Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, a jury convicted David Wood of manslaughter for fatally shooting someone in his apartment during a drug transaction. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request for immunity from prosecution under Colorado's "Make My Day" statute. Following its review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Defendant could have sought immediate review of the trial court's order by invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction before the verdict was handed down, but "Make My Day" immunity may not be reviewed on appeal after trial. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

In 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed Defendant Gonzalo Santana's conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, concluding that the prosecution had violated his constitutional rights by shifting the burden of proof to him at trial. According to the appellate court, the prosecutor shifted the burden by cross-examining the defense expert about his ability to perform conclusive tests which established that the expert could have run such tests. The prosecution then emphasized that testimony in its closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court found that defense counsel "opened the door" by questioning the expert about his ability to conduct conclusive tests. In light of the whole record, the Court reasoned that the prosecutor's questions and comments were "likely not meant to shift the burden of proof, but to highlight the strength of the prosecution's case."

Both Defendant Tremaine Speer and the State challenged the Court of Appeals' judgment that reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery. The State contended that the district court erred by denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on the affirmative defense of "duress" which resulted in the reversal of his conviction. Defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that even if the Supreme Court disagreed that the omission of the instruction was "reversible error," he would nevertheless be entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in rejecting his challenges for cause on two prospective jurors who worked in âsecurity.â Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's "duress" jury instruction. It was undisputed that Defendant had a gun and drove himself to the scene of the crime. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could consider that Defendant acted under duress. Furthermore, the Court found that technically neither of the prospective jurors worked in "security," despite their employers being the Department of Homeland Security. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the district court's judgment.

At issue in this case was a child custody dispute between a divorced mother and father. The children lived in Colorado with their mother and step-father. The father, who lived in New York, filed a custody action in New York to modify the initial child custody determination. A New York Supreme Court entered its determination awarding sole custody to the father. The mother objected to New York's exercise of jurisdiction over the case and filed her own custody action in Colorado. The father asked a Colorado district court to enforce the New York court's award of custody. Upon consideration, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the New York Supreme Court failed to exercise jurisdiction consistent with New York law and with the requirements of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. 1738A, "PKPA") and as such, Colorado was not required to give that order full faith and credit. The Court remanded the case to the Colorado district court for further proceedings.

At issue in this case was a child custody dispute between a divorced mother and father. The child lived in Colorado with her mother. The father, who lived in Nebraska, filed a custody action in Nebraska. A Nebraska district court entered an initial child custody determination awarding custody to the father. The mother objected to Nebraska's exercise of jurisdiction over the case and filed her own custody action in Colorado. A Colorado district court refused to recognize the Nebraska court order and awarded custody to the mother. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the Colorado district court order, holding that though Nebraska did not have jurisdiction over the custody action, Colorado must nevertheless grant it "full faith and credit." Upon consideration, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the Nebraska district court failed to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the requirements of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. 1738A, "PKPA") and as such, Colorado was not required to give that order full faith and credit. Therefore, the Court reversed the Colorado appellate court's decision, and reinstated the Colorado trial court's order.

Plaintiff-Appellant The State of Colorado appealed a district court order that suppressed test results performed on blood drawn from Defendant-Appellee Joshua Smith following a car accident. Police suspected Defendant was intoxicated. A passenger extracted from the car told police that Defendant had been driving. Paramedics took Defendant to the hospital, and police asked for blood samples. Police did not have a search warrant or ask for Defendant's consent prior to taking the samples. The nurse drew one sample, after which another officer advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant waived his rights and did not object to, resist, complain about, or otherwise question any of the blood draws. The trial court concluded that police had probable cause to arrest Defendant for vehicular assault at the time of the draws. Nevertheless, the court suppressed the results of the tests performed because the State's "prior consent" statute required that the police ask Defendant for his consent prior to drawing the blood. Upon consideration of the arguments and the "prior consent" statute, the Supreme Court held that officers do not have to request a driver's consent to conduct a constitutional involuntary blood draw. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court's decision that suppressed Defendant's test results. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

The State appealed a trial court order that suppressed statements made by Defendant Wayne Klinck during his initial interview by police. Responding to a domestic disturbance report, police arrived at Defendant's girlfriend's house. They asked Defendant to remain on the porch while the officers interviewed the girlfriend. Shortly thereafter, an officer spoke with Defendant, and when the officer determined he had probable cause, he placed Defendant under arrest. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he invoked his right to counsel. Detectives re-contacted and interviewed Defendant in jail, and at that time Defendant waived his Miranda rights and provided additional information. The trial court suppressed the statements Defendant made on the porch prior to being placed under arrest. Upon consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Defendant was not in custody during his initial interview on the porch. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Terry Townsend unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on escape charges. The terms of Petitioner's probation mandated he participate in an "intensive supervision program." When he failed to participate, his probation was revoked. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that jury instructions issued by the trial court at his revocation hearing were an incorrect articulation of the law, and as such, the jury convicted him based on bad information. Furthermore, Petitioner argued that the "ISP" condition of his probation was unconstitutional. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's jury instructions correctly stated the applicable law, and that the ISP statute was not unconstitutional. The Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence.

Respondent and former employee Andrew Blood suffered severe and permanent injuries while working on a wood utility pole owned by Petitioner Qwest Services Corporation (Qwest). Blood sued Qwest for negligence, asserting that Quest failed to implement a routine inspection program that would have detected the rotting that caused the pole to collapse on top of him. A jury awarded Respondent close to $30 million, finding Qwest 100% at fault. Qwest appealed the verdict and award, and the appeals court affirmed the trial courtâs decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Qwest argued that the âexemplary damagesâ awarded to Respondent violated its due process rights. Furthermore, Qwest challenged whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support âexemplary damagesâ and the juryâs subsequent award. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions, finding that Qwestsâs due process rights were not violated by the trial courtâs decision. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Qwestâs failure to implement an inspection program for 46-years prior to Respondentâs accident to support the exemplary damage award handed down by the trial court.

In this case, two bail-bonds agents were charged with second-degree burglary and felony menacing in pursuit of an alleged âbail jumper.â On appeal, Defendants Jason Oram and Devon Weinstein challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against them at trial and used the common law âbonding agent privilegeâ to excuse their actions. The Supreme Court found that no common law bonding agent privilege exists in Colorado, and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charges against Defendants. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts.