Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A proposed referendum in this case would require the electorate to decide at the November 2012 general election whether to accept or reject the California state Senate district map certified by the Citizens Redistricting Commission. If the referendum qualifies, the state Senate map certified by the Commission would automatically be stayed, presenting the question of what Senate districts should be used for the 2012 primary and general elections of the State. The Supreme Court held (1) if the proposed referendum qualifies for the November 2012 general election ballot and triggers a stay of the Commission's certified Senate district map, the Commission's state Senate map should be used on an interim basis for the June and November 2012 elections, pending the outcome of the referendum; and (2) if the proposed referendum does not qualify for the ballot, the Commission's state Senate map will continue to be used for the 2012 election and future elections until replaced pursuant to Cal. Const. art. XXI by new maps drawn by a future newly constituted Commission following the 2020 census.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the jury made true findings as to the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstances. The jury was fully instructed as to the elements of the felony-murder special circumstances for a defendant who was the actual killer. However, the jury was not fully instructed as to the elements of the special circumstances for a defendant who was not the actual killer, including the requirement that a nonkiller, in the absence of a showing of intent to kill, must have acted with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant in the commission of the underlying felony. The Court of Appeal determined the omission in the instructions was harmless and affirmed the judgment. The court agreed that the instructional error was amenable to harmless-error review, but found that the error here was prejudicial. Therefore, the court reversed the jury's findings on the special circumstances of burglary murder and robbery murder, as well as defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, remanding the matter for further proceedings.

A jury charged codefendants, Michael Allen and Cleamon Johnson, of the first degree murders of two victims, with multiple-murder special-circumstance findings as to both. After Allen waived his right to a jury trial, the court found that he had previously been convicted of first degree murder. The jury returned verdicts of death for both defendants. During the guilt phase deliberations, two jurors reported their concern that another juror had made up his mind before the case was submitted to the jury. After speaking with all panel members, the trial court discharged that juror for having prejudged the case, and for having relied on evidence not presented at trial. The court held that because the record did not show to a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 11 was unable to discharge his duty, the court abused its discretion by removing him. Accordingly, both guilt and penalty phase judgments must be reversed. In view of the disposition, the court need not address defendants' remaining claims.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to cultivation of marijuana and admitted to having suffered a prior conviction and having violated probation in two other cases. At issue was under what circumstances was a trial court obligated to conduct a hearing on whether to discharge counsel and appoint new counsel when a criminal defendant indicated a desire to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the ground that current counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The court concluded that a trial court must conduct a People v. Marsden hearing only when there was at least some clear indication by defendant, either personally or through counsel, that defendant wanted a substitute attorney. The court also held that, if a defendant requested substitute counsel and made a showing during a Marsden hearing that the right to counsel had been substantially impaired, substitute counsel must be appointed as attorney of record for all purposes. In so holding, the court specifically disapproved of the procedure of appointing substitute or "conflict" counsel solely to evaluate a defendant's complaint that his attorney acted incompetently with respect to advice regarding the entry of a guilty or no contest plea. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter to that court with instructions.

Defendant was convicted of oral copulation in a local detention facility and of the first degree murder of a fellow inmate. The jury found true the special circumstance allegations of murder while engaged in the attempted commission of oral copulation and, in a separate proceeding, of a prior conviction of murder, returning a death verdict. On automatic appeal, the court addressed pretrial, guilt phase, and penalty phase issues. The court found no error, and where the court assumed error, it found no prejudice. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case arose from litigation challenging the validity, under the United States Constitution, of the initiative measure (Proposition 8) that added a section to the California Constitution providing that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California" (Cal. Const., art. I, section 7.5). The Ninth Circuit posed the following procedural issue to the court, "[w]hether under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative's validity or the authority to assert the State's interest in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refused to do so." In response, the court concluded that when the public officials who ordinarily defended a challenged state law or appealed a judgment invalidating the law declined to do so, under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Election Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative measure were authorized to assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity, enabling the proponents to defend the constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative.

This case stemmed from the taking of property in downtown Los Angeles to comply with a federal court order to improve the quality of bus services and involved California's "quick-take" eminent domain procedure, Code of Civil Procedure 1255.010, 1244.410, where a public entity filing a condemnation action could seek immediate possession of the condemned property upon depositing with the court the probable compensation for the property. At issue was Section 1255.260's proper interpretation. The court of appeals in this case held that, under the statute, if a lender holding a lien on condemned property applied to withdraw a portion of the deposit, and the property owner did not object to the application, the lender's withdrawal of a portion of the deposit constituted a waiver of the property owner's claims and defenses, except a claim for greater compensation. The court found the court of appeal's conclusion was inconsistent with the relevant statutory language and framework. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm in commission of the murder. The jury also found true the three special-circumstance allegations that defendant intentionally killed a police officer, that he committed murder for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, and that he intentionally killed the victim by lying in wait. Defendant was sentenced to death and an appeal to the court was automatic. The court held that because the trial court had no authority to strike a special circumstance found by the jury, the court reinstated the lying-in-wait special circumstance. As so modified, the court affirmed the judgment of death.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, premeditated attempted murder, two counts of robbery, attempted rape, assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, and false imprisonment and kidnapping. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of death and defendant's appeal was automatic. The court concluded, or assumed for argument, that six instances of nonprejudicial error occurred during the course of defendant's trial. The court held that, given the strong evidence of defendant's guilt of first degree murder and the aggravating circumstances attending that crime, none of the trial court's missteps amounted to substantial error and there was no prejudicial cumulative effect warranting reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of crimes stemming from two home invasions committed the night before Mother's Day 1993, in the same neighborhood in Torrance. The most serious incident, in which the victims, - a married couple with children - were home during the burglary, resulted in convictions for first degree murder of the husband and attempted premeditated murder of the wife. Related convictions involved burglary, attempted forcible rape, and forcible oral copulation. The jury also sustained special circumstances providing that the husband's murder occurred in the commission of burglary, robbery, attempted rape, and oral copulation. Additional findings were that defendant was armed with and personally used a handgun and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the wife. In the other incident, defendant was convicted of burglarizing the home of a second couple who were vacationing out of town. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to death and the trial court declined to grant a new trial, denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict. On automatic appeal, the court found no prejudicial error at defendant's trial and affirmed the judgment in its entirety.