Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In October 2018, the petitioner and several friends planned to rob alleged drug dealers at gunpoint. During one of these planned robberies, the petitioner and his group approached a victim, K.H., and during the confrontation, the petitioner and another individual fired their weapons, resulting in K.H.'s death. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery.The case proceeded to trial in the El Paso County District Court, where a jury convicted the petitioner on most counts, including felony murder. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the felony murder conviction, plus additional years for other charges. The petitioner appealed, arguing that his LWOP sentence for felony murder was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the LWOP sentence was not categorically unconstitutional and was proportionate to the offense.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that an LWOP sentence for felony murder for an adult offender is not categorically unconstitutional. The court reasoned that there was no national consensus against such sentences and that the sentence served legitimate penological goals such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. The court also conducted an abbreviated proportionality review and concluded that the petitioner's offense was grave and serious, and thus, the LWOP sentence was not grossly disproportionate. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals. View "Wayne Tc Sellers IV v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Christopher Oneil Tarr, who struck a pedestrian with his car while allegedly intoxicated. At the hospital, Tarr refused to have his blood drawn for alcohol testing, despite being informed that under Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, he had already consented to such a test by driving. The police proceeded with the blood draw without a warrant, and the results were used to charge Tarr with several crimes, including vehicular homicide—DUI. Tarr moved to suppress the results of the blood draws, arguing they were unconstitutional as he had clearly revoked his consent and the police did not yet have a warrant when his blood was drawn. The trial court denied the motion, and Tarr was found guilty.The trial court's decision was based on a previous case, People v. Hyde, which held that there is no constitutional right to refuse a blood-alcohol test. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing with its interpretation of Hyde. Tarr then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for certiorari review.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the lower courts' decisions. It held that a conscious driver can revoke their statutory consent to a blood draw. Once consent has been revoked, the police are generally required to obtain a warrant before trying to conduct a blood draw. Otherwise, any evidence obtained from the blood draw should be excluded from trial unless one of the recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies. The case was remanded for consideration of any outstanding arguments concerning the admissibility of the evidence. View "Tarr v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Taunia Marie Whiteaker, who was convicted of second degree burglary, first degree criminal trespass, third degree assault, and harassment following a physical altercation at her mother-in-law's house. Whiteaker appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court erred by failing to merge her conviction for first degree criminal trespass into her conviction for second degree burglary.The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Whiteaker's argument, relying on a previous ruling that first degree criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of second degree burglary. The court reasoned that even though subsequent opinions cast doubt on the previous ruling, it was the prerogative of the Supreme Court alone to overrule its cases. One judge disagreed, believing that a recent opinion had abrogated the previous ruling, but agreed that both convictions should survive because the district court's error in failing to merge the two offenses was not plain.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court agreed with Whiteaker that first degree criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of second degree burglary, and that her overlapping convictions violated the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The court held that double jeopardy sentencing errors require automatic reversal even when the error isn't obvious to the district court. Therefore, Whiteaker's convictions for trespass and burglary merge. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to instruct the district court to amend the mittimus to reflect the merger of Whiteaker's conviction for first degree criminal trespass into her conviction for second degree burglary. View "Whiteaker v. People" on Justia Law

A high school student, identified as J.G., was required to undergo daily searches for weapons as part of a safety plan after committing firearm-related offenses. However, when J.G. returned to school for his tenth-grade year, he was not searched on the first two days. On his third day, school administrators discovered a loaded handgun in his backpack and he was arrested and charged with weapons-related offenses. J.G. moved to suppress evidence of the handgun, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights as the safety plan was no longer in effect at the time of the search. His motion was denied by the juvenile court which found that the safety plan, with its requirement for daily searches, was still in place when the handgun was found.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a search of a student conducted on school grounds in accordance with an individualized, weapons-related safety plan is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that J.G.'s behavior did not create individualized reasonable suspicion on the day he was searched. However, the presence or absence of individualized suspicion is not the full extent of the inception prong of the reasonableness test. The court held that the search of J.G.’s backpack was reasonable at its inception because it was carried out in conformity with a formal safety plan and it was appropriately limited in its scope. The court also found that J.G. had sufficient notice of the search requirement to diminish his expectation of privacy in his backpack. View "People In re J.G." on Justia Law

This case involves the interpretation of a provision in the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) that dictates the factors parole boards must consider when deciding whether to release a convicted sex offender on parole. The Supreme Court of Colorado was asked by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether SOLSA requires, permits, or prohibits parole boards from considering maturity and rehabilitation of an offender.The case arose from the sentencing of Omar Ricardo Godinez, who was convicted of several serious offenses committed when he was fifteen years old. Godinez argued that SOLSA violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to him, claiming that the Act does not allow parole boards to consider an offender's maturity and rehabilitation. This, he contended, renders the Act unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, which mandates that young offenders must be given "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."The Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that although SOLSA does not expressly require parole boards to consider an offender's maturity, it does not prevent them from doing so. Hence, SOLSA permits consideration of maturity. As for rehabilitation, the Court held that it is a necessary part of the factors the parole board is required to consider under SOLSA. Thus, the Court concluded that SOLSA requires consideration of rehabilitation. Therefore, the Court held that SOLSA permits consideration of maturity and requires consideration of rehabilitation. View "Godinez v. Williams" on Justia Law

In a case brought by a group of Colorado electors, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado considered whether former President Donald J. Trump could appear on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. The electors claimed that Trump was disqualified under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits anyone who has engaged in insurrection against the U.S. Constitution from holding office. The district court found that Trump had engaged in insurrection on January 6, 2021, but concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the presidency.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Election Code allows the electors to challenge Trump's status as a qualified candidate based on Section Three. The court found that Congress does not need to pass legislation for Section Three's disqualification provision to apply, and that the provision encompasses the office of the Presidency. The court further held that the district court did not err in finding that Trump had engaged in insurrection, and that his speech inciting the crowd was not protected by the First Amendment. As a result, the court concluded that Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three, and it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Secretary of State to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot. The court stayed its ruling until January 4, 2024, to maintain the status quo pending any review by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Anderson v. Griswold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the district court's order to suppress inculpatory statements made by the defendant, John J. Sanders Jr., in a case involving alleged sexual assault on a child. The district court concluded that Sanders's statements were elicited during a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings and were not voluntary. The People appealed, challenging the district court's ruling on custody but failing to sufficiently challenge the court's separate ruling on voluntariness. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, stating that even if they agreed with the People on the issue of custody, they must affirm the district court's suppression order due to the unchallenged finding of involuntariness. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

On November 18, 2022, Ashleigh Walthour drove her car off a snowy road into some trees. She ran the four or five blocks to her home and called the Aurora Police Department. When the police arrived at Walthour’s home to speak with her, she smelled like alcohol and had slurred speech, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes. She admitted to having consumed a shooter of Jack Daniels and was unable to perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Walthour was arrested and taken to the Aurora City Jail, where she consented to a blood test. The police submitted Walthour’s blood sample to the CBI for processing on November 23. Walthour appeared in court for the first time on January 6, 2023. At that hearing, she notified the court that she would seek the assistance of the Public Defender’s Office. The court set a second hearing for February 6. However, at the second hearing, Walthour explained that she had not qualified for a public defender and would be representing herself. At the same hearing, the State said it had not yet received the blood test results from the CBI but that they “should” have the results “hopefully within the next week or two.” The court set a third pretrial conference for March 7 and directed the prosecution to disclose the test results by February 28 at 5 p.m. The prosecutor did not have any test results to disclose on that date. The trial court announced that it would suppress blood alcohol test results when no trial had been set and the prosecution had not yet received the results of the test from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”). A day later, on March 8, the prosecutor received the blood test results from the CBI. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(I)(b)(3), which required prosecutors to disclose the results of scientific exams such as blood alcohol tests to defendants “as soon as practicable but not later than [thirty-five] days before trial,” did not support the trial court's preemptive suppression. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Walthour" on Justia Law

The Weld County Colorado Board of County Commissioners (“Weld County”) sought review of rules adopted by the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission (the “Commission”) to minimize emissions of certain pollutants from oil and gas wells. A Colorado court of appeals applied a specialized political subdivision standing test and concluded that Weld County did not have standing to pursue its claims. In Colorado State Board of Education v. Adams County School District 14, 2023 CO 52, __ P.3d __, the Colorado Supreme Court abandoned the political subdivision test because it generated unnecessary confusion, and that a political subdivision, just like any other plaintiff, had to satisfy only the standing test developed in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). Applying that holding here, the Court examined whether Weld County has suffered (1) an injury in fact (2) to a legally protected interest. To this, the Court concluded that, although Weld County had a legally protected interest, it could not demonstrate an injury to that interest. Accordingly, Weld County lacked standing to pursue the claims raised here. We thus affirm the division’s judgment, albeit on different grounds. View "Weld County v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Two months after an apparent arson left five people dead, the Denver Police Department (“DPD”) had no suspects. They employed an unconventional investigative technique: a “reverse-keyword warrant.” Google disclosed to DPD a list that included five Colorado internet protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with devices that had searched for the location of the fire in a roughly two-week period before it occurred. Based in part on this information, law enforcement eventually charged Gavin Seymour and two others with multiple counts of first degree murder. Seymour moved to suppress the fruit of the warrant, arguing that it lacked probable cause and particularity. The trial court denied Seymour’s suppression motion. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, finding: (1) under the Colorado Constitution, Seymour had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his Google search history even when revealed only in connection with his IP address and not his name and that, under both the Colorado Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, he also had a constitutionally protected possessory interest in that same history; (2) Seymour’s Google search history implicated his right to freedom of expression; (3) the warrant at issue adequately particularized the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (4) the warrant required individualized probable cause and that its absence here rendered the warrant constitutionally defective; and (5) law enforcement obtained and executed the warrant in good faith, so the evidence shouldn’t be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. "At every step, law enforcement acted reasonably to carry out a novel search in a constitutional manner. Suppressing the evidence here wouldn’t deter police misconduct." View "Colorado v. Seymour" on Justia Law