Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted, among other things, of murder and attempted murder in association with a criminal street gang pursuant to the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act ("STEP"), Pen. Code, 186.20 et seq. The court explicitly held that the STEP Act allowed a predicate offense to be established by proof of an offense defendant committed on a separate occasion. Therefore, at issue was whether, even if the STEP Act allowed a predicate offense to be established by evidence of a defendant's offense on a separate occasion, the inherent prejudice in such evidence generally required its exclusion under Evidence Code section 352. The court held that the admission of evidence of defendant's conviction of extortion and related activities in 1993 and 1994 was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion under section 352 where the evidence was highly probative on several issues and not unduly prejudicial because the evidence tended to establish elements of the prosecution's case. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Real party in interest, as personal representative of his son's estate, filed a complaint in 2006 seeking a refund of state personal income taxes for the years 2000 and 2001, alleging that the estate had paid over $15 million as part of a tax amnesty program, reserving the right to seek a refund, and demanding a jury trial. At issue was whether a taxpayer had the right to a jury trial in an action for a refund of state income taxes. The court held that article I, section 16 of the California Constitution did not require a jury trial in a statutory action for a state income tax refund where the statutory cause of action for a tax refund was a purely legislative creation with no foundation in contract and where such statutory right of action occupied a different class from the common law form of action in which a jury trial was available.

Defendants, minors, committed arson by setting off a firecracker on a brush-covered hillside in Pasadena, causing a fire that burned five acres of forest land. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the requisite mental state of malice, as defined in the arson statutes, because defendants lit and threw the firecracker without intent to cause a fire or any other harm. The court held that, under the circumstances of the case, defendants' acts of intentionally igniting and throwing a firecracker amidst dry brush on a hillside, although done without intent to cause a fire or other harm, were sufficient to establish the requisite malice for arson.

Defendant was convicted of murdering her 4-year-old niece where the jury found as special circumstances that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture and occurred while defendant was engaged in the commission and attempted commission of mayhem. Defendant was sentenced to death and alleged numerous errors on appeal. The court discussed and reviewed the cumulative impact of the guilt phase errors and held that there was no reasonable doubt that they had any significant impact on defendant's conviction and there was no reasonable possibility that they affected the penalty determination. The court also held that the court's error in failing to curtail unduly inflammatory passages in the prosecutor's closing argument was harmless "under the most exacting standard of review." The court further held when the circumstances were balanced against the evidence in mitigation, it could not say that it was an especially close case at the penalty phase. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and jury's verdict.

Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance of killing during the course of a robbery and receipt of stolen property. At issue was whether the trial court erred by failing to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident as a defense to the crime of robbery, thus requiring reversal not only of his robbery conviction, but also of his conviction of first degree felony murder and the special circumstance. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the intent element of robbery did not include an intent to apply force against the victim or to cause the victim to feel fear; rather, it was when defendant committed a forcible act against the victim motivated by the intent to steal, even if defendant did not also intend for the victim to experience force or fear. The court also held that a trial court had no obligation to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident where, as here, defendant's theory of accident was an attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime.

Defendant was convicted of pandering in violation of Penal Code section 266i, subdivision (a)(2), which defined pandering as encouraging "another person to become" a prostitute. At issue was whether subdivision (a)(2) applied when the target was already a prostitute or an undercover police officer acting as one. The court held that subdivision (a)(2) included encouragement of someone who was already an active prostitute or undercover police officer and disapproved People v. Wagner and People v. Montgomery to the extent that they were inconsistent with the opinion. The court also rejected defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence that he encouraged anyone to become a prostitute where the undercover officer testified that he offered his services as pimp by telling her he would provide her with protection, housing, and clothing if she turned her earnings over to him and where defendant twice identified himself as a pimp, assured the officer that she could continue to work in the same area, and promised he would "take care of her."

Defendant was convicted, among other things, for murder and sentenced to death after robberies at two McDonald's restaurants. Defendant raised jury selection issues, evidentiary issues, prosecutorial misconduct issues, issues related to counsel, instructional issues, and issues related to the prejudicial "spillover" effect of errors. Defendant also asserted error in admission of victim impact evidence and challenged the constitutionality of California's death penalty law. The court rejected defendant's argument that the cumulative effect of the guilt and penalty phase of errors required reversal of his conviction and death sentence when no single error compelled reversal and held that, whether considered singly or in combination, any error or assumed error was nonprejudicial.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of contract against defendants, an attorney and his law firm, where the attorney agreed to represent plaintiff in its effort to obtain approval of a redevelopment project, the attorney terminated the representation about two years later, and then the attorney became involved in a campaign to thwart the same redevelopment project by soliciting signatures on a referendum petition to overturn the city council's approval of the project. At issue was whether the court of appeals properly found that plaintiff's claims arose from protected activity in violation of the anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation ("anti-SLAPP") statute, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, and whether plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on them. The court reversed the court of appeals and held that, based on the respective showings of the parties, plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of contract possessed at least minimal merit within the meaning of the anti-SLAP statute.