Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Venalonzo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Anthony Edwin Marsh of sexually assaulting three of his granddaughters and possessing more than twenty images depicting child pornography. Marsh appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the presence of temporary internet cache files stored on a person’s hard drive can constitute evidence of “knowing possession” as used in Colorado’s child pornography statute, section 18-6-403, C.R.S. (2016). First, the Court held that when a computer user seeks out and views child pornography on the internet, he possesses the images he views. The evidence presented at trial established that Marsh’s cache contained images that a computer user had previously viewed on the web browser. The Court therefore concluded that the internet cache images qualified as relevant evidence that Marsh had previously viewed, and thus possessed, those images. Even if the trial court improperly admitted the forensic interviewers’ testimony as lay opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that error was harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment in its entirety. View "Marsh v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Colorado medical marijuana constitutional amendment required law enforcement officers to return medical marijuana seized from individuals later acquitted of state drug charges. The federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) prohibited the distribution of marijuana, with limited exceptions. The question in this case was whether the return provision of the Colorado Constitution was preempted by the federal CSA. In a split decision, the court of appeals held the return provision was not preempted. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding that the CSA did not preempt state law on the same subject matter unless there was a positive conflict between the state and federal laws such that the two could not consistently stand together. The Colorado Court reasoned that because state law enforcement officers were returning marijuana, they were indeed “distributing” it. This constituted a “positive conflict” between the laws. The Court found that the Colorado provision was thus preempted and rendered void. View "Colorado v. Crouse" on Justia Law

In 2012, police arrested respondent Alexander Wolf after a search of his car netted various narcotics, including less than one ounce of marijuana. Respondent was ultimately charged with possession, and pertinent to this appeal, possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. Before respondent’s case was submitted to a jury, Colorado passed Amendment 64, legalizing possession of up to one ounce of marijuana for personal use. The jury found respondent guilty of possessing the marijuana, and he was sentenced to twenty-one days in jail and two years of probation. Respondent appealed, arguing that his conviction for possessing what ultimately was less than one ounce of marijuana should be vacated because Amendment 64 legalized possession of less than one ounce of marijuana before he has been convicted. A divided court of appeals vacated the marijuana possession conviction and sentence. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that Amendment 64 deprived the State of the power to continue to prosecute individuals for possession of one ounce of marijuana after the Amendment became effective. View "Colorado v. Wolf" on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant Brandi Russell and her husband brought their infant to a hospital with a broken leg. Worried that the child may have been abused, a doctor contacted a social worker, who then contacted the Department of Social Services. The social worker interviewed defendant, and worried she was on drugs. A court order was obtained requiring defendant to submit to a drug test. The results revealed defendant has used amphetamine, marijuana and methamphetamine. Police obtained a warrant, searched defendant's home, and found drug paraphernalia. The State charged defendant with child abuse resulting in serious injury, and possession of controlled substances. A jury acquitted defendant of the child abuse charge, but convicted her on possession charges. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court found that defendant would have been convicted on the methamphetamine charge with or without a police officer's testimony, so any error in admitting that testimony as lay testimony was harmless. With respect to defendant's possession of marijuana conviction, the Supreme Court found that Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution deprived the State of the power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana pending on direct appeal when the Amendment became effective. The Court affirmed the court of appeals as to both issues. View "Russell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution (legalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana) deprived the State the power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, and where there was a pending right to appeal (exercised by filing a notice of appeal) at the time the Amendment became effective. "In case a statute is repealed or rendered inoperative, no further proceedings can be had to enforce it in pending prosecutions." The Colorado Supreme Court found that Amendment 64 rendered inoperative the pertinent language of the statute under which the defendant in this case had been arrested, because Amendment 64 legalized what the applicable statute had prohibited. As such, the Court concluded that Amendment 64 indeed deprived the State of its power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana and where there was a pending right to appeal at the time the Amendment became effective. View "Colorado v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court's suppression order. The court suppressed a firearm that Denver Police seized from a car in which defendant Randiray Delacruz was a passenger. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the firearm was discovered during a valid protective search of the vehicle in light of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the search. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's order and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Delacruz" on Justia Law

Alamosa County police officers applied for and received a warrant to search Lonnie Cooper’s residence and vehicles on his property for illegal drugs and other items associated with the sale of illegal drugs. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed an interlocutory appeal to answer whether an officer could reasonable and in good faith rely on a warrant when the warrant affidavit was devoid of specific dates, but established a long, ongoing pattern of drug trafficking from a home. After review of the specifics of this case, the Supreme Court concluded there was enough evidence in the warrant affidavit of an ongoing drug trafficking operation that an officer could have a reasonable, good faith belief that the warrant was proper. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Respondent Curtis Adams was found guilty by jury of assaulting a correctional officer. The presumptive sentencing range for that offense was two to six years, but because Adams committed the assault while serving a sentence for a prior felony, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to Adams’ remaining sentence. This case arose out of the intersection between two sources of sentence enhancement: one requiring an aggravated term-of-years range; the other requiring consecutive sentencing. The appellate court concluded Adams was not subject to the term-of-years enhancement as applied by the trial court. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court was required to apply both enhancements. The Supreme Court, in its review of the plain language of the applicable statutes, concluded both enhancements applied. The Court reversed a portion of the appellate court’s judgment vacating respondent’s sentence. The case was then remanded for resentencing. View "Colorado v. Adams" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic disturbance involving then 16-year-old A.L.-C., who was feuding with he mother and stepfather on the first floor of the family home. B.O., his sister, told an aunt who was in the house, that A.L.-C. had sexually assaulted her. B.O. repeated her allegations to the police. A.L.-C. was briefly detained, but then returned to his parents. The following day, A.L.-C. and his parents went to the police station for questioning about the alleged sexual assaults. A detective and Spanish interpreter advised the three of A.L.-C.'s "Miranda" rights, then the detective and interpreter stepped out of the room to allow the family to discuss whether A.L.-C. would waive his rights. A videorecorder captured their exchange. Initially, the tape showed the parents individually asking A.L.-C. whether he understood his rights. A.L.-C. replied that he was "always the liar, or the one lying" and told his mother he would rather keep quiet. Whether A.L.-C. meant this as a refusal to speak with his mother or with the police was unclear. Minutes later, the detective and interpreter re-enetered the room and A.L.-C. and his mother both signed the Miranda waiver form. A.L.-C. indicated he understood his rights and agreed to discuss his sister's allegations. A.L.-C.'s stepfather left the room before more questioning began, but his mother remained for its entirety. At issue was A.L.-C.'s statement to his mother outside of police presence. The trial court suppressed A.L.-C.'s incriminating statements, concluding that although his mother was present, she could not protect his right to remain silent because she did not share his interests. The State sought the Colorado Supreme Court's review. Finding that the plain language of section 19-2-511(1) C.R.S. (2016) required only that a parent be present during the advisement and interrogation, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "People in the Interest of A.L.-C." on Justia Law