Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate determined that probable cause existed to believe that A.S.M. had committed the delinquent acts alleged. A.S.M. timely sought review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. But the juvenile court declined to review the matter on the merits, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding did not constitute a final order. A.S.M. then invoked the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause. After review, the Supreme Court held that while only a district court magistrate’s final orders or judgments namely, those fully resolving an issue or claim were reviewable under C.R.M. 7(a)(3), the preliminary hearing statute in the Children’s Code, section 19-2.5-609(3), C.R.S. (2022), specifically permitted review of a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding. "Therefore, we need not get in the middle of the parties’ tug-of-war over whether the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in this case constituted a final order. Instead, we hold that section 19-2.5-609(3) entitles prosecutors and juveniles alike to ask a juvenile court to review a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency proceeding." View "In re Interest of A.S.M." on Justia Law

Eduardo Barrera was driving a Jeep SUV eastbound on I-70 with Isaiah Deaner in the passenger’s seat. Trooper Bollen, an officer patrolling the highway, saw the SUV pass by and noted that it was an apparent rental vehicle with Arizona plates. Trooper Bollen testified that he was suspicious because I-70 is a major drug corridor where traffickers frequently use rental vehicles to smuggle contraband, bulk narcotics, people, weapons, and cash. He further testified that he specifically noticed the Arizona plates because Arizona borders Mexico, a main source of bulk narcotics in this part of the country. In this interlocutory appeal of a suppression order, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Under the totality of the circumstances here, the Court concluded the officer lacked such reasonable suspicion. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained from the search, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Deaner" on Justia Law

Defendant Cheryl Plemmons intentionally spat on two sheriff deputies while they were attempting to determine if she was suicidal. The deputies arrested her for spitting on them, and the prosecution charged her with three counts of second degree assault: one under section 18-3-203(1)(f.5), C.R.S. (2022), and two under section 18-3-203(1)(h). A jury found her guilty of each count. On appeal, Plemmons argued the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on an element of the offense: the scope of the term “harm” as it related to her intent in spitting on the officers. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Like the courts below, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “harm” as used in subsections 18-3-203(1)(f.5)(I) and (h) encompassed more than just physical harm. "Psychological harm can suffice." However, the Court concluded Plemmons was entitled to a new trial because the trial court’s jury instructions didn’t accurately convey the meaning of “harm” to the jury. Thus, judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Plemons v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Colorado's prohibition against forced specimen collection in DUI-related offenses applied to all searches of people suspected of DUI, or only to warrantless searches. A Fort Collins police officer responded to a call about an unauthorized car in a disability parking space. When the officer approached the car, he found Charles Raider sitting in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. The officer noticed various signs of visible intoxication; Raider denied having consumed any alcohol. When the officer asked him to perform roadside maneuvers, he declined. The officer then arrested Raider for DUI and, pursuant to the Expressed Consent Statute, gave him the choice of a breath or blood test. Raider initially didn’t respond, but ultimately, he refused. After learning that Raider had several prior DUI convictions, another officer applied for a search warrant to conduct a blood draw. Again, Raider refused to cooperate, so hospital personnel put him in a four-point leather restraint, and several officers held him down while his blood was drawn. Testing revealed that his blood alcohol content was well above the legal limit. The trial court denied Raider’s pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the blood test, concluding that the Expressed Consent Statute’s prohibition against forced specimen collection does not apply when, as here, a blood draw is authorized by a warrant. Ultimately, the jury found Raider guilty of felony DUI. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the statute only contemplated warrantless searches. Therefore, the Court held that the Expressed Consent Statute’s prohibition against forced specimen collection had no bearing on searches executed pursuant to a valid warrant. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals which held to the contrary. View "Colorado v. Raider" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify what prosecutors had prove to establish a defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a prior crime when the defendant’s conviction of that prior crime was an element or sentence enhancer of the present offense (e.g., in cases involving a charge of possession of a weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”) or a charge under the habitual criminal statute). The Court concluded that in order for the prosecution to prove a defendant’s identity in such a case, the prosecution must establish an essential link between the prior conviction and the defendant. "This, in turn, requires the prosecution to present some documentary evidence combined with specific corroborating evidence of identification connecting the defendant to the prior felony conviction." The question thus became whether the prosecution satisfied this standard here and therefore carried its burden of proving that Enrique Gorostieta was convicted of the prior felony alleged in this case. Like the division below, the Supreme Court believed that the prosecution could and should have done more to carry its burden. Nonetheless, under the relatively lenient standard of review that applied to sufficiency of the evidence challenges, the Supreme Court concluded the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Gorostieta had been convicted of the prior felony at issue here. View " Gorostieta v. People" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on proposed Initiatives #67 (2021-2022), #115 (2021-2022) and #128 (2021-2022), and whether they violated the single-subject requirement of the Colorado Constitution. Each indicative included provisions that would allow food retailers already licensed to sell beer to also sell wine, and provisions that would authorize third-party delivery services to deliver all alcoholic beverages sold from licensed retailers to consumers at their homes. After review, the Supreme Court determined the Initiatives violated the single-subject requirement, and the Title Board lacked jurisdiction to set titles for them. Accordingly, the Board’s actions were reversed. View "Fine v. Ward" on Justia Law

Colorado State Patrol Trooper Christian Bollen, acting on a hunch, initiated a traffic stop on what ended up being a rental car. The vehicle had out of state plates, and because it was a rental, the trooper though the car might be involved in the transportation of illegal narcotics. The driver informed him that she and her passengers were traveling from California to Maryland, but the trooper did not believe that story. Asking the passengers, their respective stories did not match the driver’s. A drug detection dog made no alert on a sniff of the vehicle. Acting on a hunch, the trooper searched the vehicle to find a kilogram of cocaine in the glove box and some fentanyl in a prescription bottle. In this interlocutory appeal brought by the prosecution, the parties agreed that Trooper Bollen performed a lawful traffic stop. The question before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the district court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground that Trooper Bollen lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. “Because probable cause to search was measured against an objective standard of reasonableness and cannot be established by piling hunch upon hunch or by ignoring facts that militate against it,” the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the method of calculation employed by the Colorado Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to determine the parole eligibility date for Nathanael Owens, who was serving three consecutive prison sentences. There was no dispute that Colorado law required that Owens’s sentences be treated as a single continuous sentence for purposes of calculating his parole eligibility date. What complicated matters was that one of Owens’s sentences was subject to a statutory provision that rendered him parole eligible after serving 50% of the sentence, while the other two sentences are subject to a statutory provision that rendered him parole eligible after serving 75% of those sentences. The DOC applied the 75% rule to all three of Owens’s consecutive sentences, reasoning that two of them were subject to that rule. But, in so doing, it applied the 75% rule to the sentence that was subject to the 50% rule. A division of the court of appeals nevertheless approved this methodology. Because the division erroneously approved the non-hybrid methodology used by the DOC to calculate Owens’s parole eligibility date, the Supreme Court reversed. However, because the DOC has since recalculated Owens’s parole eligibility date, and because the new calculation was consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion, no further action was required. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case with instructions to simply return the case to the district court. View "Owens v. Carlson" on Justia Law

While in police custody, during a pause in an interrogation, Isaiah Trujillo-Tucson waited in an interview room with a non-interrogating officer while the interrogating officer was off getting Trujillo-Tucson a soda. The non-interrogating officer was patting Trujillo-Tucson down without pressing for information while Trujillo-Tucson repeatedly initiated mostly casual conversation. Shortly thereafter, Trujillo-Tucson asked, “Am I able to get a phone call? . . . To my lawyer, [E.K.]?” The officer spoke over Trujillo-Tucson during the latter portion of his question to say, “Yeah.” After a brief silence, casual conversation continued. When the interrogating officer joined the two men in the room to continue questioning, Trujillo-Tucson made incriminating statements. After the State charged Trujillo-Tucson with various offenses, Trujillo-Tucson moved to suppress his statements, arguing that questioning should have ceased because he had invoked his right to counsel. The trial court agreed. The State filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s suppression order arguing that Trujillo-Tucson’s question, posed to the non-interrogating officer, was not an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. Based on its independent review of the video- and audio-recorded interrogation, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Trujillo-Tucson’s question about a phone call to an attorney did not constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel during the interrogation. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Trujillo-Tucson" on Justia Law

In the November 2020 election, Colorado voters approved Proposition 118, which established the Paid Family and Medical Leave Insurance Act (“the Act”). This case concerned whether the Division of Family and Medical Leave Insurance's (“the Division”) collection of premiums under the Act violated section (8)(a) of the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (“TABOR”), specifically, whether the premium was an unconstitutional “added tax or surcharge” on income that was not “taxed at one rate.” And, if so, the Colorado Supreme Court was asked whether the Act’s funding mechanism was severable from the rest of the Act. The Supreme Court concluded the premium collected by the Division did not implicate section (8)(a) because the relevant provision of that section concerned changes to “income tax law.” The Act, a family and medical leave law, was not an income tax law or a change to such a law. Moreover, the premium collected pursuant to the Act was a fee used to fund specific services, rather than a tax or comparable surcharge collected to defray general government expenses. View "Chronos Builders v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law