Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Atorrus Rainer was convicted by jury on two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and crime of violence. He was seventeen at the time of the charged offenses, and he was charged as an adult. Rainer was sentenced to forty-eight years for each attempted murder charge, thirty-two years for each assault charge, and thirty-two years each for the charges of burglary and aggravated robbery. The sentences for the two counts of attempted murder were subsequently ordered to run concurrently, as were the sentences for the two counts of assault, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 112 years. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), which categorically banned sentences of life without parole for juveniles who were not convicted of homicide, Rainer moved the district court to vacate the sentence, arguing that his aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and therefore unconstitutional under "Graham." The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that, because Rainer would be eligible for parole at about age seventy-five, thus ineligible for parole within his expected lifetime, he had no meaningful opportunity to obtain release and was unconstitutional under "Graham" and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court determined "Graham" and "Miller" did not apply here, and therefore, did not invalidate Rainer's aggregate term-of-years sentence. View "Colorado v. Rainer" on Justia Law

In 1995, Cheryl Armstrong was convicted by jury on two counts of second-degree murder under a complicity theory. She was sixteen at the time of the charged offenses, and was tried as an adult. Armstrong was sentenced to forty-eight years in prison on each count, to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ninety-six years. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), which categorically banned sentences of life without parole for juveniles who were not convicted of homicide, Armstrong moved the district court to vacate the sentence, arguing that her aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and therefore unconstitutional under "Graham." The district court denied Armstrong’s motion. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, because Armstrong will be eligible for parole at about age sixty, she has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, and her sentence thereby complied with "Graham" and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court determined "Graham" and "Miller" did not apply here, and therefore, did not invalidate Armstrong's aggregate term-of-years sentence. View "Armstrong v. Colorado" on Justia Law

When a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his Miranda rights, knew he was free to leave an interview, and confessed to committing a crime during the course of a conversational, friendly interview devoid of coercive promises or threats, he gave his statements voluntarily. This interlocutory appeal required the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether an defendant's confession to an Army investigator during basic training was the product of coercion. A thirteen-year-old victim told a sheriff's office that seven years prior, defendant Z.T. forced her to give him oral sex. At the time of the alleged assaults, Z.T. was thirteen, and the victim was six. At the time the victim made the allegations in 2015, Z.T. was in Army basic training in Georgia. A sheriff's deputy formally asked an Army investigator to interview Z.T. about the allegations. Z.T. would ultimately be charged with sexual assault on a child. He was extradited to Colorado to stand trial. He moved to suppress the confession, and the trial court granted the motion, finding the Army investigator engaged in coercive conduct that played a significant role in inducing the confession. Finding no such coercive behavior and that the confessions were given voluntarily, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado in the Interest of Z.T.T." on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Alejandro Estrada-Huerta of second-degree kidnapping and sexual assault. Estrada-Huerta was seventeen at the time he was charged, and he was tried as an adult. The trial court sentenced Estrada-Huerta to twenty-four years for the kidnapping conviction and sixteen years to life for each count of sexual assault. The sexual assault sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the kidnapping sentence, resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Estrada-Huerta moved to vacate his sentences, arguing his aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and was therefore unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, because Estrada-Huerta would be eligible for parole at age fifty-eight, he had a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, therefore his sentence complied with “Graham” and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s result, though on different grounds. The Court found that “Graham” and “Miller” did not apply in this matter; Estrada-Huerta was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole: he received consecutive terms for three separate convictions. View "Estrada-Huerta v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Just after midnight on September 6, 2015, Officer Luke Bishard responded to a report of a vehicle driving erratically. Officer Bishard observed defendant Melissa King’s eyes were glassy and her speech was slurred. King admitted to having stopped for a drink on her way home from work. She attempted but failed to successfully perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Officer Bishard arrested King for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). After the arrest, he read her an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016). King refused to submit to a either a blood or breath test. Before trial, King filed a motion to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional as applied. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” King’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Alan Sewick was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). The arresting officer began to read Sewick an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016), but the officer could not complete the advisement because Sewick became belligerent, yelling at the officer and telling him to stop reading. The officer asked Sewick whether he would consent to a blood test or a breath test, and Sewick refused to do so. Before trial, Sewick filed a motion asking the trial court to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court rejected Sewick’s facial challenge, but it granted Sewick’s motion with respect to the as-applied challenge. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” Sewick’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. Sewick" on Justia Law

Officer Carlos Wilkendorf was patrolling near Lowry Park in the early hours of April 25, 2015, when he saw a black SUV parked in the parking lot despite the park being closed. He approached the vehicle and found defendant Depree Maxwell asleep in the driver’s seat, with a female passenger also in the car. The passenger explained that they had pulled into the park because Maxwell was too drunk to drive. Maxwell told Officer Wilkendorf he had consumed a few beers. Another officer, Officer Ryan Marker, arrived on the scene and continued the investigation. Maxwell agreed to perform voluntary roadside sobriety maneuvers, but failed. Officer Marker arrested Maxwell for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). After the arrest, Officer Marker read Maxwell an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016); Maxwell refused to submit to a either a blood or breath test. Before trial, Maxwell filed a motion to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court rejected Maxwell’s facial challenge, but it granted Maxwell’s motion with respect to the as-applied challenge, essentially precluding the State from introducing evidence of Maxwell’s refusal to consent to the blood or breath test in order to establish guilt. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” Maxwell’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

In 2015, defendant Depree Maxwell was involved in a car crash. Responding police officers observed that Maxwell appeared to be intoxicated. Maxwell was unable to provide his driver’s license or proof of insurance, and he admitted to having consumed a few shots of vodka prior to the crash. He attempted to perform voluntary roadside sobriety maneuvers, but failed. One of the officers arrested Maxwell for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). Maxwell refused to submit to either a blood or breath test as required by the Expressed Consent Statute, 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016). Before trial, Maxwell filed a motion to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court rejected Maxwell’s facial challenge, but it granted Maxwell’s motion with respect to the as-applied challenge, essentially precluding the State from introducing evidence of Maxwell’s refusal to consent to the blood or breath test in order to establish guilt. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” Maxwell’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Angelo Montoya and his cousin were charged by grand jury indictment with extreme indifference murder in the shooting death of a young woman at a party. The two were tried together, and although both were acquitted of the charged offense of extreme indifference murder, they were each convicted of attempted extreme indifference murder, reckless manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and accessory to crime, all of which had been submitted to the jury as lesser offenses of the charged offense. Montoya was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of forty-eight years for attempted extreme indifference murder, the maximum sentence in the aggravated range for a class two felony, six years for reckless manslaughter, and three years for criminally negligent homicide, and to a consecutive term of six years for accessory to crime. He appealed, but because there was sufficient evidence to support Montoya’s conviction of attempted extreme indifference murder; because Montoya was barred from challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for being an accessory to crime, a lesser non-included offense presented to the jury at his request; and because Montoya’s simultaneous convictions of reckless manslaughter and accessory to crime neither merged nor required concurrent sentences, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Montoya v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A trial court commits plain error when it fails to limit, sua sponte, a jury’s access to recorded statements during jury deliberations. A trial court abuses its discretion when it allows a police officer to testify as a lay witness about the concept of grooming in the context of sexual predation. The State charged Benjamin Romero with one count of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse and two counts of sexual assault on a child. At trial, the court admitted two recorded exhibits and gave the jury unfettered access to those exhibits during deliberations. The first exhibit was a recording of a forensic interview with one of the victims, C.T., who testified at trial. The second exhibit was a recording, from a previous case, of Romero discussing previous acts of sexual predation he had committed (also involving friends’ daughters around fifteen years of age). The Colorado Supreme Court held that: (1) a trial court does not commit plain error when it does not limit a jury’s access to recorded statements without an objection and (2) a trial court abuses its discretion when it allows a witness to testify about grooming without qualifying that witness as an expert. The Court reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "Colorado v. Romero" on Justia Law