Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's convictions for first degree assault and first degree burglary, and his sentence of 28 years' imprisonment. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause on the grounds of juror bias, and that the defendant removed the juror in question with a peremptory challenge, and then exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. The appellate court reversed noting the Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, as explained in "Colorado v. Macrander" (828 P.2d 234 (1992)). The State petitioned the Supreme Court solely to request reconsideration of automatic reversal under these circumstances. The Supreme Court overruled the automatic reversal requirement of "Macrander." Because the Court of Appeals relied on the bright-line automatic reversal rule of "Macrander," rather than evaluating the likely effect of the trial court's error on the outcome of the specific case in which it occurred, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this holding. View "Colorado v. Montero-Romero" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's convictions for theft by receiving and his sentence to three years' probation. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause on the grounds of juror bias, and that defendant removed the juror with a peremptory challenge and then exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. The appellate court reversed noting the Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, as explained in "Colorado v. Macrander" (828 P.2d 234 (1992)). The State petitioned the Supreme Court solely to request reconsideration of automatic reversal under these circumstances. Because the Court of Appeals relied on the bright-line automatic reversal rule of "Macrander," rather than evaluating the likely effect of the trial court's error on the outcome of the specific case in which it occurred, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this holding. View "Colorado v. Roldan" on Justia Law

Following defendant's conviction for manslaughter, the trial court delayed sentencing to await resolution of an unrelated felony charge. Defendant pled guilty to that felony. The manslaughter case thereafter proceeded to sentencing. At the rescheduled hearing, the trial court found that the unrelated felony triggered sentencing within an aggravated range. Defendant was then sentenced to twice the maximum presumptive sentence (in this case, twelve years) for manslaughter. The Court of Appeals found the manslaughter sentencing delay unreasonable, also holding that defendant's right to speedy trial was violated. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: the six-month, seven-day delay was not unreasonable under Colo. Crim. P. 32(b) because the trial court imposed the delay for a legally justifiable reason. Furthermore, the Court rejected defendant's constitutional claim, holding the delay was no presumptively prejudicial. View "Colorado v. Sandoval-Candelaria" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' reversal of defendant Matthew Alfaro's convictions on murder, burglary and attempted kidnapping charges. On direct appeal, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in allowing defendant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized by statute and rule. Although defendant did not object to the trial court's interpretation of the applicable statute, the appellate court found that the trial court's error was not harmless. However, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals did not apply the outcome-determinative standard (as discussed in "Colorado v. Novotony," released in addition to the opinion of this case). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard. View "Colorado v. Alfaro" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' judgments reversing convictions of the defendants in this case and "Colorado v. Vigil." In both cases, the appellate court applied a rule requiring automatic reversal for any erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause that adversely impacted defendant's ability to shale the jury through exercise of peremptory challenges. The Court overruled prior holdings to the contrary and concluded in this consolidated opinion that reversal of a criminal conviction for other that structural error, or an appropriate case-specific, outcome-determinative analysis, will not longer be sustained. Allowing a defendant fewer peremptory challenges that authorized does not in and of itself amount to structural error. View "Colorado v. Novotny" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether a proposed amendment to the fire department's disciplinary system was subject to collective bargaining under the Charter of the City and County of Denver. Upon review of the Charter, and construing its plain language as a "harmonious and sensible whole," the Supreme Court concluded that Denver had the authority to both draft and implement disciplinary rules, and that that authority was not limited by the firefighters' right to collectively bargain. The court of appeals held that discipline was a term and condition of employment under the Charter and not subject to collective bargaining. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City & County of Denver v. Denver Firefighters" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case called for an evaluation of the relationship between C.R.S. sections 17-22.5-101 and 17-22.5-403(1) (2013) of article 22.5, governing "Inmate and Parole Time Computation." Petitioner Jeffrey Nowak was convicted on two counts of aggravated motor theft and sentenced to eight years. He began serving the sentence on May 13, 2003 - the effective date of the sentence for parole eligibility purposes. The Department of Corrections calculated petitioner's parole eligibility date (PED) as July 3, 2006. Several months after reaching his PED, petitioner absconded from a halfway house while on a temporary leave. Petitioner would later be convicted of felony escape and sentenced to twelve years in prison to run consecutively to the eight-year sentence. Petitioner began serving the new sentence on July 13, 2007. Because he had already reached his PED on the original sentence when he started serving the new sentence, the DOC used the July 2007 date (rather than the May 2003 date) to calculate petitioner's new PED. Petitioner sought habeas relief, arguing the DOC should have used the PED from May 2003. The Supreme Court concluded that for the purpose of computing an inmate's PED, section 17-22.5-101 required the DOC to construe all sentences as one continuous sentence when the inmate has been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, even when doing so results in the inmate becoming parole eligible before serving at least 50% of the second sentence. View "Nowak v. Suthers" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the appellate court applied the presumption of regularity when the it determined the jury did not receive correct jury forms. The trial court record reflected that the trial judge read the correct instructions and verdict forms. But when the record was certified on appeal, it was discovered that one of the verdict forms was stapled to a refused jury instruction that was not given to the jury, raising the question that the jury may not have received the correct forms. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that when the trial court reads the correct elemental instructions and verdict form to the jury, the party asserting error must overcome the presumption of regularity. In this case, the party did not overcome the presumption by pointing out that a verdict form was stapled to a refused instruction, and in relation by pointing to ambiguous statements in the trial transcript. View "LePage v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Following an election recount in the Town of Center, Maurice Jones and Citizen Center filed suit seeking to set aside the results of the recount. Jones argued that voters' right to ballot secrecy had been violated. The district court set aside the results and ordered a new recall election. The three officials who had been elected in the recall petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the district court's decision. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall results and ordering a new election. As such, the Court reversed the district court and enter judgment in favor of the newly elected officials. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Grassi was involved in a single-car accident early one September morning. He suffered serious injuries, and his passenger was killed. Paramedics transported petitioner to a local hospital for treatment, where he remained unconscious for several hours. At the hospital, a trooper (part of the investigation but who had not been at the scene of the accident) detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from petitioner's mouth though he remained unconscious. The trooper ordered a blood draw. Prior to the blood draw, police knew that petitioner had been driving when it crashed, that no road conditions or other external factors appeared to have caused the crash, that petitioner's driving was consistent with that of an intoxicated driver, and that his breath smelled of alcohol. The blood draw revealed that petitioner's blood alcohol content (BAC) was well over the legal limit for driving under the influence. Petitioner was later charged with vehicular homicide, manslaughter and driving with an excessive BAC. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence of his BAC, arguing that the officer at the hospital who ordered the blood draw lacked probable cause to order blood from him while he lay unconscious in the hospital. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Colorado's express consent statute did not require police to possess probable cause in order to draw blood from an unconscious driver. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the fellow-officer rule imputed information that the police possess as a whole to individual officers who conduct searches if: (1) that officer acts pursuant to a coordinated investigation; and (2) police possess the information at the time of the search or arrest. Because the record of this case reflected those conditions, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Grassi v. Colorado" on Justia Law