Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In June 2013, in Pueblo and El Paso County citizens certified petitions to recall State Senator Angela Giron and State Senator John Morse. A month later, the Governor set a September 10 recall election for both Senate seats. This recall election was the first in Colorado's history for members of the General Assembly. The Governor then submitted an Interrogatory to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article VI, section 3,of the Colorado Constitution to ask whether the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Colorado Court issued an Order holding that the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. View "In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Bristol Bay Productions, LLC brought claims against author Clive Cussler in California for fraud based on allegations that he had misrepresented his readership numbers. Bristol Bay alleged Cussler told it he had sold over 100 million books when the figure was, in fact, closer to 40 million. According to Bristol Bay, it reasonably relied on those numbers when it purchased the film rights to Cussler's books and produced an ultimately unsuccessful movie based on one of them (Sahara), with resulting damages of more than $50 million. In a special verdict, a California jury found Cussler misrepresented his readership figures and that Bristol Bay reasonably relied on those misrepresentations, but that Bristol Bay's reliance on those misrepresentations did not cause its damages. Bristol Bay also sued Cussler's literary agent and publishers for fraud in Colorado based on the same allegations asserted in the California suit. Following Bristol Bay's unsuccessful appeal of the California action, the trial court dismissed Bristol Bay's Colorado action on issue preclusion grounds for failing to state a claim. The court of appeals affirmed. Bristol Bay appealed the Colorado courts' dismissal. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Bristol Bay's Colorado action was indeed barred on issue preclusion grounds. However, the Colorado Court held the trial court erred by dismissing Bristol Bay's Colorado action without converting the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. View "Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack" on Justia Law

Paul Voth was arrested after firing several gunshots in a rural subdivision where he lived. He was taken to Denver Health Medical Center. Denver Health reported that Voth was disoriented when he arrived at the hospital due to visual and auditory hallucinations. Voth's delirium began to subside around about a month later. Although Denver Health suspected that viral encephalitis was the source of Voth's psychotic episode, it did not reach a definitive diagnosis. Voth was ultimately charged with several crimes; he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the trial court's oral order allowing Voth, to assert involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense under section 18-1-804, C.R.S. (2013).The Court found the trial court abused its discretion when it found that a virus qualified as a "substance" that could result in intoxication under the statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Voth" on Justia Law

J.R. was sexually assaulted by a man who offered her a ride as she was walking home at 2:00 A.M. one winter morning in 2005. J.R. was taken to the hospital for examination; she complained of neck and jaw pain stemming from when her assailant held her mouth shut. A presence of semen later implicated Respondent Michael Jones as J.R.'s assailant. The State charged respondent with numerous offenses. Prior to trial, he moved the trial court to bar the State from introducing evidence that he allegedly sexually assaulted two other women in two other states. The trial court denied the motion, finding the evidence of the two other alleged assaults under the four-part "Spoto" admissibility test allowed the evidence's admissibility to show respondent's "common plan, scheme, or design" and to rebut respondent's defense of consent (Colorado v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (1990)). A jury ultimately convicted respondent, but the appellate court reversed, finding that evidence of the two out-of-state assaults were not sufficiently similar to the Colorado assault. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that trial courts have no obligation to determine that evidence of other acts offered under the Colorado Rules of Evidence satisfy the doctrine of chances, and to also satisfy the second and third prongs of the Spoto admissibility test. Though the doctrine of chances provides one theory pursuant to which other-act evidence may satisfy components of the Spoto analysis, trial courts have discretion to assess the relevance of other-act evidence under Spoto apart from the doctrine. The court of appeals therefore erred when it effectively held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other-act evidence without conducting a doctrine of chances analysis. View "Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Marquez was convicted at a single trial of attempted aggravated robbery (a statutorily designated crime of violence); second degree assault (found by the jury to have been committed as a crime of violence under the circumstances of this case); and two counts of felony menacing. Petitioner was also found to be an habitual criminal requiring sentences to triple the maximum of the presumptive range for each of his crimes. The district court sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment for his felony menacing convictions, which it also ordered to be served concurrently with his crime-of-violence sentences, but it ordered petitioner's two crime-of-violence sentences to be served consecutively. After concluding that both crimes of violence were committed as part of a single "crime spree," the district court felt compelled to impose consecutive 48-year sentences. Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed the district court's imposition of consecutive sentences for two crime-of-violence convictions. Because the phrase "arising out of the same incident," as appearing in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2013), is a reference to, and has the same meaning as, the phrase "arising from the same criminal episode," in section 18-1-408(2), C.R.S. (2013), and because the record in this case established that the crimes of violence of which petitioner was convicted were not "based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode," as previously construed in the latter statute, the Supreme Court concluded the district court was not required to impose consecutive sentences. Rather, it was not only permitted, but in fact, required to exercise its discretion concerning the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "Marquez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A petition in Dependency and Neglect was filed a few days after O.C.'s birth. The child was removed from her parents' care over concerns that her mother was not adequately caring for her. O.C. was eventually placed in foster care. At issue in this case was whether O.C.'s grandparents could intervene to have the child placed in their care. The County and Guardian Ad Litem opposed the grandparents' motion, arguing the grandparents lacked standing to intervene. The trial court denied the grandparents' motion. The Supreme Court held that parents, grandparents and relatives could intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Colorado law. The Court affirmed the appellate court which overturned the trial court's judgment. View "In the Int. of O.C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Cameron Davis was driving his girlfriend's car while a man in the passenger seat shot and killed a bystander. At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on testimony from three witnesses: Davis' girlfriend, his mother, and one of his friends. The appeal concerned the testimony of two detectives who testified about their interviews with these three witnesses. The record in this case indicated that the testimony from law enforcement officials regarding a witness' credibility was offered to provide context for the detectives' interrogation tactics and investigative decisions. The Supreme Court concluded that this kind of evidence was properly admitted. View "Davis v. Colorado " on Justia Law

Defendant met his victim "ML" while standing in line at a store. A few days later, he and ML went out for dinner and drinks. Instead of driving ML to her car at the end of the date, defendant drove ML to a secluded location and sexually assaulted her. A jury would convict defendant of felonious sexual assault for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight years to life, and designated as an SVP. Defendant appealed his conviction, sentence, and SVP designation to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the sexual assault conviction, but held that the trial court erred when it designated defendant as an SVP without making the factual findings required by the SVP statute. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to make the factual findings of whether defendant was an SVP. Defendant took issue with the trial court's finding that he "established a relationship" with the victim with the intent of assaulting her to satisfy that criterion of the SVP statute. After applying its interpretation of the relationship criterion to the record in this case, the Court held that the trial court made the appropriate specific findings and correctly designated defendant as a SVP. View "Candelaria v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court answered a question of Colorado law certified from the United States Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiffs were landowners who owned property abutting a former railroad right-of-way. The United States authorized the right-of-way to be used as a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act ("Rails-to-Trails" Act). The issue before the federal court was whether the United States took property for which Plaintiffs should have received compensation. The Colorado Court determined that the centerline presumption was a common law rule of conveyance that presumed a grantor who conveyed land abutting a right-of-way intended to convey land to the center of the right-of-way and absent a contrary intent on the face of the conveyance. Therefore, while the Court held that the centerline presumption applied to railroad rights-of-way, it also held that, to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of a railroad right-of-way, an adjacent landowner must produce evidence that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. View "Asmussen v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant David Uribe-Sanchez was charged with four felonies and two crimes-of-violence sentence enhancers for the sexual assault of a girl who referred to him as "dad." He would be sentenced to 34 years imprisonment and designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). To conclude that defendant satisfied the relationship criteria of the SVP statute, the trial court concluded defendant "promoted" his relationship with the victim primarily to victimize her. The appellate court affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts in this case erred by concluding defendant "promoted a relationship" with the victim when he assaulted her. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of whether the SVP designation was proper under the SVP statute. View "Uribe-Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law