Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Joseph Lucero was convicted of crimes connected to several break-ins in August and September 2000, including three counts of theft and one count of first degree burglary. In review of this case, the Supreme Court applied several of its earlier decisions, and merged the three theft convictions into one, and vacated the first degree burglary conviction. As the Court held in "Roberts v. People," the General Assembly required all thefts committed by the same person within a six-month period prior to 2009 to be joined and prosecuted as a single theft. The court therefore corrected Defendant's sentence. Furthermore, the Court applied its holding in "Montez v. Colorado," holding that the General Assembly has provided that a firearm is not a deadly weapon per se for the purposes of the first degree burglary statute. As in "Montez," the prosecution in this case conceded that if firearms are not per se deadly weapons, Defendant's conviction could not stand. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's first degree burglary conviction.

Defendant Anthony Revoal was charged with one count of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana in an amount less than five pounds after an investigatory stop and "Terry" frisk revealed marijuana and a scale containing marijuana residue. At the time of the stop, the police were aware that: (1) it was 11:30 p.m.; (2) robberies had recently occurred in the area; (3) Defendant was standing on the side of a closed sandwich shop; (4) Defendant walked to the side of an open liquor store, then walked toward the back of the liquor store, where it was dark; and (5) Defendant turned and walked away from the investigating officer when he saw the patrol vehicle. The trial court suppressed the marijuana evidence on the basis that these facts did not give the investigating officer reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the facts and circumstances the officer knew at the time of the intrusion, viewed either individually or in conjunction with each other, did not amount under the "totality of the circumstances" to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the officer's investigatory stop.

In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a magistrate's order suppressing certain statements made by the juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the magistrate's suppression order was never reviewed and adopted (with or without modification) by the district court before the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

In an arbitration proceeding between Respondent SunOpta Grains and Foods Inc. (SunOpta) and Colorado Mills, LLC, an arbitrator, at SunOpta's request, issued subpoenas to petitioners SK Food International and Adams Vegetable Oil, Inc. SK Food and Adams were not parties to the underlying arbitration. Neither company was incorporated in Colorado, was registered as a foreign corporation in Colorado, or maintained a principal office in Colorado. The subpoenas, which requested business records, were served on SK Food and Adams at their places of business in California and North Dakota. When SK Food and Adams refused to comply with the arbitration subpoenas, SunOpta asked the district court to enforce them. The district court issued an order enforcing the subpoenas.In response, SK Food and Adams filed a petition for a rule to show cause, which the Supreme Court issued. The nonparties appealed the district court's order enforcing the subpoenas. The Supreme Court held that Colorado courts, as a matter of state sovereignty, have no authority to enforce civil subpoenas against out-of-state nonparties. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's enforcement order, and remanded case back to the district court for further proceedings.

The State charged Defendant Christopher Strimple with possession of an explosive or incendiary device and other crimes after a police search of the home he shared with his common law wife. Police responded to the home when Gabriele Thompson complained of domestic abuse. When police arrived, Defendant refused to let them in, threatened to kill officers if they entered, and engaged officers in a tense stand-off for nearly forty-five minutes. He ultimately surrendered peacefully, and police took him into custody. Thompson consented to an additional search during which the police discovered knives, a pipe bomb and drug paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed this evidence on the basis that, during the stand-off, Defendant had refused consent for entry into the home. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Thompson validly gave her consent to the second warrantless search because Defendant was no longer physically present and the police did not remove him from the scene in order to avoid his objection to the search.

Defendant Andrew Mumford challenged his conviction for possession of one gram or less of cocaine, arguing, among other things, that an incriminating statement he made to a law enforcement officer should have been suppressed because it was obtained without proper warnings under "Miranda v. Arizona" (384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of "Miranda" at the time he made the statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances at the time he made the incriminating statement, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have felt deprived of his freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest.

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge a district court's suppression of evidence seized from the trunk of the Defendant Brittney Coates' vehicle. Upon discovering a bindle and single prescription pill in the driver's pants pocket, the police arrested the driver, placed him in their patrol car, and searched the vehicle. The district court found that the police lacked any reasonable and articulable basis to search Defendant's trunk incident to the arrest of the driver in accordance with "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), and that they also lacked probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle's trunk pursuant to the automobile exception. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held, however, that because the evidence for which suppression was sought was not seized from the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle, the search-incident-to-arrest exception could not justify its seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that it was able to determine from the district court's findings of fact that the police lacked probable cause to search Defendant's vehicle, whether or not they would have been justified in searching the passenger compartment on less than probable cause.

The Supreme Court reviewed a judge disqualification issue raised by the appellate court's decision to reverse and remand an order that terminated the parental rights of Respondent, C.M. (Mother). In its review of the termination hearing, the court of appeals held that the trial judge should have recused himself on the grounds that his clerk was the mother of a material witness in the case. Although the court of appeals held that the judge should have been disqualified, Motherâs lateness in filing the motion for disqualification prompted the court to conclude that Mother may have waived her right to move for disqualification. According to the court of appeals, the question of whether Mother had waived the disqualification issue turned on whether her counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the motion for disqualification. Reasoning that Mother could not be bound by waiver if she had in fact received ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals remanded for additional findings about counselâs performance. The court then directed the chief judge of the district to transfer the case to himself or to a senior judge for the proceedings on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the transfer: "[w]ithout deciding what is required to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the supreme court acknowledges that, at the least, an allegation of prejudice is necessary. Moreover, the court holds that when an ineffective assistance claim is premised on counselâs failure to file a motion for disqualification, the prejudice element cannot be satisfied without an allegation that the judge was actually biased. Because the respondentâs motion for disqualification was entirely based on an appearance of impropriety, rather than a claim of actual bias, it failed to satisfy the prejudice element." The Court held that Mother's motion was untimely and should not have been granted. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The State appealed the reversal of Respondent Jerad Pickering's conviction for reckless manslaughter. The court of appeals held that the trial court's self-defense jury instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent acted recklessly. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's instruction did not shift the State's burden, and accordingly reversed the court of appeals' judgment and overruled contrary rules announced in "People v. Lara" and "People v. Taylor."

Defendant Gerald Lewis appealed his convictions and sentences for a number of offenses including three counts each of kidnapping and sexually assaulting his kidnap victims. The trial court sentenced Defendant for sexual assault and separately sentenced him for the second degree kidnapping of each victim, elevated to the level of a class two felony. Among its other holdings, the court of appeals rejected Defendant's contention that "People v. Henderson" should be overruled because of subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, and it affirmed each of his separate convictions and sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether "Henderson" was still good law. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that the federal Court's case law "neither undermine [the Colorado Court's] prior assessment of legislative intent in 'Henderson' nor in any way diminish[es] the dispositive impact of legislative intent on Lewis's double jeopardy and merger claims."