Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Saul Chavez was charged with one count of sexual assault. The alleged victim lived in a home with other members of her family. The State alleged that Chavez, a family friend, had been allowed to stay the night at the victim’s house after drinking alcohol late into the evening. The State further alleged that Chavez entered a bedroom where the victim was asleep, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, while she was physically helpless. Chavez filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the home (the scene of the alleged crime). He argued that he needed access in order to “be able to investigate and photograph the property for his defense.” Chavez cited Crim. P. 16(I)(d) in support of his motion, arguing that, under that rule, the court had “discretionary power” to order the disclosure of “relevant material and information.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court had the authority to grant a defendant’s discovery motion seeking access to the private residence of a non-party. The Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order such access, and abused its discretion by its order. View "In re Colorado v. Chavez" on Justia Law

The Cordells were the record owners of a tract of land in La Plata County (Tract1), and Mr. Cordell was also the record owner of an adjoining tract that had been deeded to him by his grandmother (Tract2). After the Cordells failed to pay the taxes owed on these properties for three successive years, Brenda Heller purchased tax liens for each tract and later assigned these liens to Bradley Klingsheim. Thereafter, Klingsheim requested deeds for the properties from the Treasurer. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review principally required the Court to determine the scope of a county treasurer’s duty of diligent inquiry, pursuant to section 39-11-128(1), C.R.S. (2015), in attempting to notify a taxpayer that his or her land may be sold to satisfy a tax lien. The Cordells contended that the deeds were void because the La Plata County Treasurer’s Office had not fulfilled its statutory duty of diligent inquiry in attempting to notify the Cordells that it would be issuing a tax deed for the Cordells’ properties. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a county treasurer had an initial duty to serve notice of a pending tax sale on every person in actual possession or occupancy of the property at issue, as well as on the person in whose name the property was taxed or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry, such persons can be found in the county or if their residences outside the county are known. In addition, we hold that a treasurer owed a duty of further diligent inquiry after an initial notice has been sent only when the facts known to the treasurer show that the taxpayer could not have received the notice of the pending tax sale. The Court concluded the Treasurer satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry. In addition, the Court concluded that the notice that the Treasurer provided in this case satisfied due process requirements. View "Klingsheim v. Cordell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Amadeo Chavez-Barragan was charged with possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. After the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence, the State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a district court's order that concluded that the "lewd fondling or caress" provision of the Colorado public indecency statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Court found that the provision did not burden a substantial amount of protected speech or expressive conduct, so it was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Moreover, because defendant's conduct in this case met any reasonable definition of "lewd fondling or caress," the statute wasnot vague as applied to his actions. The Court reversed the trial court's order holding to the contrary. View "Colorado v. Graves" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charles Dean was convicted by jury of second degree murder, the sentence for which carried a maximum presumptive sentencing range of twenty-four years. The trial court adjudicated him a habitual criminal and sentenced him under Colorado's habitual criminal statute. Under the corresponding parole eligibility provision governing his conviction, petitioner had to serve seventy-five percent of his sentence, here, seventy-two years, before he was eligible for parole. On appeal of that sentence, petitioner contended that the interplay of the habitual criminal statute and the parole eligibility statute, as applied to his case, violated his right to equal protection because he had to serve a longer period of incarceration before he was eligible for parole than a habitual offender with a history of more serious felony convictions. After review, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing and parole eligibility scheme for habitual criminal offenders did not violate petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection. View "Colorado v. Dean" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Eduardo Perez was convicted of identity theft and criminal impersonation for using another person's Social Security Number in order to get a job. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review involved the applicability of the culpable mental state, "knowingly," to the elements of identity theft as enumerated in 18-5-902, C.R.S. (2015). After review, the Supreme Court held that to be guilty of identity theft, an offender must have used the identifying information of another with knowledge that the information belonged to an actual person. The Court concluded that the evidence presented at respondent's trial was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that responded indeed knew the Social Security number he used belonged to actual person. View "Colorado v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this matter to determine whether the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a potential juror who was an employee of a privately owned and operated prison. The court of appeals held that because the private prison used "sovereign police powers characteristic of law enforcement in the service of the public interest," it was a "public law enforcement agency" as used by statute. The appellate court concluded the trial court should have sustained the defendant's challenge for cause. The Supreme Court found that under the plain language of 16-10-103(1)(k) C.R.S. 2015, a private company that operates a prison was not a "public law enforcement agency" because it was not a division of a state or federal government that has the authority to investigate crimes or to arrest, prosecute or detain criminals. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Bonvicini" on Justia Law

The issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this case required an interpretation of the statute that provided for challenges for cause to potential jurors in criminal cases. Specifically, the issue involved the scope of the provision that directed trial courts to sustain a challenge to a potential juror who was a "compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency." Petitioner Samuel Mulberger brought a challenge to a juror who worked as a nurse for the El Paso County Jail. The nurse was paid by a governmental contractor, but was not a compensated employee of the jail. Mulberger used a peremptory challenge to dismiss the potential juror and ultimately exhausted all of his challenges. The jury found Mulberger guilty, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Mulberger argued the trial court erred in concluding the contract-employee was not an employee of the public law enforcement agency, and that the trial court erroneously denied his challenge for cause, then exhausted his challenges to remove the juror. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Mulberger v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Salvador Esquivel-Castillo appealed the court of appeals decision to affirm his conviction for felony murder. A jury acquitted him of a separate count of kidnapping, but convicted him of felony murder for a death caused during his commission or attempted commission of kidnapping the same victim, during the same charged timeframe, by a different statutorily qualifying act of kidnapping. The appellate court rejected petitioner's assertion that a more specific kidnapping charge necessarily limited the scope of the more generally-charged felony murder county to a charge of death caused in the court of or in furtherance of the commission of kidnapping by seizing and carrying the victim from one place to another, resulting in his having been convicted of a crime with which he had never been charged. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed: the crime of kidnapping alleged more generally as an element of felony murder was not limited to the specific alternative act of kidnapping alleged in the separate kidnapping count, and therefore jury instructions as to all statutory forms of kidnapping supported by the evidence did not constructively amend the felony murder charge. View "Esquivel-Castillo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Respondent Larry Marquardt was committed to the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP) in 2013 after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon and assault on an at-risk adult. He was diagnosed with "schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, with prominent paranoia." Respondent took ten milligrams of an antipsychotic medication once daily, but refused to take more because of a fear of the side effects, namely tardive dyskinesia. The State petitioned to have the dosage increased to a maximum of twenty milligrams daily, because respondent's psychiatrist felt that ten milligrams was only partially effective. A trial court found that the increased dosage was "necessary to prevent a significant long-term deterioration in his mental condition." The court observed that because of respondent's mental illness and insanity plea, he would never be released from the institution unless his condition improved, and concluded that respondent's need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to override "any bona fide and legitimate interest of [Marquardt] in refusing treatment." The court ordered respondent to submit to the increased dose. Respondent appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied the controlling case law precedent to his case. "Colorado v. Medina," (705 P.2d 961 (1985)) outlined the rule that courts had to follow before ordering a patient to be forcibly medicated. In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the "Medina" rule applied to petitions to increase the dose of a medication over a patient's objection. Further, the Court held that if the patient was stable, a lack of improvement, without more, did not satisfy Medina's requirement that the patient be at risk of significant and likely long-term deterioration. View "Colorado v. Marquardt" on Justia Law