youth-related evidence. View "California v. Medrano" on Justia Law