Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A man was found dead in Thornton, Colorado, and police suspected homicide. Thornton detectives identified defendant Thorvyn Bullcalf Evan Smiley as the sole suspect and, after tracking him down in New Mexico, brought him to a police station there to collect certain samples from him pursuant to a court order. Seeing Smiley’s obvious concern, they repeatedly reassured him that he wasn’t in trouble and that he’d be leaving the police station that day. The detectives then advised Smiley of his Miranda rights. Smiley signed a waiver and agreed to speak with the detectives. During the subsequent interrogation, Smiley confessed to killing the alleged victim. One of the questions before the trial court was whether the prosecution had proved that Smiley voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded the answer was no, and it suppressed the statement. The Colorado Supreme Court found no reversible error in that judgment and affirmed. View "Colorado v. Smiley" on Justia Law

The State of Colorado charged Dennis Chirinos-Raudales with, among other crimes, sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust, which prohibits sexual contact with persons under eighteen, but whose penalty escalates from a class 4 felony to a class 3 felony if the victim is under fifteen. The question presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the “subject of the action” was the subsection that applied when the child is under eighteen or the subsection that applies when the child is under fifteen. To this, the Court held that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense rather than the sentence enhancer. Therefore, because the substantive offense applies when the child is under eighteen and the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado" on Justia Law

There was no reason to believe defendant Nora Hilda Rios-Vargas did not commit the burglary with which she was charged: at trial, she argued the crime was committed by a nonparty alternate suspect, Sylvia Villalobos, who knew when the owner would be away, knew the location of the items that were stolen, had unique reasons for wanting those items, and had a motive for framing Rios-Vargas. Even the victim suspected Villalobos. Despite the strength of the connection between Villalobos and the burglary, and even though Rios-Vargas’s defense hinged on this connection, the jury was not allowed to see or hear from Villalobos. The trial court accepted Villalobos’s blanket invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and ruled that Rios-Vargas could not call her to the stand. It further prohibited defense counsel from informing the jury why Villalobos did not testify. As a result, the prosecution was able to tell two conflicting narratives. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review to decide whether a defendant could call to the witness stand a nonparty alternate suspect who intended to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and if not, what the jury may be told about the alternate suspect’s failure to appear. The Court held that a defendant is entitled to question a nonparty alternate suspect in the jury’s presence under the circumstances and procedures set forth in this opinion. Because the trial court erred in accepting Villalobos’s blanket Fifth Amendment invocation without holding a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and because that error was not harmless, the Supreme Court reversed Rios-Vargas’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Rios-Vargas v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Jose Leonel Orellana-Leon sexually abused his girlfriend’s daughter, L.V., from the time she was seven or eight years old until she was fifteen. When L.V. was fifteen years old, she told her father and stepmother about the abuse; as a result, a forensic interview was conducted. The State subsequently charged Orellana-Leon with sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust. Before trial, the State gave notice it intended to admit statements L.V. made to her father, stepmother, and the forensic interviewer under the child hearsay statute. Over the defense’s objection, the trial court granted the State's request. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on what happens when a defendant is charged under a statute that references two different ages. In the companion case, Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado, 2023 CO 33, ¶ 21, __ P.3d __, the Court concluded that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense, which applied when the child was under eighteen, rather than the sentence enhancer, which applied when the child is under fifteen. Applying that holding to this case, the Court concluded that because the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Orellana-Leon v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Noelle Kelley was taken by ambulance to the hospital after she was involved in a car accident in which another person was injured. At the hospital, an officer investigating the accident asked Kelley if she would release her medical records to the police. She refused. After Kelley was charged with vehicular assault, careless driving, and driving under the influence, she pled not guilty and endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. The State moved the trial court to conclude that Kelley’s endorsement of involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense constituted an implied waiver of her physician-patient privilege and thus the State was entitled to the disclosure of her medical records. They further asked the court to determine that Kelley’s refusal to release her medical records was admissible at trial. The trial court granted the State's motion as to both issues. Kelley then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction for review. Kelly argued: (1) when she endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, she did not impliedly waive her physician-patient privilege; and (2) even if she did waive the privilege, the trial court’s order requiring the release of her medical records was too broad. Kelley also argued that her refusal to release her medical records was inadmissible because she cannot be penalized for exercising her Fourth Amendment right to refuse a warrantless search. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) a party impliedly waives the physician-patient privilege when they assert the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, limited to those medical records related to the affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court’s disclosure order here was not overbroad because it was carefully limited to those medical records that related to Kelley’s endorsement of the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Because the parties did not have the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of the admissibility of Kelley's refusal to release the records, the Supreme Court declined to address it. View "Colorado v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendant Cristobal Garcia, was found guilty of one count of attempted extreme-indifference murder, a form of first degree murder that requires that the defendant “evidenc[e] an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally.” Garcia argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court wasn’t required to define “universal malice” for the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. View "Garcia v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Jacob Woodside committed two alcohol-related offenses in relatively quick succession. First, he pled guilty to the later-committed offense, which was sentenced as his first despite having occurred second in time. Afterward, he pled guilty to the earlier-committed offense and argued that it too should be sentenced as his first. The trial court disagreed, finding that Woodside’s prior conviction subjected him to second-offense penalties because “at the time of sentencing” he had a relevant “prior conviction,” despite the order in which the offenses occurred. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the plain language of section 42-4-1307(5)(a) C.R.S. (2022) imposed second-offense penalties when a defendant has a relevant prior conviction; it did not require that conduct underlying a second-offense sentence pre-date conduct underlying the first-offense sentence. The Court concluded the trial court properly determined that Woodside’s Weld County DWAI, though based on conduct pre-dating his Grand County DWAI, was a second offense subject to the penalties laid out in section 42-4-1307(5)(a). View "Colorado v. Woodside" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ari Liggett was charged with the first degree murder of his mother. Although Liggett pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”), he was ultimately convicted. On appeal, Liggett argued: (1) the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by ruling that the State could use psychiatric evidence derived from Liggett’s voluntary custodial statements to “rebut any evidence presented that [he] was insane at the time of the alleged offense,” even though police obtained those statements in violation of his Miranda rights; and (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to subpoena and present privileged information from his nonphysician medical providers. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that when a defendant presents psychiatric evidence supporting their insanity defense, they can open the door to the admission of psychiatric evidence rebutting that defense, even if the evidence includes the defendant’s voluntary but non-Miranda-compliant statements. Additionally, the Court held that § 16-8-103.6(2)(a), C.R.S. (2022)’s waiver of privilege as to “communications made by the defendant to a physician or psychologist” includes communications made to a physician’s or psychologist’s agents. Because the nonphysician medical providers who testified at Liggett’s trial made their observations as agents of Liggett’s physicians, the Court concluded Liggett waived the statutory privileges he shared with those providers. View "Liggett v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The named victim in this sexual assault case availed herself of her constitutional and statutory right to attend the preliminary hearing held by the county court. After the State rested their case at the hearing, the defense called the named victim to the stand, even though it had not subpoenaed her. The named victim exited the courtroom, but the court prevented her from leaving the courthouse, ordered her to return to the courtroom, and eventually required her to testify. Although the State objected based on the Victim Rights Act (“VRA”) and Colorado case law, the court overruled their objection. In so doing, the court, like defense counsel, relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. District Court, 576 P.2d 169 (Colo. 1978). The State then obtained a stay and petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the county court's order. Given the state of the record at the preliminary hearing, the Supreme Court concluded the county court erred by applying McDonald. "And, in any event, McDonald preceded the VRA, which was a game changer. Reading McDonald with the gloss supplied by the VRA, we hold that defense counsel may not call to the witness stand an unsubpoenaed victim who happens to be in attendance at a preliminary hearing." View "Colorado v. Platteel" on Justia Law

After defense counsel raised concerns regarding seventeen-year-old A.T.C.’s competency, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. A psychologist from the Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”) subsequently evaluated A.T.C. and determined that he was incompetent but restorable. Shortly thereafter, based on OBH’s evaluation, the magistrate entered a preliminary finding that A.T.C. was incompetent but restorable. The State moved for a second competency evaluation, asking the magistrate to allow a psychologist of the State's choosing to evaluate A.T.C. Over defense counsel’s objection, the magistrate granted the motion. The psychologist retained by the State evaluated A.T.C. and concluded that he was competent to proceed. Following a contested hearing at which OBH’s psychologist, the psychologist retained by the State, and a third psychologist all testified, the magistrate found that A.T.C. was competent to proceed. Defense counsel timely petitioned the juvenile court for review, but was unsuccessful. Counsel then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court. Addressing whether a juvenile in a delinquency case could seek interlocutory review of a magistrate’s competency finding in the juvenile court as a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court concluded a magistrate’s finding of competency pursuant to section 19-1-108(3)(a.5), C.R.S. (2022), was subject to review in the juvenile court under section 19-1-108(5.5). View "Colorado in the interest of: A.T.C." on Justia Law