Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The People brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011),and C.A.R. 4.1, challenging the district court's suppression of statements made by Defendant Erick Figueroa-Ortega to a police detective. Defendant was charged with burglary, criminal mischief, and theft, in connection with a break-in at the restaurant where he worked as a cook. The district court found that the statements in question were the product of custodial interrogation, without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Because the Supreme Court determined that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements in question, the district court erred, and its suppression order was reversed.

In this case, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari on a statutory construction issue involving the definition of the word "victim" within the criminal case restitution statute, sections 18-1.3-601 to -603, C.R.S. (2011). Under that statute, the general assembly defined "victim" as "any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender." The prosecution argued that the El Paso County Department of Human Services (DHS) was a victim entitled to restitution from Defendant Nicolette Chris Padilla-Lopez because it was required to expend funds to provide foster care for her children as a result of her guilty plea to misdemeanor child abuse. The court of appeals held that DHS could not be considered a victim for purposes of the criminal case restitution statute because the elements of the underlying crime of child abuse pertained to wrongful conduct against the child and do not include a wrong against DHS. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: "the existing criminal case restitution statute does not classify DHS as a 'victim' for the purpose of recovering costs it has expended in the course of fulfilling its statutorily mandated duty to provide necessary care to dependent and neglected children."

With the approval of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), in 2005 the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel) began constructing a coal-fired electric power unit known as "Comanche 3." When Xcel sought to recover a portion of its construction costs nearly four years later in a rate proceeding, Petitioner Leslie Glustrom intervened. Petitioner sought to introduce testimony that Xcel acted improperly and, consequently, should not recover its costs. The PUC excluded most of her testimony, a ruling that Petitioner challenged. Petitioner separately challenged the depreciation rate and the possibility that Comanche 3 might not be "used and useful" at the time rates went into effect. The PUC denied her challenges, and the district court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PUC did not abuse its discretion when it struck substantial portions of Petitioner's testimony pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Further, the depreciation rate approved by the PUC was established pursuant to law and in accordance with the evidence. Lastly, the PUC was free to exercise its discretion in departing from a strict application of the "used and useful" principle. Petitioner failed to meet her burden in showing why such a departure here would result in a rate that is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.

Defendant Michael Pierson sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed his various convictions of felony sexual assault on a child and indecent exposure. The district court denied Defendant's pre-trial motion to admit evidence of the child's similar victimization by a teenage cousin, during substantially the same time period. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, finding both that the proffered evidence of prior sexual contact did not fall within the rape shield exception for the source of semen, pregnancy, disease, or similar evidence of sexual intercourse, and that it was not relevant for any of the other purposes offered by the Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding that because the proffered evidence amounted to evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual activity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence.

The State brought an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a trial court order that suppressed evidence seized by police following an inventory search after a traffic stop. The trial court ruled that the traffic stop was pretextual and thus invalid. The court reasoned that, pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, contraband (heroin and drug paraphernalia) seized from the car during the inventory search had to be suppressed as evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, irrespective of the officers' pretextual or subjective reason for stopping the vehicle, the officers possessed an independent and objective basis to make this traffic stop (the Defendant ran a red light). Having ruled that the stop was invalid, the trial court did not consider the State's argument that the search of the car was a valid inventory search and that the seizure of contraband from the car was therefore admissible. Hence, the Court reversed the trial court's order of suppression but remanded the case to the trial court with directions to make factual findings and conclusions of law concerning the validity of the inventory search consistent with our holding in "Pineda v. People," (230 P.3d 1181 (Colo. 2010)).

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing incriminating statements made by Defendant Michael Lynn while in custody. The trial court held that the statements came after Defendant's unambiguous request for counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that Defendant's question, "When can I talk to a lawyer?" was an unambiguous request for counsel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the trial court suppressing Defendant's statements.

This original proceeding before the Supreme Court arose from a divorce and parenting case in its third year of post-dissolution decree litigation. Mother's petition challenged the district court's summary denial of her motion for a protective order and sanctions concerning the acquisition by Father's attorney of Mother's entire employment file from Mother's former employer by subpoena. The Court accepted jurisdiction to determine whether Father's attorney violated C.R.C.P. 45 when she made arrangements with Mother's former employer for the production of Mother's employment file without Mother's consent and before Mother had notice of the existence of the subpoena. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "[The Court] interpret[ed] Rule 45 to require that, unless the subpoenaed witness and other parties consent to an alternate arrangement or by other court order, subpoenaed documents are to be produced only at the deposition, hearing, or trial specified in the subpoena and hold that the conduct of Father's attorney in this case violated Rule 45." Furthermore, the Court held that Father's attorney frustrated the purpose of Rule 45 by depriving Mother of the opportunity to object to the subpoena before the documents were produced. The Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that Father and Father's attorney identify and recover, and then return or destroy all physical and electronic copies of the documents produced by Mother's former employer pursuant to the subpoena issued by Father's attorney, including Mother's entire employment file. The Court also directed the trial court to determine whether sanctions should be awarded to Mother against Father's attorney for the rule violation.

Prior to a foreclosure sale, Petitioner Betty Amos and her late husband, Thomas Righetti, owned a condominium unit in Aspen. Amos borrowed approximately $1.6 million from Equitable Bank securing the loan with a Deed of Trust on the condominium unit in favor of Equitable Bank and granted by Amos and Righetti. In September 2002, Righetti died. Amos and Righetti's daughter, Brandy Righetti, were named as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Thomas Righetti. The loan fell into default and Equitable Bank decided to foreclose on the property. Equitable Bank filed a Rule 120 Motion for Order Authorizing Sale and sent notice of the proceeding to Amos in her individual capacity. Equitable Bank did not send notice of the Rule 120 proceeding to the Estate or to Brandy Righetti. Neither Amos nor the Estate opposed the order authorizing sale. The public trustee held a foreclosure sale in early 2007. Neither Amos nor the Estate submitted a bid. After Equitable Bank bid the amount of its debt, three individuals Respondent Aspen Alps 123, LLC was the successful bidder. The public trustee issued the deed quieting title in the property to Aspen Alps. Amos then brought this action against the public trustee and Equitable Bank to enjoin the issuance of the deed to Aspen Alps, and to compel the trustee to allow her to redeem. Concurrently, she filed a notice of lis pendens. When the trial court refused to grant a preliminary injunction in Amos' favor, she filed a second notice of lis pendens. Amos then amended her complaint to include a claim that Equitable Bank failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of Rule 120. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the parties received actual notice which afforded them an opportunity to present their objections and no prejudice resulted. Accordingly, the Court refused to disturb the completed foreclosure sale.

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review a district court order dismissing a misdemeanor charge in a county court case that was improperly transferred to the district court in violation of a chief judge's order governing such transfers within the judicial district. "While it is questionable whether the district court had jurisdiction to dismiss the county court charge," the Court nevertheless held that the only forum for an initial appeal of such a dismissal is in the court of appeals because it is a final judgment of the district court. The Court noted that to hold otherwise would render this "important issue of the respect owed to a controlling chief judge's order" unreviewable. Accordingly, the Court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over this appeal. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to review the district court's dismissal on the merits.

The prosecution brought this interlocutory appeal seeking to reverse the trial court's ruling that suppressed evidence obtained from the search of the apartment of the Defendant Andrian Arapu. Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents sought to contact Defendant, suspecting he was in the country illegally. In accordance with their standard protocol, ICE requested assistance from local law enforcement. When federal agents contacted Defendant, he refused to give them permission to enter his apartment, but he consented to the local detective entering the apartment to monitor a woman already inside. When the federal agents were arrested Defendant, he gave his consent to the local detective to gather his keys and phones, and to secure the apartment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a suspect who consented to a law enforcement officer entering his dwelling to monitor another person inside permits the law enforcement officer to ask the monitored person for identifying information. Further, the Court held that a suspect who consents to a law enforcement officer remaining inside his dwelling to gather belongings and to secure the dwelling, permits the law enforcement officer to remain in the apartment until all law enforcement personnel have left the dwelling. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's suppression of the drug-related evidence, and reversed the district court's suppression of a firearm because it would have been discovered in a search pursuant to a warrant supported by a redacted affidavit that independently established probable cause to search the apartment for drug-related evidence. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.