Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The State filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court seeking relief from a district court order that suppressed statements of Defendant Jesus Luna-Solis as well as certain DNA evidence. Although the court found that the statements in question were voluntary and made after an effective waiver of Miranda rights, it nevertheless suppressed them on the grounds that the Sixth Amendment barred the police from questioning defendant without counsel present. The court suppressed the DNA evidence on grounds that police in the execution of a Crim. P. 41.1 order of a County Court, sought the order for the benefit of the prosecution in this case, and that after filing a motion to admit evidence of an uncharged assault, the prosecution was permitted to acquire non-testimonial identification evidence from defendant, even to verify his identity as a perpetrator in the assault, only according to Crim. P. 16 II (a)(2), governing discovery in this case. Because defendant's Miranda waiver effectively waived his right to counsel as guaranteed by not only the Fifth but also the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in suppressing statements as a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because Crim. P. 16 II imposes disclosure obligations on criminal defendants without simultaneously barring the use of evidence acquired through otherwise lawful investigation, the Court also found that the district court erred in finding a discovery violation and excluding DNA evidence. The district court's suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Luna-Solis" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal before the Supreme Court to challenge a district court's order to suppress Defendant Carlos Barraza's incriminating statements made prior to his first police interview at his home, and at a second interview at the police station after having been given his Miranda rights. Defendant was charged with retaliation against a witness or victim when he confronted residents of an apartment who called police on his friend, leading to the friend's arrest. The district court concluded that Defendant's initial statements were given while in custody, and subsequent statements were tainted by the failure to initially advise Defendant of his rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time he made the initial statements, and because statements made at the police station were not therefore fruit of the poisonous tree, the district court erred in suppressing both statements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Barraza" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court stemmed from a dependency and neglect case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the father's parental rights and reversed the termination of the mother's parental rights on grounds that the trial court erred in allowing the foster parents to intervene and participate fully in the termination hearing. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court construed C.R.S. section 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the parents' due process rights are not impacted by the participation of the foster parents who properly intervene. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law

Steven Pham represented the estate of a driver of a car involved in a traffic accident. He appealed (along with the driver's parents and the five passengers in the car at the time of the accident) the court of appeals' judgment which affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer, State Farm, on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims were bound by the statute of limitations governing underinsured motorist claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs failed to file their action or demand arbitration of their underinsured motorist claims within either three years of the accrual of their cause or within two years after receiving payment of a settlement or judgment on an underlying bodily injury liability claim preserved as prescribed by the applicable statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Pham v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether foster parents who intervene in a dependency and neglect action possess limited rights to participate in a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights. The Court construed C.R.S. 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who have properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that parents' due process rights are not impacted by the full participation of foster parents in the termination hearing. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law

Police suspected that Defendant Stephanie Theander was involved in the death of her ex-husband Gregg Theander. While confined to a hospital bed, she made a series of statements during two separate interviews with police. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress these statements, finding that police violated her Miranda rights and that the statements were involuntary. The State appealed the trial court's rulings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the State and reversed the trial court. View "Colorado v. Theander" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an indigent alleged juvenile offender was entitled as of right to a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. Upon receiving an competency evaluation report, the trial court made a preliminary finding that "W.P." was competent to proceed. However, citing ongoing concerns about her client's mental health, W.P.'s public defender objected, requesting a hearing and filing a motion for a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. At the motion hearing, the public defender stated that because the juvenile code was silent, the statutory authority relied upon referred to the adult code which entitled the second evaluation at the State's expense. Concluding that the Children's Code was "specifically silent on that issue," the district court determined that the adult provisions did not apply and denied the request for a second evaluation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the public defender's request for a second evaluation. View "In re People in the Interest of W.P." on Justia Law

Antelope Development LLC was formed to develop a residential subdivision in Bennett, Colorado. The LLC took out construction loans from the bank at the start of the project; before it was finished, the LLC had exhausted its financing. The LLC entered into oral agreements with Respondent AC Excavating for work on the subdivision. AC Excavating was paid for some but not all of its work. Petitioner Donald Yale, a member of the LLC, realized that the LLC had insufficient funds to meet its obligations, so he placed some of his own money in the LLC's bank account. Yale then applied these funds to the LLC's general business expenses and some outstanding subcontractor invoices. AC Excavating still was not paid in full. AC Excavating sued Yale alleging, among other things, that the LLC had violated Colorado's construction trust fund statute by failing to hold the funds in the LLC's bank account in trust for payment to AC Excavating. AC Excavating further alleged that Yale thereby committed theft, permitting it to claim treble damages and attorney fees under the state Rights in Stolen Property statute. The trial court ruled in favor of Yale, and AC Excavating appealed. The appellate court reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the LLC member's voluntary injection of capital into the company did not constitute "funds disbursed to a contractor . . . on a construction project" under the construction trust fund statute, as that money was not required to be held in trust. The Court also concluded the appellate court erred in remanding the case for a determination of whether Yale was civilly liable for theft under the Rights in Stolen Property statute. View "Yale v. AC Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

Through cold calls, defendants sold plaintiffs shares in oil and gas joint ventures in Texas, Alabama and Mississippi. Plaintiffs all signed agreements with forum selection clauses stating that courts in Dallas County, Texas would have exclusive jurisdiction should any disputes arising from the agreements arise. The ventures lost money, and plaintiffs sued in Colorado, raising violations of the Colorado Securities Act (CSA) and various other common-law claims. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims citing the forum selection clause. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the clauses were void because they were unenforceable on public policy grounds. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the forum selection clauses were valid, and that they requires the parties to litigate their claims in Texas. View "Cagle v. Mathers Family Trust" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Colorado law recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege between a guardian ad litem and a minor child with respect to a dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court held that a guardian ad litem holds a minor child's psychotherapist-patient privilege when: (1) the child is too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege; (2) the child's interests are adverse to those of his or her parent(s); and (3) section 19-3-311 C.R.S. (2012) does not abrogate the privilege. In this case, the Court found that the guardian ad litem partially waived the child's privilege when she disseminated a letter from the child's therapist to the juvenile court and to all parties. The Court remanded the case to the juvenile court for a determination of the scope of that waiver. View "L.A.N. et al. v. L.M.B." on Justia Law