Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After prison officials found Rigsby guilty of possessing contraband, they imposed disciplinary actions which resulted in a 30-day loss of inmate privileges and early release credits. The superior court granted Rigsby habeas corpus relief and the Warden appealed.The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting habeas relief and held that the superior court's analysis conflicted with In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1498. In this case, Rigsby and another inmate jointly occupied a prison cell that was six feet by eleven feet in size; during a search of the cell, prison officials discovered a prohibited item located in a common area accessible to both men; and these facts were not materially distinguishable from those in Zepeda and thus permit an inference that Rigsby was in possession of the contraband. View "In re Rigsby" on Justia Law

In 2005, defendant-appellant Jorge Rodriguez pled guilty to unlawful intercourse by a person over 21 under Penal Code1 section 261.5(d). Defendant, as a person over 21, admitted to having sex with a person under the age of 16. The trial court sentenced defendant to formal probation for 36 months. Days later, defendant was taken into custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service pending resolution by an immigration judge whether defendant would be removed from the United States. That same year, defendant was ordered removed. In 2007, defendant admitted to violating his probation. The trial court added 60 days to defendant’s sentence, to be served on a work release program to commence December 14, 2007, and reinstated defendant’s probation. On September 10, 2008, defendant admitted a violation of a term of his probation requiring defendant to report to probation. The court then reinstated probation. In 2016, filed a petition for dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4, and a petition for a reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17(b). As mitigation, defendant provided in his petition that he married the victim and had two children with her. Moreover, defendant noted that both violations of probation occurred because he was in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and was deported so he was unable to meet his probation officer or check in for his weekend custody obligation. Both motions were denied, and defendant appealed. On January 1, 2017, Penal Code section 1473.7 went into effect. Among other things, section 1473.7 permitted a defendant to challenge a conviction based on a guilty plea where prejudicial error affected the defendant’s ability to understand the immigration consequences of the plea. On July 10, 2017, following the filing of the Court of APpeal's opinion in defendant’s first appeal, defendant, in pro. per., filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7. The trial court denied defendant’s motion without defendant or defense counsel present. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's section 1473.3 motion and reversed. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Antonio Moses, III of human trafficking of a minor; attempted pimping of a minor; and pandering. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found Moses previously suffered a strike conviction, but dismissed four prior prison term allegations for lack of evidence. The court then imposed the high term of 12 years on count 1, doubled to 24 years based on the prior strike, and stayed under section 654 the imposition of midterm sentences for counts 2 and 3. Pertinent here, in enacting Penal Code section 236.1, the electorate specified that a defendant’s mistaken belief that the minor was of age was not a defense to attempted human trafficking. Moses contended that his conviction of human trafficking in count 1 had to be reversed based on the undisputed fact that the intended victim of his conduct was not actually a minor, but rather an undercover police officer. The Court of Appeal agreed: the plain terms of section 236.1(c) included, as a required element, the victim had to be “a person who is a minor at the time of commission of the offense.” This requirement distinguished attempted human trafficking as defined by section 236.1(c) from an ordinary criminal attempt defined in section 21a. "Because there was no evidence here of any involvement of an actual minor victim as required by the human trafficking statute under which Moses was convicted, we reverse the judgment as to count 1 and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings, including resentencing on counts 2 and 3." View "California v. Moses" on Justia Law

Derrick Burns struck his girlfriend and led law enforcement on a high-speed chase. A jury convicted him of false imprisonment, evading a police vehicle, infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon; Burns admitted two prior strikes. After dismissing one of the strikes, the trial court sentenced Burns to a total term of 19 years, eight months in state prison. Burns appealed his convictions on counts 2 and 3 (evading a police officer and inflicting corporal injury) on the basis that his counsel conceded guilt during opening and closing statements without his express consent. Consistent with its recent decision in California v. Marsh, 37 Cal.App.5th 474 (2019), the Court of Appeal rejected this claim as contrary to controlling precedent. However, the Court accepted Burns's remaining claim that the case should have been conditionally reversed for the trial court to consider his eligibility for mental health diversion pursuant to newly enacted Penal Code section 1001.36. Judgment was conditionally reversed with directions for further proceedings under section 1001.36. View "California v. Burns" on Justia Law

After S.M was adjudicated a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) and committed for treatment to the Department of State Hospitals, he appealed from an order that he be involuntarily administered antipsychotic medication by the Department. The involuntary medication order is due to expire, and is a renewal of a prior order that expired in 2018, which the court affirmed.The Court of Appeal held that the Department had standing to petition to renew the involuntary medication order; even if the trial court abused its discretion by denying S.M.'s motion to represent himself, it was not reasonably probable that he would have received a better result had he been allowed to represent himself; S.M. waived his discovery objection and, because he did not accept the trial court's offer to grant a continuance, he could not establish prejudice; and, even if the trial court did erred by admitting the opinion of a non-testifying psychiatrist, the error was not prejudicial. View "People ex rel. California Department of State Hospitals v. S.M." on Justia Law

Jimmy Flores Meza appealed his conviction for misdemeanor child endangerment. He was charged about two years after he assaulted his 17-year-old daughter on the street. At the State's request and without objection from Meza, the trial court directed the jury that it could find him guilty of felony child endangerment or the lesser included offense of misdemeanor child endangerment. A jury found him not guilty of the felony, but guilty of the misdemeanor. On appeal, Meza argued for reversal because the one-year statute of limitations had run on the misdemeanor offense. The State argued Meza forfeited this ground for attacking his conviction because his attorney generally assented to the State's requested jury instructions. The Court of Appeal concluded general consent to a prosecutor’s packet of instructions did not forfeit the statute of limitations objection. Because it was uncontested Meza’s misdemeanor conviction was time-barred, the Court reversed judgment. View "California v. Meza" on Justia Law

After receiving a speeding citation, defendant Dr. Nickesh Pravin Shah duped an employee into signing a letter falsely stating that defendant was responding to a medical emergency at the time of the traffic stop. Defendant’s attorney eventually entered the letter in evidence at his traffic trial. After the traffic trial, defendant was charged with violating Penal Code sections 132 and 134 by preparing and offering the forged letter as false evidence. A jury found defendant guilty of both offenses, and the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation. On appeal, defendant contended judgment should have been be reversed because the trial court: (1) failed to instruct the jury that materiality is an element of the offenses; (2) erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of forgery as it relates to the violation of Penal Code section 132 (count 1); (3) erred in denying his motion to dismiss the felony complaint as an impermissible successive prosecution for the same act or course of conduct; and (4) impaired his constitutional right to present a defense through its evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Shah" on Justia Law

Petitioner Hedy Wolf pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of making harassing telephone calls. The trial court: (1) granted Petitioner one year of summary probation with the condition she serve one day in jail in lieu of paying fines; and (2) imposed a criminal protective order. Petitioner moved to withdraw her plea. The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion. Petitioner appealed the denial of her motion to the superior court’s appellate division and requested the appointment of appellate counsel. The appellate division denied Petitioner’s request for appointment of appellate counsel. Petitioner then petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to direct the superior court’s appellate division to: (1) vacate its order denying Petitioner’s request for appointment of appellate counsel; and (2) enter an order granting Petitioner’s request for appointment of appellate counsel. The Court determined the possibility that Real Party in Interest could prevail on a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s appeal in the appellate division did not mean Petitioner should have been denied counsel. The Court granted the writ petition. View "Wolf v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Following the partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant Antonino Flores pleaded guilty to one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine. The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant probation under various terms and conditions. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal was the court erred by not granting his motion to suppress in its entirety. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed judgment and remanded with directions. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Douglas Stout of attempted carjacking, attempted kidnapping, criminal threats, carrying a loaded firearm with the intent to commit a felony, possession of a firearm by a felon, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and possession of ammunition by a felon. The jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a forearm in the commission of the enumerated felonies, and he had prior prison terms and on-bail enhancements. The trial court imposed a state prison term of 35 years and four months, encompassing three different cases. Defendant raised multiple challenges to his conviction and sentence. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant and the Attorney General that the firearm use enhancement on the count 4 conviction for carrying a loaded firearm with the intent to commit a felony had to be stricken. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the asserted instructional error was harmless, and one of defendant’s convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon had to be reversed. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the firearm use enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill 620, and directed the trial court on remand to stay sentence on the count 1 conviction for attempted carjacking and its associated firearm use enhancement, unless the trial court decides to strike the enhancement. The Court noted a clerical error in the abstract of judgment; because the trial court must recalculate the aggregate sentence on remand, the Court did not address defendant’s fifth contention that the trial court miscalculated defendant’s sentence. View "California v. Stout" on Justia Law