Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Brian Koback walked into a rental car company office and stole a set of car keys. When confronted by three employees in the parking lot, defendant told the men to back off or he would “f*ck” them up. He then walked across the street. Undeterred, the three employees followed defendant to a motel parking lot where they again confronted him and demanded defendant return the keys. Defendant made a tight fist around one of the key fobs, so the ignition portion of the key was sticking out between his knuckles and, from within arm’s reach, lunged at one of the employees while swiping or swinging at the employee’s torso. Defendant did not make contact. When the employees backed off, defendant jumped a fence and tried to flee. Police officers arrived and pursued defendant. Officers subdued defendant after a brief struggle, during which three of the officers suffered minor injuries. Defendant was charged with and convicted of robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and resisting arrest. Defendant admitted he had suffered a strike conviction, and the trial court sentenced him to state prison for 14 years four months. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was not supported by substantial evidence because there was no evidence he used the car keys in a manner that was capable of inflicting and likely to cause great bodily injury; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences on the robbery and resisting arrest counts, under the mistaken belief it could only impose concurrent sentences if it struck defendant’s strike prior; (3) the minutes of sentencing and abstract of judgment do not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence with respect to restitution and parole revocation fines; and (4) the minutes of sentencing contain a clerical error because they state defendant admitted two strike priors instead of one. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon: that was supported by substantial evidence. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded the trial court erred when it concluded the only way it could impose concurrent sentences on defendant’s robbery and resisting arrest convictions was if it first struck defendant’s admitted strike prior: this was remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Koback" on Justia Law

In 2016, the California Legislature created a new law, which became effective in January 2017, allowing a person who was no longer in custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction because: “The conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to a prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” In 1994, defendant Fernando Mejia pleaded guilty to three drug crimes; as a result, he faced mandatory deportation. In 2017, Mejia filed a Penal Code section 1473.7 motion; the trial court denied the motion, finding Mejia did not prove an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim. In 2018, Mejia timely appealed. The Attorney General conceded the 2019 amendment to section 1473.7 was retroactive. The Court of Appeal held that to establish a “prejudicial error” under section 1473.7, a person need only show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) he did not “meaningfully understand” or “knowingly accept” the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of the plea; and (2) had he understood the consequences, it is reasonably probable he would have instead attempted to “defend against” the charges. The Court found Mejia made such a showing. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order denying Mejia’s section 1473.7 motion. On remand, the Court directed the trial court to allow Mejia to withdraw his 1994 guilty pleas. View "California v. Mejia" on Justia Law

JRE filed suit against defendants in an action stemming from a dispute concerning a television production based on the life of the Mexican-American celebrity Jenni Rivera. JRE filed suit against Rivera's former manager, the program's producers, and the program's broadcaster. JRE alleged that the manager breached a nondisclosure agreement by disclosing information to the producers and the broadcaster.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying the producers' special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, holding that JRE satisfied its burden to demonstrate a prima facie case, with reasonable inferences from admissible evidence, that the producers had knowledge of the nondisclosure agreement before taking actions substantially certain to induce the manager to breach the agreement. However, the court held that the First Amendment protected the broadcaster's use and broadcast of the information in the series, and the court reversed the trial court's order denying the broadcaster's special motion to strike. In this case, although First Amendment protection for newsgathering or broadcasting does not extend to defendants who commit a crime or an independent tort in gathering the information, it was undisputed that the broadcaster did not know of the nondisclosure agreement at the time it contracted with the producers to broadcast the series, and JRE did not show that the broadcaster engaged in sufficiently wrongful or unlawful conduct after it learned of the nondisclosure agreement to preclude First Amendment protection. View "Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

LeRoy Guillory and 11 other plaintiffs appealed the denial of their 42 U.S.C. 1988 motion for attorney fees as prevailing parties in their civil rights claim against defendant Orange County Sheriff’s Department Investigator Michele Hill. In 2007, following a huge Halloween party, 100 special weapons and tactics (SWAT) officers raided the mansion where the party had taken place. The SWAT team forcibly detained plaintiffs and restrained their hands behind their backs with zip ties. About an hour later, Hill and a team of around 40 officers entered the mansion to conduct a warrant-based search for evidence of illegal gaming. Hill coordinated the search. At various times that day, she interviewed and released each plaintiff separately. Plaintiffs sued Hill and other defendants for allegedly violating plaintiffs’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Eventually, “several defendants including the various SWAT teams, unnamed ‘Doe’ police officers, and County of Orange defendants dropped out, either by plaintiffs’ failure to name the ‘Doe’ defendants or by settlement or summary adjudication,” leaving Hill as the sole remaining defendant. At the close of evidence, the trial court granted Hill’s motion for a directed verdict. On appeal from the first trial, the Court of Appeal reversed the directed verdict solely as to plaintiffs’ “section 1983 claims based on the prolonged detention of the plaintiffs” after the search ended. The Court affirmed, however, the directed verdict on plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims, “including the SWAT team and other officers’ allegedly excessive force in entering and securing the premises” and “restraining the detainees with excessive force before Hill questioned them.” The jury awarded damages to nine plaintiffs; the jury found in Hill’s favor on the three remaining plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contended the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their request for attorney fees. The Court of appeal found, "in light of plaintiffs’ minimal success and inflated fee request," the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny their section 1988 motion. Plaintiffs originally sought over $1 million in damages but ultimately obtained an award of less than $5,400. Plaintiffs then moved for almost $3.8 million in attorney fees in a 392-page motion containing, in the trial court’s words, “bloated, indiscriminate,” and sometimes “‘cringeworthy’” billing records. View "Guillory v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 2017, appellants were charged with multiple counts of second-degree robbery and one count of receiving stolen property based on a series of robberies in 2012. Farr was also charged with second-degree burglary, making a criminal threat, and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. A San Francisco police officer had reviewed police reports of the crimes and surveillance video of eight of them before arresting the two. Appellants unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to their warrantless arrest. Alexander pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery and admitted a prior conviction for attempted robbery and one prior prison term. Farr pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and admitted four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced Alexander to 14 years and Farr to 10 years in prison. The court of appeal upheld the denial of the motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to their warrantless arrest. The trial court properly admitted the officer’s testimony that the videos helped provide probable cause for appellants’ arrest. The court rejected appellants’ arguments that his testimony constituted hearsay, relied on unauthenticated writings and violated the secondary evidence rule. The officer's information was sufficiently reliable to justify the arrest. The court also rejected challenges to the sentences imposed. View "People v. Alexander" on Justia Law

James Toledano was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit extortion and attempted extortion. Toledano challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, and asserted the trial court misinstructed the jury on extortion and erred in failing to give an instruction on entrapment and a pinpoint instruction on the litigation privilege. The Court of Appeal concluded sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, but reversed judgment because Toledano suffered prejudice in the trial court’s decision not to instruct on Toledano’s affirmative defense his actions were protected under the litigation privilege. View "California v. Toledano" on Justia Law

J.M., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation with various terms and conditions after he made a false report that a bomb or other explosive device would be placed in his school. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that J.M.'s words were not protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Penal Code section 148.1, subdivision (c) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The court held that subdivision (c) of section 148.1 criminalizes the malicious communication of knowingly false information about placement of a bomb or other explosive, and such utterances are not constitutionally protected speech. View "People v. J.M." on Justia Law

Anthony Korwin was convicted by jury of: attempting to commit a lewd act upon a child, (count 1); contacting a minor with knowledge and intent to commit a sexual offense (count 2); and meeting with a minor for lewd purposes (count 3). He exchanged sexually explicit messages over the course of nearly five months with a law enforcement agent who Korwin believed was a 13- or 14- year-old girl. Korwin was arrested when he arrived at a restaurant where he arranged to meet the girl. Police officers recovered from his vehicle cameras, condoms, and the phone he used for the communications, which contained an age-regressed photo of another agent sent to Korwin during the communications. The court sentenced Korwin to three years in prison based upon the middle term for count 3. The court stayed punishment for count 1 (one year) and count 2 (three years) pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Korwin challenges only his conviction for count 2, contending there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction under section Penal Code Section 288.3(a) because the agent was not actually a minor. He contends his erroneous belief he was communicating with a minor was not a substitute for the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Korwin’s interpretation of that statute, concluding it was contrary to both the plain meaning of the statute and its purpose. Therefore, the Court affirmed judgment. View "California v. Korwin" on Justia Law

Six Flags, a Vallejo amusement park, features rides and animal attractions on 138 acres, including a ticketed interior portion with the entertainment activities and an exterior portion with an admissions area connected by walkways and streets to a paid parking lot. The property falls within the city’s “public and quasi-public facilities zoning district.” For many years, the amusement park was municipally owned but privately operated. In 2006, a federal district court recognized the constitutional right of an individual to protest at the park’s front entrance, which is public fora under California’s free speech clause. The following year, Park Management exercised its option and acquired the park from the city for $53.9 million; the city committed to retaining the park’s zoning designation. Management agreed to pay the city a percentage of annual admissions revenue. The city’s redevelopment agency agreed to finance the construction of a new parking structure on publicly owned fairgrounds for lease to Management. In 2014, Management banned all expressive activity at the park, including protests. Weeks later, people protested against the park’s treatment of animals at the front entrance area and handed out leaflets in the parking lot. The police and the district attorney declined to intervene without a court order. Management filed suit, alleging private trespass. The trial court granted Management summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed. While a long-time protestor failed to prove as a matter of law that he has acquired a common law prescriptive right to protest at the park, the exterior, unticketed areas of the amusement park are a public forum for expressive activity under California Constitution article I, section 2. View "Park Management Corp. v. In Defense of Animals" on Justia Law

Posing as undercover police officers, defendant Robert Montalvo and a female associate committed two robberies: they took money from a couple at a hotel, and they pretended to be conducting a prostitution sting operation and stole money from their target. In a hotel room where defendant was eventually arrested, police discovered rock cocaine and a glass smoking pipe. Defendant was ultimately convicted of multiple crimes including first- and second-degree robbery. After striking one of two prior serious felony conviction allegations, the trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 25 years in state prison and a consecutive one-year term in county jail. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented to convict him, and he alleged multiple errors with the trial proceedings. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contention that there was insufficient evidence of the “force or fear” element of robbery. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court agreed the admission of the statement of the nontestifying victim given to the investigating officer violated the confrontation clause, but the error was harmless. The Court corrected sentencing errors, requiring it to: (1) strike the section 667(a)(1) enhancements imposed on count 2 and imposed and stayed on count 3; (2) dismiss the section 667.5(b) prior prison term enhancement; (3) order that execution of the sentences imposed on counts 8 and 9 be stayed pursuant to section 654; and (4) remanded and order that the trial court impose a full-term sentence on count 3 and stay execution thereof pursuant to section 654. Also, given the statutory change in section 667(a), the Court remanded for the trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to dismiss or strike that enhancement allegation pursuant to section 1385. As so modified, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Montalvo" on Justia Law