Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nathan Ybanez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction of first degree murder and directing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole be modified only to the extent of permitting the possibility of parole after forty years. The appellate court rejected Ybanez’s assertions: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both because his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a non-waivable conflict of interest under which that counsel labored and because he was prejudiced by a deficient performance by his counsel; and (3) that he was entitled to an individualized determination regarding the length of his sentence rather than merely the possibility of parole after forty years. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) Ybanez lacked any constitutional right to a guardian ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing one as permitted by statute; (2) Ybanez failed to demonstrate either an adverse effect resulting from an actual conflict of interest, even if his counsel actually labored under a conflict, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, even if it actually fell below the required standard of competent representation; and (3) because Ybanez was constitutionally and statutorily entitled only to an individualized determination whether life without the possibility of parole or life with the possibility of parole after forty years was the appropriate sentence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals is affirmed, and the case remanded with directions to return it to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "Ybanez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nathan Ybanez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction of first degree murder and directing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole be modified only to the extent of permitting the possibility of parole after forty years. The appellate court rejected Ybanez’s assertions: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both because his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a non-waivable conflict of interest under which that counsel labored and because he was prejudiced by a deficient performance by his counsel; and (3) that he was entitled to an individualized determination regarding the length of his sentence rather than merely the possibility of parole after forty years. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) Ybanez lacked any constitutional right to a guardian ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing one as permitted by statute; (2) Ybanez failed to demonstrate either an adverse effect resulting from an actual conflict of interest, even if his counsel actually labored under a conflict, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, even if it actually fell below the required standard of competent representation; and (3) because Ybanez was constitutionally and statutorily entitled only to an individualized determination whether life without the possibility of parole or life with the possibility of parole after forty years was the appropriate sentence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals is affirmed, and the case remanded with directions to return it to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "Ybanez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Christopher Pernell of several charges, including burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault. The prosecution alleged that Pernell showed up at his ex-wife’s house uninvited; forced his way into her home; threatened her and her boyfriend at gunpoint; forced her to have sexual intercourse; and prevented her from fleeing. At trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, including the ex-wife, the boyfriend, and a police officer who investigated the incident, as well as corroborating physical evidence. Pernell did not testify or present evidence at trial. His theory of defense was that the ex-wife and the boyfriend fabricated the story of the incident. Consistent with this theory, defense counsel told the jury during opening statements that the incident, as described by the ex-wife and the boyfriend, “didn’t happen” and that the ex-wife and the boyfriend “concoct[ed] their story to get [Pernell] out of their lives.” An officer who testified at trial recounted the ex-wife’s description of the incident to him. Pernell objected to this testimony, arguing that the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements to the officer constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court admitted these statements as excited utterances. On appeal, Pernell argued, among other things, that the trial court had reversibly erred in admitting the ex-wife’s statements. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that defense counsel’s opening statement that the ex-wife fabricated her story opened the door for the admission of her out-of-court statements. However, upon review of the trial record, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of these statements contributed to Pernell’s conviction. The Court declined to address whether defense counsel’s opening statement opened the door to the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements, affirming on difference grounds as the appellate court. View "Pernell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Christopher Pernell of several charges, including burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault. The prosecution alleged that Pernell showed up at his ex-wife’s house uninvited; forced his way into her home; threatened her and her boyfriend at gunpoint; forced her to have sexual intercourse; and prevented her from fleeing. At trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, including the ex-wife, the boyfriend, and a police officer who investigated the incident, as well as corroborating physical evidence. Pernell did not testify or present evidence at trial. His theory of defense was that the ex-wife and the boyfriend fabricated the story of the incident. Consistent with this theory, defense counsel told the jury during opening statements that the incident, as described by the ex-wife and the boyfriend, “didn’t happen” and that the ex-wife and the boyfriend “concoct[ed] their story to get [Pernell] out of their lives.” An officer who testified at trial recounted the ex-wife’s description of the incident to him. Pernell objected to this testimony, arguing that the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements to the officer constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court admitted these statements as excited utterances. On appeal, Pernell argued, among other things, that the trial court had reversibly erred in admitting the ex-wife’s statements. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that defense counsel’s opening statement that the ex-wife fabricated her story opened the door for the admission of her out-of-court statements. However, upon review of the trial record, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of these statements contributed to Pernell’s conviction. The Court declined to address whether defense counsel’s opening statement opened the door to the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements, affirming on difference grounds as the appellate court. View "Pernell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case arose from a grand jury investigation of petitioner M.W. and his company, I.I. The State suspected that I.I. was manufacturing and distributing a cigarette product illegally sprayed with synthetic cannabinoids. As part of the grand jury investigation, the State issued a subpoena duces tecum to I.I’s attorney Amy Brimah, ordering her to produce all materials related to any representation by her of I.I. and M.W. The State also requested a hearing, outside the presence of the grand jury and before a judge. Brimah and M.W. moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the materials were protected by the attorney–client privilege. The State asserted that the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege applied. The district court denied Brimah’s and M.W.’s motions, declining to review the documents individually, and ordered Brimah to produce the requested materials. Brimah and M.W. petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that a two-step process applies when a party seeks disclosure of attorney–client-privileged documents under the crime–fraud exception: (1) before a court may review the privileged documents in camera, it must “require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the crime or fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege has occurred;” and (2) the court may strip a communication of privilege only upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the client was committing, or attempting to commit, a crime or fraud and the communication was made in furtherance of the putative crime or fraud. Because the State failed to make such a showing here, the district court abused its discretion in stripping the documents of privilege. Brimah and M.W. also argued the district court should have required the State to disclose the applications and authorizations for the intercepts on which it premised its subpoena under Colorado’s wiretap statute, specifically section 16-15-102(9), C.R.S. (2017). On the facts of this case the Supreme Court agreed. The district court was reversed on this point too. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re 2015-2016 Jefferson County Grand Jury" on Justia Law

This case arose from a grand jury investigation of petitioner M.W. and his company, I.I. The State suspected that I.I. was manufacturing and distributing a cigarette product illegally sprayed with synthetic cannabinoids. As part of the grand jury investigation, the State issued a subpoena duces tecum to I.I’s attorney Amy Brimah, ordering her to produce all materials related to any representation by her of I.I. and M.W. The State also requested a hearing, outside the presence of the grand jury and before a judge. Brimah and M.W. moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the materials were protected by the attorney–client privilege. The State asserted that the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege applied. The district court denied Brimah’s and M.W.’s motions, declining to review the documents individually, and ordered Brimah to produce the requested materials. Brimah and M.W. petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that a two-step process applies when a party seeks disclosure of attorney–client-privileged documents under the crime–fraud exception: (1) before a court may review the privileged documents in camera, it must “require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the crime or fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege has occurred;” and (2) the court may strip a communication of privilege only upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the client was committing, or attempting to commit, a crime or fraud and the communication was made in furtherance of the putative crime or fraud. Because the State failed to make such a showing here, the district court abused its discretion in stripping the documents of privilege. Brimah and M.W. also argued the district court should have required the State to disclose the applications and authorizations for the intercepts on which it premised its subpoena under Colorado’s wiretap statute, specifically section 16-15-102(9), C.R.S. (2017). On the facts of this case the Supreme Court agreed. The district court was reversed on this point too. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re 2015-2016 Jefferson County Grand Jury" on Justia Law

Respondent Isidore Griego was charged with attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault arising out of two incidents in which Griego drove drunk, but due to traffic conditions at the time of the incidents, did not ultimately put any particular persons at risk. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the requirement in the attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault statutes that a defendant place “another person” at risk of death or serious bodily injury necessitates that an actual, discernible person be placed at risk, or if “another person” can refer to the public at large. The Court concluded the statutes at issue required a showing of a risk to an actual, discernible person and that a risk to the public at large was insufficient. “Holding otherwise would leave the statutes without a clear limiting principle and would raise equal protection concerns.” Accordingly, the Court held the court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence did not support Griego’s convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault. View "Colorado v. Griego" on Justia Law