Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed for plain error a trial court’s decision to allow the jury unfettered access, during its deliberations, to the out-of-court statements of three child sexual assault victims. These statements were memorialized in three DVDs and three transcripts thereof, all of which had been admitted as exhibits in the criminal trial of petitioner Nerio Martinez. Martinez first raised the issue of jury access on direct appeal, arguing that allowing the jury unfettered access constituted reversible plain error. In a unanimous, unpublished opinion, a division of the court of appeals rejected this argument. Without deciding whether the trial court had abused its discretion, the division concluded that any error in not limiting the jury’s access to the exhibits during deliberations did not warrant reversal under the plain error standard. The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Martinez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case concerned the scope of a trial court’s discretion to permit, deny, or restrict the jury’s access during deliberations to a DVD containing the recorded statement of a child sexual assault victim, which DVD was admitted as an exhibit in a criminal trial. The State challenged the decision of a unanimous division of the court of appeals, which concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the jury unrestricted access to such an exhibit and that the error required reversal and a new trial. The State argued the division misconstrued Colorado Supreme Court precedent, and the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed with the division that the trial court did not employ the requisite caution to ensure that the DVD would not be used in such a manner as to create a likelihood that the jury would accord it undue weight or emphasis. By relying on an analysis that the Supreme Court later rejected, the trial court misapplied the law and abused its discretion. Moreover, because the nature of the DVD and its importance to the case’s resolution leave us with grave doubts as to the effect that unfettered access had on the verdict and the fairness of the proceedings, the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the third step of the analysis laid out in “Batson v. Kentucky,” (476 U.S. 79 (1986)), which required trial courts to determine whether a party raising a Batson objection proved by a preponderance of the evidence that opposing counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a potential juror on the basis of race or gender. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether the court of appeals erred in its review of the trial court’s Batson ruling by: (1) remanding for specific credibility findings of the prosecution’s non-demeanor-based reasons for its peremptory challenges, (2) refusing to credit the prosecution’s demeanor-based reasons because the trial court did not expressly find them to be credible, and (3) conducting flawed comparative juror analyses. After review, the Court concluded that the trial court here did not commit clear error in step three of its “Batson” analysis and that remand was unnecessary. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Beauvais" on Justia Law

Defendant Emmett Larsen was the father of S.L. and the grandfather of S.L.’s children, A.H. and K.H. S.L., along with A.H. and K.H., moved to Colorado to live with Larsen. While in Colorado, K.H. told a therapist that her uncle, T.J., had sexually abused her. A Department of Human Services (DHS) caseworker interviewed both A.H. and K.H. During the interview, K.H. said T.J. had abused her but did not accuse Larsen of abusing her. A.H., on the other hand, told the caseworker that Larsen had touched her breasts and vaginal area. In a follow-up interview, A.H. again accused Larsen of abusing her. K.H. again stated that Larsen had never touched her inappropriately. Larsen was arrested, and the State charged Larsen with one count of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as part of a pattern of abuse and two counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. This case called on the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to poll the jury about whether jurors had seen a news report about the case that had been posted online and ran in a local newspaper. Here, the trial court gave repeated admonitions not to seek out news about the case — including just before the newspaper released the story. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to poll the jury after a newspaper published a prejudicial news report with limited distribution. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "Colorado v. Larsen" on Justia Law

Around 11:30 p.m., a concerned citizen (“the caller”) called law enforcement after witnessing a possible break-in in a partially developed residential neighborhood. The caller said he saw a person, later identified as Defendant Gonzalo Reyes-Valenzuela, enter several unfinished houses, leave one of the houses carrying a black bag, and use a light-colored, boxy van to travel between houses. The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Supreme Court’s review centered on whether an officer, with a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal behavior was afoot, had to consider the possible innocent explanations for otherwise suspicious behavior before conducting an investigatory stop. Specifically, when an officer is aware that a person is driving around late at night, going in and out of unfinished houses in an area where there had been recent break-ins of unfinished houses, and carrying a black bag, is that officer required to consider possible innocent explanations before conducting an investigatory stop of that person? The Supreme Court held that, because Colorado and United States Supreme Court precedent does not require an officer to consider every possible innocent explanation for criminal behavior, the officers in this case justifiably performed an investigatory stop on the defendant based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Reyes-Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Defendant Oliver Hyde was involved in a single-vehicle accident that left him unconscious. The police suspected that he might have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Hyde was transported to the hospital, and, in accordance with Colorado law, a sample of his blood was taken to establish his blood-alcohol concentration. Hyde was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). He sought to have the result of the blood test suppressed as evidence obtained through an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court granted his motion to suppress, and the State filed an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court found that by driving in Colorado, Hyde consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to blood-alcohol testing under the circumstances present here. Hyde’s statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The Court therefore concluded that in the circumstances presented here, the blood draw was constitutional. View "Colorado v. Hyde" on Justia Law

Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute provided that any motorist who drives on the roads of the state has consented to take a blood or breath test when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer with probable cause to suspect the motorist of driving under the influence. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the trial court’s ruling that an advisement accurately informing defendant William Simpson of this law amounted to coercion that rendered his consent to a blood test involuntary and required suppression of the test result. By driving in Colorado, Simpson consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to a blood draw under the circumstances presented here. "That prior statutory consent eliminated the need for the trial court to assess the voluntariness of Simpson’s consent at the time of his interaction with law enforcement. Simpson’s prior statutory consent satisfies the consent exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the blood draw at issue here was constitutional." View "Colorado v. Simpson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Detective Billy Todis saw defendant Daniel Fitzgerald driving erratically with a headlight out, so he pulled him over and asked him to produce his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. While Fitzgerald struggled to find these documents, Detective Todis smelled alcohol in the car and noticed Fitzgerald had watery eyes. He asked Fitzgerald whether he had been drinking. Fitzgerald said he had consumed one beer. The detective asked Fitzgerald to perform voluntary roadside sobriety maneuvers. Fitzgerald declined. Colorado law provided that if a driver is suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and refuses to take a test to determine the alcohol concentration of his blood or breath, then that refusal can be used as evidence against him at trial. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the use of this “refusal evidence” violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The Court concluded it did not. View "Fitzgerald v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Gerardo Delacruz was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, and prohibited use of a weapon arising from an altercation that took place at a bar in Denver. Delacruz’s convictions were reversed on appeal and, pursuant to section 18-1-405(2), the deadline for his second trial was set for six months from the date the trial court received the court of appeals’ mandate. Four days before trial, and fourteen days before the speedy trial deadline was set to expire, the prosecution learned of a potential conflict of interest involving Delacruz’s defense counsel. The prosecution notified the court, which held a hearing on the matter the following day. The trial court concluded that a continuance was necessary for an independent investigation that would allow Delacruz to make an informed decision with respect to the potential conflict. The trial court also concluded that the prosecution was entitled to a continuance under subsection (6)(g)(I) and (II) of the speedy trial statute to allow the prosecution additional time to secure the presence of the witness who brought this potential conflict to the prosecution’s attention. Delacruz objected to the continuance as a speedy trial violation and moved to dismiss his charges on the same grounds at a later hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the speedy trial deadline. Delacruz petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for relief, arguing that because subsection (6) stated that its exclusions apply “[i]n computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of [the speedy trial statute],” these exclusions did not apply to the speedy trial calculation for a new trial following reversal of a defendant’s convictions on appeal. Delacruz further contended that the trial court erred in concluding that the potential conflict constituted an exceptional circumstance under subsection (6)(g)(II) justifying a continuance for further investigation because Delacruz could have waived his right to conflict-free counsel at the hearing without an investigation. Finally, Delacruz argued the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution was entitled to a continuance under subsection (6)(g)(I) because the witness was not “unavailable” nor was her testimony “material,” as required for a continuance under subsection (6)(g)(I). Finding no reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Delacruz v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Victor Mosley of sexually assaulting his youngest daughter. The court of appeals later reversed his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. Mosley argued on appeal that the trial court violated his statutory speedy trial right on retrial when it granted the prosecution’s request for a continuance. Consequently, he argued, the charges against him should have been dismissed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the applicable statute applied to the six-month speedy trial calculation for a new trial following reversal of a defendant’s convictions on appeal. Subsection (6) listed circumstances that were excluded from the speedy trial calculation, including delay resulting from a continuance granted because material evidence is unavailable despite the prosecutor’s diligent efforts to obtain such evidence. Moseley contended that his speedy trial right was violated because his new trial was held beyond the six-month deadline in subsection (2), and therefore, the charges against him had to be dismissed. In the alternative, Mosley contended that, even assuming the exclusions in subsection (6) applied to the speedy trial calculation for a new trial under subsection (2), the continuance in this case was unjustified because the prosecution failed to act with due diligence to locate the complaining witness, as required by subsection (6)(g)(I). The Court of Appeals rejected Mosely’s arguments on appeal, and finding no error in the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mosley v. Colorado" on Justia Law