Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Colorado Supreme Court
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In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. Adopting its reasoning in "Neuhaus v. Colorado," (2012 CO 65, released concurrently with this opinion), the Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court. View "Colorado v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

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In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. The Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. View "Neuhaus v. Colorado" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, along with "Hagos v. Colorado" (2012 CO 63), to address whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily requires a determination in post conviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. Upon review, the Court concluded that that a determination that an instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the plain error and Strickland standards are not the same. "The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard." Defendant Villarreal's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, nonetheless, failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment but on different grounds. View "Villarreal v. Colorado" on Justia Law

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In this postconviction proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily required a determination in postconviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. The Court concluded that a determination that instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the two standards are not the same. The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard. Defendant Hagos' ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. The Court affirmed the appellate court but on different grounds. View "Hagos v. Colorado" on Justia Law

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In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "People v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions arising out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder. In its holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permitted plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. In this case, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. "Likewise, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat may not be raised on appeal." The Court held that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but that this error did not amount to plain error. View "Colorado v. Gross" on Justia Law

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The supreme court vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment after the trial court found that 71 days was not a reasonable time for purposes of relating back an amended complaint under C.R.C.P. 15(c). Pursuant to "Dillingham v. Greeley Publishing Company," (701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985)), the proper measure for relation back under C.R.C.P. 15(c) is the time between the filing date of the original complaint and the date when the party related back receives notice. In this case, the Supreme Court held that 116 days was reasonable because it was within the time for service of process in Colorado. View "Garcia v. Schneider Energy Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

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In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a district court order that granted defendant Suzanne Guthrie's motion to suppress evidence of an illegal narcotic discovered during a routine inventory search of her personal effects after a judge at the El Paso County Court, in a prior proceeding, ordered a deputy sheriff to jail her for direct contempt of court. In the prosecution for Defendant's possession of illegal drugs, the district court suppressed evidence discovered during the inventory search as an ad hoc remedy for the due process violation it deemed the county court judge committed when conducting the contempt proceeding. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment: the inventory search resulted directly from the county court's order to the deputy sheriff, based on a finding of criminal contempt of court to jail Defendant. Appeal of the summary contempt conviction, which might or might not result in reversal, would be the proper recourse for the county court's alleged due process violation. Suppressing evidence of the illegal narcotic discovered as a result of the valid inventory search here would not have been an appropriate remedy even if the county court erred in convicting Defendant of direct contempt of court. View "Colorado v. Guthrie" on Justia Law

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In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "Colorado v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions that arose out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense to determine whether the defendant possessed the culpable mental state required for the crime of extreme indifference murder. In so holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permits plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. Here, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. Furthermore, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat also could not be raised on appeal. In addition, the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but this error did not amount to plain error. View "Gross v. Colorado" on Justia Law

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In this interlocutory appeal, the Surpeme Court reviewed a trial court order that suppressed statements made by Petitioner Dianeth Pittman in response to police interrogation without a prior advisement pursuant to "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that Pittman was in custody for purposes of Miranda and therefore the trial court erred by suppressing the statements. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order.

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In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed a court of appeals' opinion in "Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder," whereby the underlying civil action involved claims brought by Professor Ward Churchill pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 after his tenured employment was terminated by the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado. Churchill alleged that the Regents violated his constitutionally protected free speech rights by initiating an investigation into his academic integrity and by terminating his tenured employment in retaliation for his publication of a controversial essay. Churchill sought both compensatory and equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's termination claim on grounds that the Regents' quasi-judicial actions were entitled to absolute immunity. It also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's claim for equitable remedies because it concluded that such remedies were not available in a Section 1983 action against quasi-judicial officials. Lastly, based on its determination that allegedly retaliatory employment investigations are not actionable under Section 1983, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the University on Churchill's bad faith investigation claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: (1) the Court held that the Regents' decision to terminate Churchill's employment was a quasi-judicial action functionally comparable to a judicial process, and that the Regents were entitled to absolute immunity concerning their decision; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Churchill was not entitled to the equitable remedies of reinstatement and front pay; and (3) Churchill’s bad faith investigation claim was barred by qualified immunity because the Regents' investigation into Churchill's academic record does not implicate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law.