Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant James Hunter was designated as a sexually violent predator (SVP) following his conviction of second-degree burglary, sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and a crime of violence. The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, but reversed the SVP designation, and remanded the case back to the trial court for specific findings on whether either of defendant's victims were strangers to him, or whether he had established or promoted a relationship with either. On remand, defendant argued he was not a stranger. The trial court found that he was, and designated him an SVP. The issue before the Supreme Court turns on the interpretation of "stranger" in the SVP statute. Upon review, the Court held that "stranger" meant that the offender did not know the victim, or the victim did not know the offender at the time of the offense. On application of "stranger" in the SVP statute to this case, the Court held that the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling designating defendant an SVP. View "Colorado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Defendant Carlos Gallegos pled guilty to attempted sexual assault on a child after admitting to sexually assaulting his live-in-girlfriend's six-year-old daughter. The trial court found that defendant met the relationship criterion of the sexually violent predator (SVP) statute because he established a relationship with the victim primarily to sexually assaulting her. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was the interpretation of "established a relationship" and "promoted a relationship" in the SVP statute. Applying the definition of these phrases to defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse defendant's SVP designation because he had not "established a relationship" with the victim primarily for the purpose of assaulting her because he lived with her and treated her as a stepdaughter preceding the assault. View "Colorado v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

Defendant Rhoderick Flockhart was convicted of distribution of marijuana and possession of eight ounces or more. On appeal, the appellate court ruled on three issues: (1) the court reversed defendant's convictions because the trial court instructed the jury before deliberating; (2) the trial court erred by requiring defendant to raise and argue his challenges for cause in front of the prospective jurors; and (3) affirmed the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to disqualify the judge. The Supreme Court, after its review of the trial court proceedings, concluded: (1) that the trial court erred in giving pre-deliberation instructions, but that the error was harmless; (2) the trial court can, in its discretion, conduct venire challenges for cause in open court; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge. View "Colorado v. Flockhart" on Justia Law

The Arapahoe County Sheriff's Department received a call from R. Talent, who claimed to have spotted his stolen van in the driveway of a house that was later determined to be Defendant Lance Brunsting's residence. Talent told police that "Lance" was known to carry a gun and was associated with dangerous people who were involved in drugs and who were known to carry guns. Concerned with the report of guns at the residence, the Sheriff dispatched five deputies and a sergeant to the location. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deputies' violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, or whether their claim of exigent circumstances at the time they were called to the property applied as an exception those rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that exigent circumstances existed when the deputies entered the curtilage of Defendant's residence, the issue of officer safety. With no violation of defendant's rights, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for consideration of other issues defendant raised on appeal. View "Colorado v. Brunsting" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dina Marshall was charged with driving under the influence of drugs, careless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia after lab urinalysis results revealed she had methamphetamine in her system when she caused a car accident. At trial, the State sought to admit the lab result showing that Marshall had methamphetamine in her urine; over Marshall's objection, the trial court admitted the lab report without the testimony of the lab technician who actually performed the test. Marshall appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the admission of the report did not violate Marshall's right to confront witnesses. The Court found that there was no evidence presented at trial that Marshall possessed drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court erroneously denied Marshall's motion for judgment of acquittal on this charge, and reversed the district court's judgment with respect to that charge. View "Marshall v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case arose from Petitioner Brandon Allen's designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's SVP designation and held that the trial court could designate an offender as an SVP even if the offender was deemed unlikely to recidivate based on his low score on the Sex Offender Management Board's risk assessment screening instrument. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court makes the ultimate SVP designation, but should give substantial deference to the scored Screening Instrument. A trial court that deviates from the results of the scored Screening Instrument must make specific findings on the record to demonstrate the necessity of the deviation. View "Allen v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling in favor of the Colorado Department of Local Affairs’ interpretation of CRS 39-4-102. The Court held that Qwest Corporation as a public utility, is valued centrally and therefore was not entitled to the intangible property exemption or the cost cap valuation method found elsewhere in Colorado’s tax statutes. The Court also held that this valuation method did not violate Qwest’s constitutional guarantee under the Equal Protection Clause nor did it violate Qwest’s rights under the Uniform Taxation Clause of the Colorado Constitution. View "Qwest v. Colorado Division of Property Taxation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that CRCP 26(b) requires a trial court take an active role managing discovery on questions of scope. The trial court must determine the appropriate scope of discovery in light of the reasonable needs of the case and tailor discovery to those needs. To resolve a dispute regarding the proper scope of discovery, the trial court should, at a minimum, consider the cost–benefit and proportionality factors set forth in CRCP 26(b)(2)(F). The Court also held that title opinions may contain privileged attorney–client communications if the parameters of that doctrine are met. View "In re DCP Midstream, LLP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dennis Shaw and First Horizon Home Loan Corporation challenged an appellate court's ruling that "constructive fraud" was sufficient to void a request for release of a deed of trust, arguing that actual fraud is required under CRS 38-39-102(8). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the statute creates a narrow exception that voids the public trustee’s release of a deed of trust only when proof of actual fraud is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Shaw v. 17 West Mill St." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered a reformulated certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: whether Colorado’s premises liability statute applied as a matter of law only to activities and circumstances directly or inherently are related to the land. The Supreme Court held that the statute is not restricted solely to activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land. Instead, the Court held that the premises liability statute applied to conditions, activities, and circumstances on the property that the landowner is liable for in its legal capacity as a landowner. View "Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law