Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who is blind and uses a screen reader, filed suit alleging that defendant violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act by violating the federal American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her being unable to access defendant's restaurant website with her screen reader.The Court of Appeal held that Title III of the ADA applies to defendant's website; at a minimum, Title III covers a website with a nexus to a physical place of public accommodation; and the undisputed facts show a sufficient nexus between defendant's website and its restaurant. The court also held that plaintiff's and the trial court's references to nongovernmental guidelines did not violate defendant's due process rights; the trial court could and did disregard surplus comments plaintiff made about the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0; and the specification of WCAG 2.0 guidelines in the injunction did not support or show a due process violation. Finally, the court held that whether defendant's alternative means of communication would be effective was not a triable issue of fact; plaintiff had standing to obtain an injunction; and the injunction mandating compliance with WCAG 2.0 was not overbroad or uncertain. View "Thurston v. Midvale Corp." on Justia Law

Sagin was sentenced to life without parole for a 1985 stabbing murder. After the murder, two Monterey County Jail inmates separately reported that Sagin (housed at the jail awaiting trial on other charges) confessed to the killing. More than 20 years later, the Northern California Innocence Project identified evidence that could be tested for DNA and obtained an order allowing that testing. (Pen. Code 1405). The victim’s bathrobe contained DNA from the man the victim was dating at the time and from an ex-boyfriend. Hair found on her couch was the ex-boyfriend’s. Towels contained DNA from the victim’s coworker and the ex-boyfriend. Fingernail scrapings contained DNA from an unknown male. Sagin sought habeas corpus relief, based on the newly-available DNA evidence. The court of appeal vacated the conviction The fingernail DNA does not, alone, prove someone other than Sagin committed the crime. The court employed the revised standard, requiring only that the new evidence would likely have changed the trial outcome. A jury would have considered the DNA results with the rest of the evidence, including the testimony of four alibi witnesses that, if credited, establishes Sagin is not the perpetrator. It was more likely than not the new evidence would have changed the outcome of Sagin’s trial. View "In re: Sagin" on Justia Law

Appellant Steven Force was adjudged a sexually violent predator, and received treatment at a state mental hospital for pedophilia and exhibitionism. He challenged the trial court’s order denying his petition to be placed in the conditional release program known as CONREP. According to appellant, he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor interfered with his right to testify, and the trial court erroneously refused to admit his release plan into evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed, after review of the trial court record, with both contentions, “Successful prosecution is defined not by the result, but by the process. . . . The prosecutor here took his eyes off the prize just long enough to commit misconduct in a way that requires reversal. We publish that reversal not to pillory him, but as a reminder of the unrelenting vigilance and ethical clarity required daily of prosecutors if they are to fulfill our nation’s promise of a fair trial.” The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "California v. Force" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of their claims brought against the state level defendants. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from their allegations that KHSD adopted and implemented a district-wide disciplinary program that was biased toward minority students, students who speak limited English, and others similarly situated.The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of most of plaintiffs' claims against the state level defendants, either because such claims did not state a cause of action or because they were brought against the local level defendants but not the state level defendants. However, the court ultimately found that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution and they have properly petitioned for a writ of mandate based on the state level defendants' ministerial duty to monitor the practices of local school districts for violations of federal law. Therefore, the court held that the trial court wrongly sustained the state level defendants' demurrer as to those claims, as well as plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief on the same issues. In a related conclusion, the court held that plaintiffs' complaint had sufficient allegations to demonstrate associational standing for one of the community organizations to pursue these claims against the state level defendants. View "Collins v. Thurmond" on Justia Law

The State of California filed an information alleging petitioner Oscar Vaquera committed a lewd or lascivious act against John Doe number one and John Doe number two, who were both children under 14 years of age. These were designated offenses under the One Strike law. As to each count, the State alleged that Vaquera committed the crime “against more than one victim.” The jury convicted Vaquera of both counts and found true the multiple victim allegations. The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 25 years to life. Vaquera sought habeas relief, challenging the evidence insufficient, and the sentence he received was miscalculated. Finding no such reversible errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "In re Vaquera" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alphonso Benton (Benton) and defendant Cynthia Moreno Benton (Moreno-Benton) were married and shared a Chino Hills dental practice through late 2014, when they divorced. Benton continued to work at that practice, plaintiff Compcare Medical, Inc. Moreno-Benton, however, opened a separate practice by forming defendant Moreno Family Medical and Associates, Inc. (Moreno Family) around the time of her departure from Compcare. Defendant Kristi Diehl was a physician’s assistant at Compcare who left with Moreno-Benton for the rival practice. Benton and Compcare alleged that defendants Moreno-Benton, Diehl, and Moreno Family misappropriated trade secrets, intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs’ prospective economic advantage, defamed plaintiffs, and engaged in unfair competition. Plaintiffs also alleged Moreno-Benton violated the fiduciary duties she owed to Compcare, and that Diehl violated the duty of loyalty she owed to that company. Defendants responded to the operative complaint with a motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, because it was designed to address so-called strategic lawsuits against public participation. The motion alleged that plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises out of two types of activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute: (1) notices to patients and others that Moreno-Benton was leaving Compcare to start a new practice, as well as advertising Moreno-Benton’s services; and (2) the filing of the petition for the divorce of Moreno-Benton and Benton. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the causes of action did not arise from protected activity, and that they could in any event demonstrate that their lawsuit had a probability of success on the merits. The trial court denied the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion for two reasons, one of which was that the commercial speech exemption found in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 applied to the conduct underlying the operative complaint. Although most trial court orders resolving an anti-SLAPP motion were subject to interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeal found the California Legislature precluded interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion on the ground that the commercial speech exemption applied. The Court therefore dismissed this appeal. View "Benton v. Benton" on Justia Law

In 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Sapienza pled guilty to criminal threats. The trial court imposed the upper term of three years of imprisonment, but suspended execution of sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal probation.In 2018, the court found defendant in violation of his probation. A few months later, the court imposed the three-year suspended sentence and awarded defendant 903 days of custody credits. On appeal, defendant argued the matter should have been conditionally reversed and remanded to the trial court to determine, retroactively, whether defendant qualified for a pretrial diversion program for individuals diagnosed with qualifying mental disorders pursuant to recently enacted Penal Code section 1001.36. The State contended defendant’s appeal should have been dismissed because the issue raised was outside the scope of his notice of appeal; that section 1001.36 was not retroactive; that even if retroactive, defendant’s judgment was already final and, thus, inapplicable; that retroactive application of a pretrial diversion program would effectively vacate defendant’s conviction violating the separation of powers doctrine; and that the court had already rejected defendant’s mental health defense. The Court of Appeal concurred with the State's contention that because defendant acquiesced in the judgment entered on August 31, 2015, by failing to file an appeal, the judgment was final, and defendant was not entitled to any retroactive relief pursuant to section 1001.36. View "California v. Sapienza" on Justia Law

Between 2015 and 2018, Manuel Gonzalez was charged with and pleaded guilty to three cases important to the decision in this appeal. After violating probation in two cases, defendant Gonzalez was sentenced to state prison. While in jail and prior to being transported to state prison, Gonzalez was charged with an additional crime to which he pleaded guilty. At sentencing on the later case, the trial court recalled the two probation violation sentences and, pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law, sentenced Gonzalez consecutively on the three cases. On appeal, Gonzalez contended the trial court erred when it refused to consider applying, under former Penal Code section 667 (c)(8), concurrent sentences to his probation violation cases. He further contended, and the Attorney General agreed, that the matter had to be remanded for resentencing pursuant to the newly amended Penal Code section 1385, which gave the trial court discretion whether to strike his prior conviction enhancement. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court properly sentenced Gonzalez to consecutive sentences under Penal Code section 667(c)(8). The matter was remanded solely for resentencing in light of section 1385. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2017, David Gates and Gage Bruce submitted to the San Bernardino County Registrar of Voters notices of intent to circulate for signatures with respect to nine initiatives. The initiatives were referred to county counsel for preparation of ballot titles and summaries. County counsel prepared ballot titles and summaries for two of the initiatives, and a third initiative was withdrawn. Litigation ensued with respect to the remaining six initiatives, which the parties have referred to as Initiatives 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Pursuant to a stipulation, the trial court addressed the parties’ arguments regarding all six proposed initiatives in a single hearing on January 18, 2018. The trial court sided with county counsel, denying Gates and Bruce’s writ petition and granting county counsel declaratory relief. The judgment, entered on February 1, 2018, excuses county counsel from her duty pursuant to section 9105, subdivision (a), to prepare a ballot title and summary for the initiatives on the ground that each is “invalid and may not be placed on the ballot.” Gates and Bruce contended the trial court should not have engaged in any preelection review of the proposed initiatives, and also that, even if review were proper, the initiatives were not invalid. The Court of Appeal disagreed with both contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "Gates v. Blakemore" on Justia Law

In 2016, petitioner Darren Williams sought extraordinary writ relief from the Court of Appeal. He sought to appeal a superior court order denying his Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss an indictment issued by a grand jury charging him with a series of cell phone store robberies. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the deputy district attorney’s excusal of a juror for hardship violated the grand jury’s independence and rendered it improperly constituted. Petitioner also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the gang allegations and counts regarding a March 10, 2014, robbery. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court should have granted the motion to dismiss the indictment because the deputy district attorney’s exercise of authority he did not have over the grand jury, in front of the grand jurors, substantially impaired the independence and impartiality of the grand jury. As such, the Court did not reach the sufficiency of the evidence claims. The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate vacating the superior court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the indictment and directing the court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Williams v. Superior Court" on Justia Law