Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The State sought review of a court of appeals judgment that reversed an amended restitution order that substantially increased defendant Franck Belibi after he was convicted. Following the acceptance of Belibi’s guilty plea, the imposition of a sentence to probation, including a stipulation to $4,728 restitution, and the entry of judgment, the district court amended its restitution order to require the payment of an additional $302,022 in restitution. The court of appeals held that in the absence of anything in the court’s written or oral pronouncements reserving a final determination of the amount of restitution, the initial restitution order had become final and could not be amended. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed: because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution due, finalizes any specific amount already set, the sentencing court lacked the power to increase restitution beyond the previously set amount of $4,728. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. View "Colorado v. Belibi" on Justia Law

The State sought review of a court of appeals judgment that reversed an amended restitution order that substantially increased defendant Franck Belibi after he was convicted. Following the acceptance of Belibi’s guilty plea, the imposition of a sentence to probation, including a stipulation to $4,728 restitution, and the entry of judgment, the district court amended its restitution order to require the payment of an additional $302,022 in restitution. The court of appeals held that in the absence of anything in the court’s written or oral pronouncements reserving a final determination of the amount of restitution, the initial restitution order had become final and could not be amended. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed: because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution due, finalizes any specific amount already set, the sentencing court lacked the power to increase restitution beyond the previously set amount of $4,728. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. View "Colorado v. Belibi" on Justia Law

Carlos Meza pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the Class A Traffic Infraction of “Limitations on backing.” Although defendant was present at the providency hearing, his guilty plea consisted merely of acknowledging his reading, understanding, and signing a standardized advisement and plea form, which was presented to the court by the prosecutor, along with an unsigned order for restitution in the amount of $150. The court accepted the plea, fined the defendant $100, ordered restitution, and signed both the completed advisement and plea form and the restitution order. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a motion for additional restitution, which was opposed by the defendant. In addition to legal argument before the trial court, both counsel made a number of further factual allegations concerning the incident, the reasons for the victim’s belief that his full damages would be, but were not, paid by defendant’s insurance company, and the plea negotiations. The county court ordered the requested additional amount of restitution, finding that the victim had suffered a loss of $936.85 that was not known to the State or the court at sentencing, when restitution was initially, but not finally, set at $150. On appeal, the district court, sitting as the court of direct appellate review (pursuant to the simplified procedure for county court convictions) found that the annotation “RR” on the form guilty plea was sufficient to reserve the final amount of restitution and that the record supported the county court’s finding of an additional loss not known at sentencing; it therefore affirmed the increase as having been sanctioned by section 18-1.3-603(3)(a) of the revised statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution, finalizes any specific amount already set, and because the court ordered no reservation in this case, it lacked the power to increase the amount of restitution it had previously set. View "Meza v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Carlos Meza pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the Class A Traffic Infraction of “Limitations on backing.” Although defendant was present at the providency hearing, his guilty plea consisted merely of acknowledging his reading, understanding, and signing a standardized advisement and plea form, which was presented to the court by the prosecutor, along with an unsigned order for restitution in the amount of $150. The court accepted the plea, fined the defendant $100, ordered restitution, and signed both the completed advisement and plea form and the restitution order. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a motion for additional restitution, which was opposed by the defendant. In addition to legal argument before the trial court, both counsel made a number of further factual allegations concerning the incident, the reasons for the victim’s belief that his full damages would be, but were not, paid by defendant’s insurance company, and the plea negotiations. The county court ordered the requested additional amount of restitution, finding that the victim had suffered a loss of $936.85 that was not known to the State or the court at sentencing, when restitution was initially, but not finally, set at $150. On appeal, the district court, sitting as the court of direct appellate review (pursuant to the simplified procedure for county court convictions) found that the annotation “RR” on the form guilty plea was sufficient to reserve the final amount of restitution and that the record supported the county court’s finding of an additional loss not known at sentencing; it therefore affirmed the increase as having been sanctioned by section 18-1.3-603(3)(a) of the revised statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution, finalizes any specific amount already set, and because the court ordered no reservation in this case, it lacked the power to increase the amount of restitution it had previously set. View "Meza v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Alfred Sandoval was charged with first degree assault (a class three felony), and possession of a weapon by a previous offender (a class five felony). Sandoval entered into a plea agreement to the reduced charge of felony menacing (a class five felony) in exchange for dismissal of the original charges. The plea agreement also provided that Sandoval would not be sentenced to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). It did not include any stipulation to judicial fact-finding at sentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court plainly erred when it sentenced Sandoval to an aggravated community corrections sentence based on judicial fact-finding to which Sandoval did not stipulate. The Supreme Court found that it did: in affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied to a direct sentence to community corrections. Furthermore, the Court held it was plain error for the trial court to sentence the defendant to an aggravated sentence to community corrections without meeting Blakely’s requirements. View "Colorado v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Alfred Sandoval was charged with first degree assault (a class three felony), and possession of a weapon by a previous offender (a class five felony). Sandoval entered into a plea agreement to the reduced charge of felony menacing (a class five felony) in exchange for dismissal of the original charges. The plea agreement also provided that Sandoval would not be sentenced to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). It did not include any stipulation to judicial fact-finding at sentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court plainly erred when it sentenced Sandoval to an aggravated community corrections sentence based on judicial fact-finding to which Sandoval did not stipulate. The Supreme Court found that it did: in affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied to a direct sentence to community corrections. Furthermore, the Court held it was plain error for the trial court to sentence the defendant to an aggravated sentence to community corrections without meeting Blakely’s requirements. View "Colorado v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant James Washam, III was charged by information with twelve counts of sexual assault on a child. A portion of the charged date range fell outside of the applicable statute of limitations. After trial began, the prosecution successfully moved to amend the information, narrowing the date range so that it fell completely within the statute. Ultimately, Washam was convicted on all twelve counts. He appealed, arguing that under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(e), the amendment to the date rate was a substantive amendment, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the change once trial began. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the convictions, further ordering the charges be dismissed with prejudice. The State appealed. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the amendment simply narrowed the date range in the information (and did not add an essential element to the offense or raise issues of inadequate notice), the amendment to the information was one of form and not substance. Furthermore, the Court found Washam’s substantial rights were not prejudiced, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment after trial began. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Washam" on Justia Law

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law