Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Austin Veith pleaded guilty to theft and securities fraud. He asked the trial court to sentence him to probation instead of a term of incarceration. The trial court rejected his request for probation with no incarceration and sentenced Veith to ten years of incarceration on the theft count, and twenty-five years of probation on the securities fraud count. Veith did not object when the judge announced his sentence.  But, he did not sign the probation order acknowledging and accepting the terms and conditions of his sentence of probation. Instead, he filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a), arguing that the probationary portion of his sentence must be vacated because he did not consent to it. The trial court denied the motion, and Veith appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Veith had consented to the terms and conditions of the sentence of probation by requesting probation prior to the hearing, but that his consent did not include certain terms of probation added by the court. As a result, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to remove the terms of probation from his sentence that Veith had not requested before sentencing.I t did not order any modification of the prison sentence. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the legality of Veith’s sentence of probation, and reversed the appellate court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that a trial court cannot impose a sentence of probation without the defendant’s consent. In this case, Veith consented to probation in lieu of incarceration; therefore, the trial court exceeded the scope of Veith’s consent when it imposed a ten-year sentence of incarceration in addition to probation. The trial court lacked authority to impose the sentence of probation.  Accordingly, the Court vacated Veith’s sentence in its entirety, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to that court to return the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with Veith’s plea agreement. View "Veith v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the issues presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review implicated: (1) whether a defendant may raise his or her unpreserved double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal and, if so, what standard of review applies; and (2) whether driving under revocation (“DUR”) is a lesser included offense of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (“aggravated DARP”). The Colorado Supreme Court addressed similar issues in four cases at the same time as this case, captioned as “Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado,” (2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___). In “Reyna-Abarca,” the Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Applying those rulings here, the Court concluded that the appellate court in “Zubiate v. Colorado,” (2013 COA 69, ___ P.3d ___), correctly (1) conducted plain error review of Vanessa Zubiate’s unpreserved double jeopardy claim and (2) determined that DUR was not a lesser included offense of aggravated DARP (although the Supreme Court’s analysis differed somewhat). View "Zubiate v. Colorado" on Justia Law

These cases presented issues of whether double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if so, what standard of review applied. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed these same issues in four cases at the same time as these, captioned as “Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado,” (2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___). In “Reyna-Abarca,” the Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Applying that ruling here, the Court concluded that the divisions in “Colorado v. Zadra,” (2013 COA 140, ___ P.3d ___), and “Colorado v. Adams,” (No. 12CA339 (Colo. App. Mar. 12, 2015)), correctly conducted plain error review of the defendants’ unpreserved double jeopardy claims and merged certain of the defendants’ convictions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments in both cases. View "Colorado v. Zadra" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Anthony Marsh of sexually assaulting three of his granddaughters and possessing more than twenty images depicting child pornography. Marsh appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the presence of temporary internet cache files stored on a person’s hard drive could constitute evidence of “knowing possession” as used in Colorado’s child pornography statute, 18-6-403, C.R.S. (2016). The Court held: when a computer user seeks out and views child pornography on the internet, he possesses the images he views. Here, since the evidence presented at trial established that Marsh’s cache contained images that a computer user had previously viewed on the web browser, the Court concluded that the internet cache images qualified as relevant evidence that Marsh had previously viewed, and thus possessed, those images. Therefore, when considered as a whole and in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Marsh possessed more than twenty images depicting child pornography. In addition, the Court held that even if the trial court improperly admitted the forensic interviewers’ testimony as lay opinion, the error was harmless. View "Marsh v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Four cases raised the ultimate question of whether driving under the influence (“DUI”) was a lesser included offense of either vehicular assault-DUI or vehicular homicide-DUI, and presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address: (1) whether a double jeopardy claim could be raised for the first time on direct appeal; and (2) what test courts should apply in evaluating whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another. The Supreme Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on appeal, and appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. With respect to the applicable test for determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another, the Supreme Court reiterated that the “strict elements test” was the proper test, but the Court acknowledged that prior iterations of that test had arguably been inconsistent. An offense is a lesser included offense of another offense if the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the greater offense, such that the lesser offense contains only elements that are also included in the elements of the greater offense. Applying this test to the cases here, the Court concluded that DUI was a lesser included offense of both vehicular assault-DUI and vehicular homicide-DUI, and thus, defendants’ DUI convictions had to merge into the greater offenses. The Court further concluded that in not merging such offenses, the trial courts here plainly erred and that reversal of the multiplicitous convictions was therefore required. View "Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case presented two issues for the Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether a double jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time on appeal; and (2) whether defendant William Costello Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced with a deadly weapon (“aggravated robbery-menaced victim”) and menacing amounted to plain error. In light of the Court’s opinion in “Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado,” (2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___),the Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that in the circumstances presented here, any error that might have occurred when the trial court entered judgment on Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced victim and menacing was not obvious and thus, did not amount to plain error. Accordingly, although the Court concluded that the division erred in declining to review Scott’s unpreserved double jeopardy claim, the Court nonetheless affirmed the judgment. View "Scott v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner-defendant Farouk Nagi appealed the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction and sentence for sexual assault on a child by one of a position of trust. He also argued the district court lacked sufficient grounds to justify ordering a competency evaluation, and that the period during which petitioner was under observation or examination was not properly excluded from the calculation of time within which trial was statutorily required. The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s assertion he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. In the absence of any specific assertion or indication in the record that the district court’s order was entered in bad faith, for the purpose of circumventing the statutory speedy trial mandate or otherwise depriving the defendant of a protected interest, rather than from any concern for the defendant’s rights or the integrity of the judicial process, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Nagi v. California" on Justia Law

In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Colorado v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The defendant in this case, Daniela Molina, used the last name and social security number (SSN) of another person, D.K., to obtain an apartment lease and employment. A jury later convicted Molina of two counts of identity theft and three counts of forgery. Molina appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove all the elements of identity theft and forgery. The court of appeals held: (1) the State was required to prove that Molina knew she had stolen the information of a real person; (2) there was insufficient evidence that Molina knew the last name and SSN she used belonged to a real person; (3) vacated her identity theft convictions; and (4) affirmed her forgery convictions. The court of appeals declined to reach Molina’s argument that the term “thing of value” in the identity theft statute only pertained to items with pecuniary value and therefore neither employment nor an apartment lease were “thing[s]of value.” The Supreme Court concluded: (1) the State needed to show that Molina knew she stole another person’s information; (2) there was sufficient evidence to show Molina knew she stole a real person’s information; and (3) an apartment lease and employment qualified as “things of value.” View "Colorado v. Molina" on Justia Law

Trooper Joseph Ynostroza stopped John Cox for driving in the left lane. During the stop, the Trooper observed several factors that led him to suspect that there might be evidence of illegal activity in the trunk of the vehicle, including the fact that his canine alerted to the odor of drugs in the trunk. The Trooper opened the trunk where he found, among other things, two white trash bags with multiple sealed packages of marijuana. The trial court granted Cox’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that it is “unreasonable for an officer to rely on the alert from a canine trained to detect any amount of marijuana, including legal amounts.” The trial court concluded that, based on the remaining factors to be considered, the Trooper did not have probable cause to search the trunk. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Trooper had probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. View "Colorado v. Cox" on Justia Law