Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 38-5-105 C.R.S. (2011) granted condemnation authority to a company for the construction of a petroleum pipeline. Upon review, the Court concluded that the General Assembly did not grant expressly or implication, the power of eminent domain to companies for the construction of pipelines conveying petroleum. Therefore, section 38-5-105 did not grant that authority to Respondent Sinclair Transportation Company for its proposed pipeline project. The Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion that upheld the trial court's order granting Sinclair immediate possession of the property belonging to Petitioners Ivar and Donna Larson and Lauren and Kay Sandberg.

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's suppression of evidence obtained following an investigatory stop of Defendant Adolph Funez-Paiagua. Defendant was standing on the property of a closed auto-body shop at 1:15 in the morning. One of two responding officers approached where Defendant had been standing. After hearing a loud crash and seeing Defendant fleeing the property with "some large bags," the officer ordered Defendant to stop. The trial court found the officer's testimony credible, but concluded that the evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Specifically, the trial court determined that the seizure occurred "at the time the [first] officer contacted [Funez-Paiagua]." The trial court found that, at that time, the officer knew that Defendant was standing on private property late at night. The trial court concluded that these facts did not support reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and therefore the trial court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop created reasonable suspicion. The investigatory stop was therefore not an unreasonable seizure, and the trial court incorrectly suppressed evidence resulting from the stop.

Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that the petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 40-6-115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40-6-115(5) pertained to venue, not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court: section 40-6-115(5) mandated venue and did not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court discharged the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court could transfer this case to the Denver District Court.

In its order, the trial court in this case ruled that the prosecutorial work product doctrine under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) was limited to work product prepared in anticipation of the case before the court, and did not extend to work product prepared in anticipation of a different but related criminal prosecution. Prior to disclosing the contested materials, the State petitioned the Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21 to reverse the trial court arguing the prosecutorial work product protection under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) extended to all work product and was not limited to materials prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case immediately before the court. Resolving this issue in accordance with the intent of Crim.P. 16(I)(e)(1) to protect the professional judgment and mental impressions of prosecutors from disclosure so that they may candidly analyze the merits of a case and plan their litigation strategy, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and made the rule absolute: the Court held that the protection of prosecutorial work product, under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1),extends to opinion work product prepared by the prosecution in anticipation of any criminal prosecution. Because the trial court did not inspect the contested materials nor decide whether they constituted opinion work product prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution, the Court remanded the case matter to the trial court to make this determination through an ex parte, in camera review.

Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that Petitioner Associated Governments of Northwestern Colorado failed to meet the requirements of section 40-6-115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40-6-115(5) pertained to venue and not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court, and held that section 40-6-115(5) mandated venue and did not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court discharged the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court may transfer this case to the Denver District Court.

In an original proceeding, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's order that quashed service on Defendant Paulo Rodriguez-Cera. Defendant resided in Mexico but was served by substituted service in Colorado. After previously granting substituted service, the trial court determined that C.R.C.P. 4(d) mandated that service on a defendant located in a foreign country be made according to international agreement, if any. Because Mexico and the United States are parties to the Convention on Service Arboad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361), the trial court concluded that Plaintiff Rex Willhite must serve Defendant via the Convention. As a result, the trial court quashed the substituted service. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that C.R.C.P. 4(d) did not establish service according to international agreement as the exclusive means of serving a defendant in a foreign country. The Court held that substituted service under Colorado law provides a valid alternative to service abroad. The Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court reviewed a district court order that upheld a county court's decision that a six-year stattue of limitations did not bar Respondent Account Brokers of Larimer County, Inc.'s claim against Pettiioner Daniel Hassler. Petitioner financed the purchase of a vehicle by entering into a security agreement with Account Broker's predecessor-in-interest in which the vehicle served as collateral. Petitioner defaulted on the loan, and the predecessor repossessed the vehicle and later sold it at auction. The precedessor applied the proceeds of the auction to the balance of the loan. The proceeds were insufficient to cover the balance; thus Petitioner was still held responsible for the deficiency. The debt was eventually transferred to Account Brokers who sued Petitioner to recover the deficiency less than six years after the vehicle was sold. The county and district courts ruled in favor of Account Brokers, determining that the statute of limitations did not bar Account Brokers' claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the controlling issue was not the date that the debt was made liquidated or determinable but the date the debt accrued. "[U]nder Colorado law and the express terms of the parties' agreement, the present debt became due when it was accelerated following [the predecessor's] repossession of the vehicle and demand for full payment on the debt, which occurred more than six years before the initiation of the present suit. Accordingly, the action [was] barred by the statute of limitations."

Defendant Tyler Wilburn announced his intent to introduce expert testimony of a learning disability to challenge whether he "knowingly" violated his bail bond condition, a mistake-of-fact defense (he missed his court date after he allegedly wrote down the wrong date). The prosecution maintained that Defendant had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity in order to introduce expert testimony of his mental condition, a plea which requires a "commitment" to a state mental health facility. The trial court agreed and ordered Defendant committed for forty-five days to a state facility to conduct a court-ordered mental examination. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and made the rule absolute: Defendant's proposed expert testimony of a learning disability was admissible under the procedures of section 16-8-107(3)(b), which requires notice and a court-ordered mental examination. Defendant was not required to plead insanity to challenge whether he possessed the mens rea for the offense with expert testimony concerning his learning disability. Under section 16-8-106, the trial court has discretion to consider the circumstances and the nature of Defendant's defense to set a reasonable time, place, and length for a court-ordered mental health examination.

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the district court's suppression of contraband seized from the defendant's vehicle on two separate occasions. In each case, after the defendant was arrested for driving under suspension, a police narcotics detection canine was brought to the scene and led around the defendant's truck, which had been parked and left at the location of her arrest. Also in each case, after the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, a search of the truck's cab revealed drug paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine. The district court found that under these circumstances, the state constitution barred the police from bringing a trained narcotics detection dog within detection range of the defendant's vehicle without first having reasonable suspicion to believe it contained contraband, which the court found to be lacking in both cases. The Colorado Supreme Court held after it's review that an interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate under the state constitution any more than under the federal constitution, and that official conduct failing to compromise any legitimate interest in privacy cannot be deemed a search under the state constitution any more than under the federal constitution. Because narcotics dogs could not communicate anything more than reason to believe the defendant's truck either contained or did not contain contraband, no reasonable privacy interest was infringed upon in permitting narcotics dogs to sniff around the vehicle. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' opinion in "People v. Laeke" (08CA79 (Colo. App. Feb. 4, 2010)). The court held that when the prosecution has conceded that defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, he has a statutory right under Colorado's insanity statutes to a jury trial on both the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity. The court of appeals further held that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) is entered without a trial. After review of the applicable legal authority and court precedent, the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have a statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and his affirmative defense of insanity when he enters a NGRI plea and the prosecution concedes defendant was insane. "The legislature articulated its intent when it amended the insanity statutes. The explicit legislative wording did not include an intent to create a substantive statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity after it has been established that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime." The Court held that the Constitution is not violated when NGRI is entered without a trial on the merits and an affirmative defense of insanity. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings.