Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

On April 20, 2017, defendant William Davis was charged with vehicular eluding, reckless driving, and driving under restraint after failing to yield to a Parks and Wildlife officer at Golden Gate Canyon State Park. The court appointed Garen Gervey as Davis’s public defender and set the trial for November 20, 2017. On October 30, 2017, Davis, through counsel, moved for a continuance because: (1) Gervey had another trial set for the same day; and (2) due to a scheduling misunderstanding, investigation was still being completed in the case. The court denied the motion after a hearing in which it emphasized the scheduling difficulties it was having in trying to set a trial date and stated that because this case was “essentially a traffic case,” it would likely be straightforward enough to be tried in a single day. In denying the motion, the court also observed, quoting from Colorado v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1997), that the “substitution of one public defender with another does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, absent evidence of prejudice.” The court explained that it perceived no prejudice because it would not take an attorney “of any competence any time to prepare,” and therefore denied Davis’s motion. On the morning of trial, Davis, through newly substituted counsel, again moved for a continuance. The court denied the motion, and trial proceeded. The jury convicted Davis of vehicular eluding, reckless driving, and driving under restraint. The appellate court adopted the holding from Colorado v. Rainey, 2021 COA 35, 491 P.3d 531, that indigent defendants had a constitutional right to continued representation by appointed counsel and district courts had to apply the factors announced in Colorado v. Brown, 322 P.3d 214 when considering a continuance to enable continued representation by appointed counsel. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the trial court correctly considered whether defendant would have been prejudiced if his appointed counsel was replaced by a different public defender, and concluded that he would not be. View "Colorado v. Davis" on Justia Law

Robert Rainey was charged with nine criminal counts related to domestic violence in July 2016. The trial court appointed a public defender as Rainey’s counsel and set trial for January 9, 2017. The night before trial, a storm damaged the courthouse, and the trial was reset to the following day. The State was granted a number of continuances Rainey’s objection because witnesses were unavailable. Trial was ultimately continued to March 6, 2017—the day before the expiration of the speedy-trial deadline. The public defender confirmed that the date would work for trial and agreed to appear for the pretrial readiness conference set for March 3. At the conference, defense counsel raised for the first time that he would not in fact be available on March 6 for trial because of pre-existing vacation plans. Counsel's request for a continuance was denied, with the trial court observing that Rainey’s case was factually simple, and counsel would not need a substantial amount of time to prepare. Counsel conceded that he could not think of any reason why another public defender could not adequately prepare for the trial over the weekend. Trial took place on March 6 after Rainey’s two new attorneys announced that they were ready to proceed. The jury convicted Rainey on two of the nine counts—second degree kidnapping and criminal mischief—with a further finding that both crimes constituted acts of domestic violence. Rainey appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to continued representation of appointed counsel when it denied his request for a continuance and forced him to proceed with the public defenders who had a weekend to prepare his case. The Colorado Supreme Court determined a defendant did not have a right to continued representation by a particular appointed lawyer: the right to continued representation by a particular attorney flows from the right to choose that attorney, which does not apply when counsel is appointed. "Still, if a defendant represented by an appointed attorney can show that denying a continuance and replacing that appointed attorney would prejudice their case, due process requires that the defendant be given a continuance so the attorney can continue the representation." View "Colorado v. Rainey" on Justia Law

In 2011, Respondent Theodore Madrid was charged with one count of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death. During jury selection, the prosecution excused prospective juror J.T., a Black man who indicated on his juror questionnaire that he was sixty-eight years old, married with children, and a retired customer-service specialist. The court gave each side a total of five minutes to question the prospective jurors, including J.T. The prosecution asked J.T. if he had any concerns about potentially having to look at autopsy pictures in the case, to which J.T. responded, "no." The prosecution then asked J.T., "Do you have a good joke?" J.T. responded, "I'm the joke." Thereafter, the prosecution used its ninth peremptory challenge to excuse J.T. Madrid raised a Batson challenge to this, arguing the excuse was race-neutral: "the real problem is we don’t know very much about him. He has a hearing issue it appears and he’s sort of completely nonresponsive. We have very little information on him from the questionnaire and no time to really have a very detailed conversation with him." The trial court accepted this reason and excused the juror. After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted Madrid on all counts. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review on whether a party could, on remand, raise a new race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike made at trial. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: when a party has been provided with an adequate opportunity to present its race-neutral justifications at trial, it is barred from introducing new race-neutral justifications on remand. The Court's application of that holding to the facts here prompted the Court to affirm the court of appeals' judgment, which meant that Madrid was entitled to a new trial. View "Colorado v. Madrid" on Justia Law

Police officers interrogated defendant-appellee Brent Willoughby at his home about domestic violence allegations. After the State charged Willoughby with several offenses, he moved to suppress the statements he made during this interrogation, arguing that the officers obtained them in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The trial court granted the motion, finding that Willoughby had been subjected to a custodial interrogation without first receiving Miranda warnings. The State filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s suppression order. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Willoughby was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements at issue. Therefore, it reversed the portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the statements and remand the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Willougby" on Justia Law

Sylvia Johnson was convicted by jury of unlawfully purchasing a firearm “for transfer to” a man she identified as her common law husband, Jaron Trujillo, who was legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. While deliberating, the jurors posed two questions to the court about the meaning of “transfer.” This became the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court: what the term “transfer” meant under section 18-12-111(1) C.R.S. (2022), the so-called “straw-purchaser” statute. The Supreme Court held that it included temporary transfers and the shared use of a firearm. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on slightly different grounds. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At the time of his appeal, defendant John Hacke was out of custody. The issue his appeal presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether Hacke was entitled to a preliminary hearing on the charge of identity theft, a class 4 felony. After Hacke was arrested, he posted bond. During a subsequent court appearance, he asserted that he was entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was facing mandatory sentencing. Since the State did not initially take a definitive position on this contention, the court scheduled a preliminary hearing. However, the court afforded the State an opportunity to object to the preliminary hearing later if warranted. When the parties appeared again, the court ruled that Hacke was not entitled to a preliminary hearing because identity theft didn't require mandatory sentencing. The district court denied Hacke’s request for a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court concurred: "The relevant inquiry isn’t whether Hacke’s criminal history subjects him to mandatory sentencing if he is convicted of identity theft. It’s whether identity theft, the class 4 felony he’s accused of committing, requires a mandatory sentence. Class 4 felony identity theft does not require a mandatory sentence. Therefore, Hacke is not entitled to a preliminary hearing." View "Colorado v. Hacke" on Justia Law

The issue presented in these cases was whether a trial court could bifurcate the elements of felony DUI during a jury trial. Specifically, the Court addressed whether a jury trial for felony DUI could be conducted piecemeal, with the element of prior convictions tried separately, only after the jury returns a guilty “verdict” on the other elements. Citing Colorado v. Fullerton, 525 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1974), the Supreme Court held that a trial court could not bifurcate the elements of the offense of felony DUI (or of any offense) during a jury trial. View "Colorado v. Kembel" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror was preserved when the parties note that the juror was sleeping but requested no action from the court; (2) there was a distinction between the waiver of the right to a jury trial and the waiver of the right to a jury of twelve, which could possibly implicate whether counsel could waive the number of jurors on behalf of her client; and (3) the right to a jury of twelve was waived when counsel notes that a juror was asleep but did not object or request action from the court. The Supreme Court found defendant Elliott Forgette was tried by a jury of twelve, and this case did not implicate the second and third issues on which the Court granted certiorari, and it therefore did not decide those questions. The Court concluded, however, that defense counsel does not properly preserve an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror merely by noting that a juror was asleep without objecting or otherwise requesting any action from the court: "when counsel is aware of all of the pertinent facts and does not preserve an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror, that objection is waived, thereby precluding appellate review." View "Elliott v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the office of Mayor in the City of Thornton, Colorado constituted a separate office from that of Councilmember for purposes of article XVIII, section 11(1) of the Colorado Constitution (“section11”), which restricted individuals from serving “more than two consecutive terms in office.” This issue was of consequence to the people of Thornton because the Supreme Court's resolution of this question determined the applicable term limit for the then-current Thornton Mayor, petitioner Jan Kulmann. Based on the plain language of the Thornton City Charter and Thornton Municipal Code, the Supreme Court concluded that the Mayor and Councilmembers in Thornton serve in distinct offices. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling declaring, as a matter of law, that the Mayor’s seat and Councilmembers’ seats were part of one elected body and constituted the same office for purposes of section 11’s term limit restrictions. View "Kulmann v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Following his conviction and sentence for first degree murder, James Woo brought a civil replevin action seeking the return of certain property that was lawfully seized by the government as part of his criminal case. The trial court ruled, and the court of appeals agreed (on different grounds), that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) barred Woo’s claim. Woo argued on appeal that, if the CGIA precluded his replevin action, he was rendered remediless and the CGIA, as applied to him, violated his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Woo had a remedy in his criminal case to recover any property lawfully seized, and because the Court further concluded that the remedy was constitutionally adequate, the CGIA’s bar of this replevin action did not violate his federal and state constitutional rights to procedural due process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, but on slightly different grounds. View "Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff" on Justia Law