Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Fritz Schneider appealed when the court of appeals affirmed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault: one for sexual assault of a physically helpless victim and another for "sexual assault by causing submission of a victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will" These charges were based on evidence of a single, continuous penetration of the same victim. The court of appeals upheld the convictions against challenges of jeopardy and merger on grounds petitioner had been convicted of two separate crimes. The appellate court upheld the consecutive sentences on grounds that the sentences were mandated by statute. Petitioner again appealed, arguing the court of appeals erred in its judgment. The Supreme Court concurred in the outcome, if on slightly different grounds. View "Schneider v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Similar to "Colorado v. Johnson," (2016 CO 69 (2016)), at issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. Defendant Brooke Higgins was a juvenile respondent before a magistrate judge. The district attorney requested, and Higgins' then-defense-counsel agreed to, a state administered mental health assessment of Higgins. Because the parties agreed, the magistrate judge ordered the assessment. Later, in front of a trial court, the DA dismissed the juvenile charges against Higgins and charged her as an adult with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins sought, and the trial court granted, a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether she should remain in adult court. Before that hearing, Higgins, now represented by different counsel, filed a motion to suppress the mental health assessment and disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court denied both requests, holding that the parties stipulated to the assessment, and there was independent statutory authority for the magistrate judge to order the assessment. Higgins appealed, arguing the trial court lacked authority to order a juvenile-charged-as-an-adult to undergo a mental health assessment for a reverse-transfer hearing. The Supreme Court found that based on the facts of this case, Higgins' arguments, while loosely related to those in "Johnson," were hypothetical and premature. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Higgins v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant requested a reverse-transfer hearing, and the trial court granted her request. The State appealed, arguing that C.R.S. 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) (the reverse-transfer statute) required a trial court to evaluate the petitioner's mental health. The DA requested access to defendant's mental health and psychological records and requested a court-ordered mental health assessment. Defendant responded that she should not have to produce the records because she had not waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege in her request for a reverse-transfer, and the statute did not give the trial court authority to order an assessment. The trial court ruled in favor of the DA on both counts. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) nothing in the reverse-transfer statute stated that a juvenile waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, so the trial court could not order her to produce her mental records; and (2) nothing in the statute gave the trial court explicit authority to order the mental health assessment. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case's first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a suppression order by the trial court, concluding that the police lawfully stopped defendant Amadeo Chavez-Barragan for failing to drive within a single lane (weaving). Methamphetamine was discovered following the stop, and evidence of the methamphetamine was suppressed. The trial court had not ruled on other issues raised in the suppression motion, so the case was remanded. The trial court found different grounds upon which to base its suppression and again suppressed the evidence. This time, the trial court determined that the seizure that followed the initial stop was unreasonable, and defendant's consent to the search was not voluntary. After review, the Supreme Court again reversed the suppression order. Concluding that the initial stop and detention was reasonable and the consent to search was voluntary. The drugs found should not have been suppressed. View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law

The Colorado State Patrol gave petitioner Gregory Hoskin a speeding ticket. Hoskin pled not guilty, and the matter went to a bench trial, which ultimately ended against Hoskin. He appealed, and the district court reversed, concluding that the county court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Hoskin when it required him to prove that his speed was reasonable and prudent, thereby violating his due process rights. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the speeding statute (C.R.S. 42-2-1101) created a mandatory rebuttable presumption that did not violate due process. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the county court's judgment that Hoskin was speeding. The Court therefore reversed the district court and remanded the case for reinstatement of the county court's judgment. View "Colorado v. Hoskin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donna Johnson challenged the Ballot Title Board's decision to set the title, ballot title and submission clause for Initiatives 2015-2016 #132 and 133, contending that the titles did not satisfy the clear title requirement and they did not contain a single subject. If passed, the Initiatives, substantially similar in language and form, represented two of several redistricting concepts proposed by the Proponents during the 2016 election cycle. Both Initiatives would have amended article V, section 44 through 48 of the Colorado Constitution by restructuring or replacing the Colorado Reapportionment Commission. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that both of the proposed Initiatives encompassed multiple subjects in violation of Colorado law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Title Board and remanded for revision. View "In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #132 & #133" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Robinson challenged the Ballot Title Board's decision to set the title, ballot title and submission clause for Initiative 2015-2016 #156, contending that the title did not satisfy the clear title requirement and it did not contain a single subject. If passed, Initiative #156 would have added a new section to the Colorado Revised Statutes prohibiting state and local licensing authorities from issuing "a license to food store that offers for sale, in sealed containers for off-premises consumption," certain "intoxicants, namely marijuana, marijuana product, liquor, wine and malt liquor. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the title indeed violated the clear title requirement because it was confusing and failed to help voters decipher the purpose of the initiative, or to help voters decide whether to support or oppose it. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Title Board's setting of title for Initiative #156, and returned it to the Board for revision. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 Initiative #156" on Justia Law

A Colorado State Trooper stopped the vehicle in which Victor Zuniga was riding as a passenger. The vehicle was carrying over a pound of raw marijuana and marijuana concentrate. Zuniga was ultimately charged with two counts of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate. Zuniga pled not guilty, and moved to suppress, arguing that the seized marijuana was the fruit of an illegal detention and search. In particular, Zuniga argued: (1) the Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in the first place; (2) the prolonged detention was unlawful; and (3) the vehicle search was not supported by probable cause. The trial court found that because marijuana possession was legal in certain circumstances in Colorado, and drug-sniffing dogs were unable to differentiate between legal and illegal amounts of marijuana, the court concluded there was no probable cause to search the vehicle because the Trooper could only speculate about the amount of marijuana he smelled. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that after a review of the facts, noting the driver and Zuniga's divergent stories about their time in Colorado, their "extreme" nervousness, the strong odor of marijuana and the drug-dog's sniff test, there was probable cause. Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of the marijuana. View "Colorado v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

Brian Penn was convicted by jury of unlawful sexual contact. On appeal, he argued that the county court erred in allowing an investigating officer to testify that he "had reason to arrest the defendant for a crime that had been committed." The district court agreed and reversed the conviction. The State moved for reconsideration which was denied, then appealed to the Supreme Court. Penn moved to dismiss the State's appeal, arguing it was outside the time limit set by Colorado Appellate Rule 52(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that the State's petition was timely, and that the county court's admission of the officer's testimony was not reversible plain error. The Court reversed the district court and remanded for reinstatement of Penn's conviction. View "Colorado v. Penn" on Justia Law