Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jay McIntyre's then ten-year-old niece accused him of sexually assaulting her on two separate occasions. In an interlocutory appeal, the State sought review of a trial court's order suppressing defendant's inculpatory statements. The trial court found defendant did not make the statements voluntarily. Upon review of the State's petition, the Supreme Court held that when considering the totality of the circumstances, police did not improperly coerce defendant into making his statements, but that he instead spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McIntyre" on Justia Law

A man called "Rabbit" tried to strangle two people in a Boulder park. Witnesses identified the man to police. Plainclothes officers located "Rabbit," identified themselves as police, and asked him questions regarding the incident in the park. Petitioner Bradley Begay (a/k/a "Rabbit") was never told he was under arrest, nor was he handcuffed. Begay never tried to leave during the encounter with police, but police did not say specifically defendant was free to leave. Approximately twenty minutes into their conversation, an officer who had interviewed one of the alleged victims identified petitioner as the assailant. Officers then read defendant his Miranda rights and arrested him for assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made before his arrest as the product of a custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. The trial court granted the motion; the State appealed. Finding that the trial court conflated the standards governing seizure under the Fourth Amendment and custody under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Colorado v. Begay" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dallas Jeffrey Finney was charged with two counts of sexual assault-helpless victim and two counts of sexual assault-victim incapable. He entered into a series of plea agreements before a final agreement was accepted by the trial court. Five different trial court judges reviewed the agreements, and at several junctures, petitioner was advised of the potential penalties he faced. The prosecution filed a complaint to revoke petitioner's final plea agreement, alleging petitioner violated the terms of the agreement because he had been terminated from a sex offender treatment program. At the hearing on the revocation complaint, defense counsel informed the court that petitioner would admit to violating the conditions of the plea agreement and that the prosecutor would agree to a sentence of community corrections if petitioner were accepted into such a facility. The court accepted petitioner's admission and set the case for sentencing. Petitioner was not advised of the potential sentence he faced if not accepted into community corrections. Petitioner later learned he was not eligible for community corrections because he had been terminated from the sex offender program. Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to two years to file in the Department of Corrections. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief arguing, among other things, that the failure to advise him of the potential penalties prior to admitting violating the terms of the plea agreement violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that petitioner had been advised multiple times of potential penalties, particularly with respect to negotiating the five plea agreements. With regard to his statutory right to an advisement under 16-11-206, the Court concluded the requirements were met in this case. View "Finney v. Colorado " on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred when it suppressed evidence that the police found in defendant-appellee Lynette Webb's purse. In a visit with defendant's son, officers found spoons with methamphetamine residue under the son's bed, and a syringe that tested positive for methamphetamine in a visitor's backpack. Upon executing a search warrant of the house (and all personal property within) based on the visit with the son, officers found methamphetamine paraphernalia in defendant's purse. The trial court concluded that defendant had a heightened expectation of privacy to the purse, and that officers' search was unreasonable because it was unlikely that the son would hide contraband in his mother's purse. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the wrong analysis: "[o]nce a lawful search warrant is issued, the scope of the search is defined by the scope of the warrant rather than an individual's expectation of privacy in any particular area or item." The Court therefore reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Webb" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Dennis Sanchez appealed the court of appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for a class 3 felony on "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse", notwithstanding the jury's verdict of "not guilty" on the charge entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child," based on a separate finding of two of six enumerated touching incidents presented on a verdict form entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse." A majority of the appeals court concluded defendant had been adequately charged in a single count and that the jury's instructions did not make its finding of a pattern of abuse contingent upon first finding the defendant's guilt of the separately charged crime of "Sexual Assault of a Child." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that because the verdict form the jury used never offered the jury the opportunity to find that defendant committed the elements of sexual assault on a child, and instead reflected at most, the jury's factual finding of two different incidents of sexual contact. The trial court erred in entering judgment for a class 3 felony and as such, the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court was error. View "Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Police arrested Jeffrey Knedler for allegedly assaulting two people. Days after the assault, officers contacted Knedler at a hair salon where he occasionally stayed. As they approached the salon, the officers observed Knedler drinking from what appeared to be a liquor bottle. He also took a long drink from an alcoholic beverage before officers handcuffed him and placed him in a police car. Knedler agreed to speak with an investigator, but he did not want to talk in the police car, so he was taken to police headquarters. Upon arriving at headquarters, Knedler was presented with a written Miranda advisement, and it was read aloud to him. Knedler stated he did not have his glasses with him to read the advisement and waiver, but he initialed by each of the numbered rights, signed the advisement and waiver and stated "I know my rights." After questioning, Knedler admitted to beating both victims and made numerous incriminating statements. The State sought reversal of the trial court's order that suppressed videotaped statements Knedler made after he signed the written waiver of his Miranda rights. Based on Knedler's extremely high blood alcohol contend at the time of the waiver, the trial court found the waiver was invalid. Because Knedler's waiver was nonetheless knowing and intelligent, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Knedler" on Justia Law

Ascension Baez-Lopez, Jose Soto-Lopez and Juan Cantu-Bojorquez were indicted on counts of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act, and counts of conspiracy to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance. The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter centered on he trial court’s order suppressing evidence from interceptions of oral and wire communications in these three cases. The trial court suppressed the “wiretap” recordings on grounds that they had not been sealed in compliance with state law and no satisfactory explanation for the absence of the seal given. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the suppression motions because the sealing procedure indeed complied with the applicable state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order. View "Colorado v. Baez-Lopez" on Justia Law

Prosecutors alleged defendant Ricky Hoang instigated a home invasion robbery involving three others stealing jewelry and cash at gunpoint. Defendant was restrained with leg shackles during his jury trial over his repeated objections. The issues this case presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the trial court erred by requiring defendant to be tried with the shackles without a finding of specific need; and (2) whether defendant’s claims of delays and deficiencies in producing the record violated his rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal. The Supreme Court held that “When the record does not show the restrains were plainly visible, the defendant must point to something in the record justifying an appellate court’s reasonable inference that at least one juror saw or heard them. If defendant fails to meet that burden, then the constitutional harmless error standard . . . does not apply.” Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendant’s rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal were not violated. View "Hoang v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Election Rule 10.7.5, promulgated as a temporary or emergency rule on the evening of the November 5, 2013 election. Plaintiffs were registered electors of the Adams 12 Five Star School District who sued seeking judicial review of the Secretary of State's authority to promulgate the rule, and for an order to direct the Clerk and Recorder of Adams County to finish counting votes and to certify the vote tally for all candidates in the school district director election. The district court ruled that the Secretary acted in excess of his authority in promulgating the emergency rule, and ordered all defendants to complete and certify the vote count for all candidates in the Adams 12 director district 4 election. The Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for review of whether the district court erred in holding "Rule 10.7.5 [was] contrary to and in conflict with existing election statutes." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 10.7.5 indeed "contravene[d] the election code by permitting a designated election official to usurp the courts' express authority to resolve . . . issues." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court only in holding that Rule 10.7.5 conflicted with existing election rules. View "Hanlen v. Gessler" on Justia Law

The issue for the Supreme Court's consideration in this case was the balance between a defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to counsel of his or her choice and the public's interest in the fairness and efficiency of the judicial system. The Court of appeals developed a balancing test for a trial court to use when deciding whether to grant or deny a defendant's request for a continuance so that s/he may change counsel. The appellate court applied its test to the facts of this case and determined that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant's constitutional rights to counsel of choice when it denied a request for a continuance. As a result, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed that outcome. While the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the decision whether to grant a continuance is a fact-based question best decided by the trial court, it declined to adopt the appellate court's test because it did not adequately reflect longstanding precedent requiring consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" when deciding on whether to grant a continuance. The Court concluded that the trial court record in this case was inadequate to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the continuance. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for additional findings and conclusions. View "Colorado v. Brown" on Justia Law