Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue presented in these cases was whether a trial court could bifurcate the elements of felony DUI during a jury trial. Specifically, the Court addressed whether a jury trial for felony DUI could be conducted piecemeal, with the element of prior convictions tried separately, only after the jury returns a guilty “verdict” on the other elements. Citing Colorado v. Fullerton, 525 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1974), the Supreme Court held that a trial court could not bifurcate the elements of the offense of felony DUI (or of any offense) during a jury trial. View "Colorado v. Kembel" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror was preserved when the parties note that the juror was sleeping but requested no action from the court; (2) there was a distinction between the waiver of the right to a jury trial and the waiver of the right to a jury of twelve, which could possibly implicate whether counsel could waive the number of jurors on behalf of her client; and (3) the right to a jury of twelve was waived when counsel notes that a juror was asleep but did not object or request action from the court. The Supreme Court found defendant Elliott Forgette was tried by a jury of twelve, and this case did not implicate the second and third issues on which the Court granted certiorari, and it therefore did not decide those questions. The Court concluded, however, that defense counsel does not properly preserve an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror merely by noting that a juror was asleep without objecting or otherwise requesting any action from the court: "when counsel is aware of all of the pertinent facts and does not preserve an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror, that objection is waived, thereby precluding appellate review." View "Elliott v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the office of Mayor in the City of Thornton, Colorado constituted a separate office from that of Councilmember for purposes of article XVIII, section 11(1) of the Colorado Constitution (“section11”), which restricted individuals from serving “more than two consecutive terms in office.” This issue was of consequence to the people of Thornton because the Supreme Court's resolution of this question determined the applicable term limit for the then-current Thornton Mayor, petitioner Jan Kulmann. Based on the plain language of the Thornton City Charter and Thornton Municipal Code, the Supreme Court concluded that the Mayor and Councilmembers in Thornton serve in distinct offices. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling declaring, as a matter of law, that the Mayor’s seat and Councilmembers’ seats were part of one elected body and constituted the same office for purposes of section 11’s term limit restrictions. View "Kulmann v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Following his conviction and sentence for first degree murder, James Woo brought a civil replevin action seeking the return of certain property that was lawfully seized by the government as part of his criminal case. The trial court ruled, and the court of appeals agreed (on different grounds), that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) barred Woo’s claim. Woo argued on appeal that, if the CGIA precluded his replevin action, he was rendered remediless and the CGIA, as applied to him, violated his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Woo had a remedy in his criminal case to recover any property lawfully seized, and because the Court further concluded that the remedy was constitutionally adequate, the CGIA’s bar of this replevin action did not violate his federal and state constitutional rights to procedural due process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, but on slightly different grounds. View "Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff" on Justia Law

In a dependency and neglect case, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether respondent R.B.’s (“Father’s”) due process rights were violated when a juvenile court denied his request for a continuance of a parental-rights termination hearing. Although his counsel was present, technical difficulties prevented Father’s virtual attendance at the hearing. Because Father failed to show actual prejudice, the Supreme Court concluded his claim fails. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, vacated its opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "People in interest of Minor Child E.B." on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged a trial court order that granted defendant Jorge Solis’ motion to disqualify the entire Seventh Judicial District Attorney’s Office because his public defender, began working for the DA’s office prosecuting his case. The issue presented here was whether, as Solis argued before the trial court, his attorney’s former representation of Solis constituted “special circumstances” under section20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2022), requiring not just the attorney’s disqualification, but also disqualification of the entire DA’s Office. Following a half-day hearing, the trial court found that the DA’s Office had a screening policy in place and that it had taken additional precautions to wall the attorney off from Solis’s prosecution. The court thus concluded Solis had failed to establish that special circumstances existed such that “it [was] unlikely that [he] would receive a fair trial.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in granting Solis’s motion. The trial court’s determination that the attorney could potentially deviate from the screening policy in the future was based on his appearance in Mr. Flores-Molina’s case; it was not a determination that the attorney would violate the screening policy in this case or that confidential information from the attorney’s prior representation had not been or could not continue to be adequately screened from the attorneys prosecuting Solis’s case. Because there was no evidence in the record that Solis is unlikely to receive a fair trial, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order disqualifying the entire DA’s Office. View "Colorado v. Solis" on Justia Law

Terrel Turner and Christopher Cruse were jointly tried and convicted on charges related to the burglary of a marijuana dispensary. On the second day of trial, Yolanda Cruse, who is Cruse’s wife and Turner’s friend, was arrested and charged with several counts stemming from a hostile encounter she had with the victim advocate and a prosecution witness just outside the courtroom. The trial judge ordered that Mrs. Cruse be excluded from the courtroom for the remainder of trial. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the trial court’s exclusion of Mrs. Cruse from the majority of the trial based on her alleged harassment of the victim advocate and a prosecution witness constituted a non-trivial, partial closure. Although the trial court failed to expressly apply the Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) test, its findings and the record supported the conclusion that the closure order was justified under Waller and didn’t, therefore, violate defendants’ Sixth Amendment public trial right. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirms that portion of the court of appeals’ judgments concluding that the exclusion constituted a non-trivial, partial closure, and reversed the portion of the judgments reversing the convictions and remanding for a new trial. View "Colorado v. Turner" on Justia Law

Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate determined that probable cause existed to believe that A.S.M. had committed the delinquent acts alleged. A.S.M. timely sought review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. But the juvenile court declined to review the matter on the merits, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding did not constitute a final order. A.S.M. then invoked the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause. After review, the Supreme Court held that while only a district court magistrate’s final orders or judgments namely, those fully resolving an issue or claim were reviewable under C.R.M. 7(a)(3), the preliminary hearing statute in the Children’s Code, section 19-2.5-609(3), C.R.S. (2022), specifically permitted review of a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding. "Therefore, we need not get in the middle of the parties’ tug-of-war over whether the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in this case constituted a final order. Instead, we hold that section 19-2.5-609(3) entitles prosecutors and juveniles alike to ask a juvenile court to review a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency proceeding." View "In re Interest of A.S.M." on Justia Law

Eduardo Barrera was driving a Jeep SUV eastbound on I-70 with Isaiah Deaner in the passenger’s seat. Trooper Bollen, an officer patrolling the highway, saw the SUV pass by and noted that it was an apparent rental vehicle with Arizona plates. Trooper Bollen testified that he was suspicious because I-70 is a major drug corridor where traffickers frequently use rental vehicles to smuggle contraband, bulk narcotics, people, weapons, and cash. He further testified that he specifically noticed the Arizona plates because Arizona borders Mexico, a main source of bulk narcotics in this part of the country. In this interlocutory appeal of a suppression order, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Under the totality of the circumstances here, the Court concluded the officer lacked such reasonable suspicion. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained from the search, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Deaner" on Justia Law

Defendant Cheryl Plemmons intentionally spat on two sheriff deputies while they were attempting to determine if she was suicidal. The deputies arrested her for spitting on them, and the prosecution charged her with three counts of second degree assault: one under section 18-3-203(1)(f.5), C.R.S. (2022), and two under section 18-3-203(1)(h). A jury found her guilty of each count. On appeal, Plemmons argued the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on an element of the offense: the scope of the term “harm” as it related to her intent in spitting on the officers. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Like the courts below, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “harm” as used in subsections 18-3-203(1)(f.5)(I) and (h) encompassed more than just physical harm. "Psychological harm can suffice." However, the Court concluded Plemmons was entitled to a new trial because the trial court’s jury instructions didn’t accurately convey the meaning of “harm” to the jury. Thus, judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Plemons v. Colorado" on Justia Law