Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001 when he was twenty-eight years old, respondent David Corson had a sexual relationship with "K.B.," a seventeen-year-old client of the residential treatment facility where Corson worked. Two years later, he pled guilty to sexual assault on a child, position of trust. The prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of probation and dismiss a separate charge. Approximately three years before this plea, the prosecutor in this case obtained a juvenile adjudication against K.B. for falsely reporting a sexual assault. That case had no connection except that it could have been used to impeach K.B.'s credibility at Corson's trial. This adjudication was not disclosed to Corson, and as a result, he sought to overturn his conviction. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the court of appeals reversed. The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Corson argued that the State's non-disclosure rendered his plea involuntary and his plea counsel ineffective. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding no due process violation, that Corson knew of K.B.'s adjudication prior to his plea, and that the adjudication was not part of K.B.'s criminal history and therefore not subject to automatic disclosure. View "Colorado v. Corson" on Justia Law

Initiative #63 would establish a right to a healthy environment in Colorado by amending the state Constitution. Petitioners argued the text of the Initiative filed a motion to the Title Board, arguing the Initiative as written was misleading and contained multiple subjects. The Supreme Court reviewed the Title Board's action setting the title, ballot title and submission clause for the Initiative, and concluded that the Initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed the subject and was not misleading. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015" on Justia Law

As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered Carl Ruch to complete a sex offender polygraph and participate in sex offense specific treatment intervention. Ruch refused such treatment, contending that participating would have violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Due to this refusal, the trial court revoked Ruch's probation and sentenced him to a prison term. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Ruch's Fifth Amendment rights would have been violated had he complied with the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether Ruch's probation officer would have sought to revoke probation based solely on the other probation violations, and if so, whether the trial court would have revoked on other grounds. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found no Fifth Amendment violation, finding Ruch's purported invocation of the Fifth was premature and amounted to a "prohibited blanket assertion of the privilege." View "Colorado v. Ruch" on Justia Law

The State challenged a district court order denying the probation department's complaint to revoke Bryan Roberson's sex offender intensive supervision probation (SOISP). The State sought to revoke probation because Roberson (among other thins) allegedly failed to participate in a sex offender evaluation and treatment program, allegedly refusing to answer during a polygraph test. Roberson refused to answer on advice of counsel, fearing that the answers would be used against him in future criminal proceedings (he had a direct appeal of his conviction pending at the time of the polygraph test). The district court denied the State's revocation complaint, concluding that answering the questions would have violated Roberson's Fifth Amendment rights to self-incrimination. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court and affirmed. View "Colorado v. Roberson" on Justia Law

The citizens of home-rule City of Longmont voted in favor of a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and the storage of its waste products within city limits. Thereafter, the Colorado Oil and Gas Association (the Association), an industry organization, sued Longmont seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating, and a permanent injunction enjoining Longmont from enforcing, Article XVI. "In a lengthy and thorough written order," the district court granted these motions, ruling that the Oil and Gas Conservation Act preempted Longmont’s bans on fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking waste. Longmont and the citizen intervenors argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that: (1) the district court erred in its preemption analysis; and (2) the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado Constitution trumped any preemption analysis and required the Supreme Court to conclude that ArticleXVI superseded state law. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n" on Justia Law

The citizens of home-rule city Fort Collins voted in favor of a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and the storage of its waste products within city limits. The Colorado Oil and Gas Association (the Association), an industry organization, sued Fort Collins and requested: (1) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, preempted Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of the moratorium. The Association subsequently moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim, and Fort Collins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to find that the moratorium was not preempted by state law. The Supreme Court concluded that "fracking is a matter of mixed state and local concern," Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium was subject to preemption by state law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Fort Collins’s five-year moratorium on fracking and the storage of fracking waste operationally conflicted with the effectuation of state law. Accordingly, the Court held that the moratorium was preempted by state law and was, therefore, invalid and unenforceable. The district court’s order was affirmed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2006, Colorado voters passed Amendment 41 and created Independent Ethics Commission (IEC), an independent commission tasked with investigating allegations of government officials’ misconduct. In an original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the IEC's decision to dismiss a complaint against a public officer as frivolous is subject to judicial review. The plaintiff contended that the General Assembly authorized such review when it enacted section 24-18.5-101(9), C.R.S. (2015), which provided that “[a]ny final action of the commission concerning a complaint shall be subject to judicial review.” The Supreme Court found that the Colorado Constitution forbade the General Assembly from “limit[ing] or restrict[ing]” IEC’s powers. Moreover, although the constitution provided that “penalties may be provided by law,” it also provided that IEC “may dismiss frivolous complaints without conducting a public hearing,” The Supreme Court concluded that, while the General Assembly could authorize judicial review of IEC’s enforcement decisions, it could not encroach upon IEC’s decisions not to enforce. Therefore, the Court held the General Assembly’s “judicial review” provision did not apply to frivolity dismissals. View "Colo. Ethics Watch v. Indep. Ethics Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant E.G. was convicted of two counts of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the scene of the crime, his grandmother’s basement. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to order such access and denied the motion. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, though not its result, holding that atrial court does indeed have authority to order defense access to a third-party residence. It nevertheless affirmed the denial of the motion for access because it concluded that E.G. had “failed to demonstrate” that inspection of the crime scene was “necessary to present his defense.” The Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order access to a private residence, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals on alternate grounds. View "Colorado in the Interest of E.G." on Justia Law

Defendant Saul Chavez was charged with one count of sexual assault. The alleged victim lived in a home with other members of her family. The State alleged that Chavez, a family friend, had been allowed to stay the night at the victim’s house after drinking alcohol late into the evening. The State further alleged that Chavez entered a bedroom where the victim was asleep, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, while she was physically helpless. Chavez filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the home (the scene of the alleged crime). He argued that he needed access in order to “be able to investigate and photograph the property for his defense.” Chavez cited Crim. P. 16(I)(d) in support of his motion, arguing that, under that rule, the court had “discretionary power” to order the disclosure of “relevant material and information.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court had the authority to grant a defendant’s discovery motion seeking access to the private residence of a non-party. The Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order such access, and abused its discretion by its order. View "In re Colorado v. Chavez" on Justia Law

The Cordells were the record owners of a tract of land in La Plata County (Tract1), and Mr. Cordell was also the record owner of an adjoining tract that had been deeded to him by his grandmother (Tract2). After the Cordells failed to pay the taxes owed on these properties for three successive years, Brenda Heller purchased tax liens for each tract and later assigned these liens to Bradley Klingsheim. Thereafter, Klingsheim requested deeds for the properties from the Treasurer. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review principally required the Court to determine the scope of a county treasurer’s duty of diligent inquiry, pursuant to section 39-11-128(1), C.R.S. (2015), in attempting to notify a taxpayer that his or her land may be sold to satisfy a tax lien. The Cordells contended that the deeds were void because the La Plata County Treasurer’s Office had not fulfilled its statutory duty of diligent inquiry in attempting to notify the Cordells that it would be issuing a tax deed for the Cordells’ properties. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a county treasurer had an initial duty to serve notice of a pending tax sale on every person in actual possession or occupancy of the property at issue, as well as on the person in whose name the property was taxed or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry, such persons can be found in the county or if their residences outside the county are known. In addition, we hold that a treasurer owed a duty of further diligent inquiry after an initial notice has been sent only when the facts known to the treasurer show that the taxpayer could not have received the notice of the pending tax sale. The Court concluded the Treasurer satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry. In addition, the Court concluded that the notice that the Treasurer provided in this case satisfied due process requirements. View "Klingsheim v. Cordell" on Justia Law