Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a convicted felon, carried a loaded and concealed firearm. A jury convicted Defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon, carrying a readily accessible concealed and unregistered firearm, and carrying an unregistered loaded firearm in public. Defendant appealed, arguing that Cal. Penal Code 654, which prohibits multiple punishment for an act that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law, prohibited multiple punishment for his convictions. The court of appeal modified the judgment to stay execution of the sentence on count three and affirmed the judgment as modified. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because different provisions of law punish in different ways Defendant's single act, section 654's plain language prohibits punishment for more than one of those crimes. Remanded.

After police found Defendant Victor Correa hiding in a closet with a cache of guns, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court initially limited review to the question of whether imposing sentence on more than one of these counts violated Cal. Penal Code 654's prohibition against multiple punishment for the same criminal act. The Court then requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether section 654 applies to multiple violations of the same criminal statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by its plain language, section 654 does not bar multiple punishment for multiple violations of the same criminal statute, but this interpretation was not applied to Defendant because the new rule may be applied prospectively only; and (2) even so, Defendant's sentence did not violate section 654 because specific statutory authority makes possession of each weapon a separate offense.

Defendant MBNA America Bank issued a credit card to Plaintiff Allan Parks. As part of its service to cardholders, MBNA extended credit to Plaintiff by sending him convenience checks that did not include disclosures required by Cal. Civ. Code 1748.9. Plaintiff later sued MBNA on behalf of himself and similarly situated MBNA customers, alleging that the bank engaged in unfair competition by failing to make the disclosures mandated by section 1748.9. MBNA argued that the National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) preempted the state disclosure law. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings on MBNA's motion, concluding that the bank's failure to attach the statutorily mandated disclosures to its convenience checks was not unlawful. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, holding that NBA preempts section 1748.9 because the state law standards act as an obstacle to the broad grant of power given by the NBA to national banks to conduct the business of banking. Remanded.

Penal Code section 4019 has offered prisoners in local custody the opportunity to earn conduct credit against their sentences for good behavior. For eight months during 2010, a now-superseded version of section 4019 that was enacted during a state fiscal emergency temporarily increased the rate at which local prisoners could earn conduct credits. At issue was whether this former statute retroactively benefited prisoners who served time in local custody before January 25, 2010, the date on which it became operative. The court held that former section 4019 applied prospectively, meaning that qualified persons in local custody first became eligible to earn credit for good behavior at the increased rate beginning on the statute's operative date. The court also held that the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions did not require retroactive application.

This case arose when petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Lassen Superior Court, seeking to require the prison to process four administrative appeals of grievances that he had filed. At issue was whether a court commissioner had the authority to summarily deny a petition for writ of mandamus or habeas corpus under Code of Civil Procedure section 259, subdivision (a), which authorized commissioners to hear and determine ex parte motions for orders and alternative writs and writs of habeas corpus. The court concluded that section 259(a) did grant this authority to commissioners and that, at least when the petition sought to enforce a prisoner's rights while in confinement - but did not seek to collaterally attack the criminal conviction that provided the basis for that confinement - the summary denial of a writ petition constituted a subordinate judicial duty properly undertaken by a commissioner within the meaning of article VI, section 22 of the California Constitution.

A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and found true the special circumstance allegations of lying in wait and the intentional infliction of torture. At the second penalty retrial, defendant was sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, the court considered jury selection issues; pretrial issues regarding the penalty phase; guilt phase issues; and penalty phase issues. The court rejected nearly all of defendant's claims of error and where it found no error, it determined that defendant was not prejudiced. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with attempted first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling and second degree burglary of an automobile. At issue was whether a person standing in the driveway of a residence who used a remote control to open a motorized garage door had entered the residence within the meaning of the burglary statute. The court held that using a remote control to open a garage door did not constitute an entry into the residence. On these facts, defendant could be charged with attempted burglary but he could not be charged with a completed burglary.

Defendant pleaded no contest to attempted murder with a street-gang enhancement and to second degree robbery in exchange for a 17-year prison term and dismissal of other allegations. At issue was whether the imposition of a mandatory restitution fine violated a defendant's plea agreement where the parties failed to make the fine an express term of the agreement and where the trial court failed to mention the fine during the colloquy. Because the amount of defendant's restitution fine was either made a part of his plea nor otherwise specified in the plea colloquy, the court concluded that it was left to the trial court's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeal's judgment because it reached the same conclusion.

Defendant, a gang member and convicted felon, shot a victim and was convicted of and punished for assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and actively participating in a criminal street gang. The court held that Penal Code 654 did not permit punishment for defendant's gang crimes in addition to his punishments for assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a felon. Accordingly, defendant's two eight-month sentences for his two convictions for committing the assault for the benefit of the gang, section 186.22, must be stayed. In all other respects, the judgment of the court of appeal was affirmed.

Petitioner was charged with several felonies, including murder with special circumstances. At issue was whether Penal Code 1054.3(b)(1) extended to a defendant who had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and proposed to call a mental health expert on the issue of sanity. The court concluded that section 1054.3(b)(1) did not apply in these circumstances. By its terms, the statute authorized an order compelling examination by a prosecution-retained expert "whenever... at any phase of the criminal action" the defense has proposed its own expert testimony on mental state, "[u]nless otherwise specifically addressed by an existing provision of law." Penal Code 1027, which governed the adjudication of an NGI plea, specifically addressed defendant's examination by court-appointed experts, but not by prosecution-retained experts, the subject of section 1054(b)(1). Therefore, the exception in section 1054(b)(1) did not pertain, and that statute as a whole applied.