Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Colorado’s "Make My Day" law, section 18-1-704.5, C.R.S. (2021), addressed the justified use of force against intruders in the home. "But the nickname is a misnomer." Though wide-ranging, the statute’s safe harbor in no way permitted an occupant of a dwelling to egg on intruders to do something so as to have an excuse to shoot them. As pertinent here, the statute provided immunity from criminal prosecution for the use of physical force (including deadly physical force) against an intruder when certain specified conditions are met. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether defendant Patrick Rau was in a dwelling when he shot and killed an intruder in the basement of a house where he and his girlfriend rented an apartment. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the basement, which was accessible to all of the building’s tenants and contained the building’s heat and water controls, was part of Rau’s dwelling, therefore, affirming the district court’s ruling that Rau was immune from prosecution for using deadly physical force against the intruder. Relying on the definition of “dwelling” in section 18-1-901(3)(g), C.R.S. (2021), the Supreme Court held that the basement was part of Rau’s dwelling because it was part of the building that he used for habitation. "And just as some of the usual uses of the garage in [Colorado v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395, 396 (Colo. 1982)] were incidental to and part of the use of the residence itself, some of the usual uses of the basement in this case were likewise incidental to and part of the use of Rau’s residence. Accordingly, we affirm the division." View "Colorado v. Rau" on Justia Law

In this case, the court of appeals affirmed petitioner William Pettigrew’s judgment of conviction for pandering of a child and tampering with a witness or victim. Pettigrew claimed that the trial court’s statements to the jury venire during voir dire lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of due process. Additionally, he contended the appellate erred in determining that a warrant to search his cell phone and the warrant’s supporting affidavit satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. In his view, had the courts below properly redacted from the warrant all information obtained as a result of his initial unlawful arrest, the warrant would not have sufficiently described the place to be searched. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that, although a number of the trial court’s comments during voir dire were problematic, on the facts presented here, there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood the court’s statements, in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, to lower the prosecution’s burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard. In addition, assuming without deciding that the warrant and its supporting affidavit, when properly redacted, did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, the Supreme Court concluded any error in admitting at trial the evidence obtained from Pettigrew’s cell phone was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "This evidence was cumulative of other evidence presented, and the evidence of Pettigrew’s guilt was overwhelming." Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, but for somewhat different reasons. View "Pettigrew v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's consideration was whether a trial court’s comments to a jury venire attempting to explain the concept of reasonable doubt effectively lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. Although the Court granted certiorari to consider three questions, the Court surmised there were really two issues to decide: (1) the proper test for determining whether a trial court’s comments to prospective jurors lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof; and (2) whether the example that the trial court used here to explain the concept of reasonable doubt lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. The Court concluded the proper test for determining whether a trial court’s statements to the jury lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof was one of function: an appellate court must ask whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the court’s statements, in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, to allow a conviction based on a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. "In this way, statements made to the venire during voir dire can, in context, have the effect of instructing the jury on the law to be applied, whether or not such statements can be characterized as formal 'instructions,' and other facts and circumstances of the trial may well inform the question of how the jury would reasonably have understood such statements." Applying this standard to the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court found it was "reasonably likely" that the jury understood the court’s statements to allow a conviction on a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, which constituted structural error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the division below and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tibbels v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged Kevin Viburg with driving under the influence with three or more prior alcohol-related traffic offenses (i.e., felony DUI). Prior to trial, Viburg moved to treat his prior convictions as an element of the crime, which would require the jury to find them beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, ruling that Viburg’s prior convictions were a sentence enhancer that needed only to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing after a trial on the merits. As a result, evidence of his prior convictions was not introduced to the jury; instead, at trial, the court instructed the jury only on the elements of misdemeanor DUI. The jury then found Viburg guilty of misdemeanor DUI. Subsequently, at a post-conviction hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Viburg had three prior alcohol-related traffic offenses, and it entered a conviction for felony DUI. The court of appeald reversed, holding that prior convictions were an element of felony DUI, meaning they had to be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The division further stated that if the prosecution sought retrial and Viburg raised a double jeopardy defense, the trial court had to rule on the defense; it declined to express an opinion on the merits of the defense. The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this case was whether the prior convictions here were a sentence enhancer or an element of the offense. While the State's petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued Linnebur v. Colorado, 476 P.3d 734 (2020), which mirrored the Viburg appellate court's analysis deeming prior convictions to be an element of felony DUI. However, Linnbebur left open the question of whether double jeopardy barred retrial of the felony DUI charge. Here, the Supreme Court held double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the defendant was not previously acquitted of felony DUI. View "In re Viburg v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This appeal presented three issues for the Colorado Supreme Court's review: (1) At what point was defendant Weston Thomas under arrest for purposes of the crime of resisting arrest?; (2) was bodily injury to an at-risk person (a class 6 felony) a lesser included offense of third degree assault (a class 1 misdemeanor)?; and (3) was it error for the trial court to adjudicate Thomas a habitual criminal and sentence him accordingly when two of his three prior felony convictions had been reclassified from class 4 and 6 felonies to level 4 drug felonies? Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ analysis of each question, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant William Hunsaker, Jr. missed the deadline for filing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. However, his original sentence was illegal, and the district court corrected it. The Colorado Supreme Court found his late filing of a collateral attack related to the illegality in his sentence, and was justifiably excused. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ conclusion that one of Hunsaker’s Crim. P. 35(c) arguments was related to the illegality in his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunsaker v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged Kevin Viburg with driving under the influence with three or more prior alcohol-related traffic offenses (i.e., felony DUI). Prior to trial, Viburg moved to treat his prior convictions as an element of the crime, which would require the jury to find them beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, ruling that Viburg’s prior convictions were a sentence enhancer that need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing after a trial on the merits. As a result, evidence of his prior convictions was not introduced to the jury; instead, at trial, the court instructed the jury only on the elements of misdemeanor DUI. The jury then found Viburg guilty of misdemeanor DUI. Subsequently, at a post-conviction hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Viburg had three prior alcohol-related traffic offenses, and it entered a conviction for felony DUI. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that prior convictions were an element of felony DUI (meaning they must be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). The appeals court further stated that if the prosecution sought retrial and Viburg raised a double jeopardy defense, the trial court had to rule on the defense; it declined to express an opinion on the merits of the defense. The Colorado Supreme Court held double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the defendant was not previously acquitted of felony DUI. View "In re Viburg v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Eddie Johnson died of natural causes before completing the direct appeal of his criminal convictions in this case. A division of the court of appeals applied the doctrine of abatement ab initio to vacate Johnson’s underlying convictions and a large restitution order associated with them. The prosecution claimed that certain statutory changes and policy considerations should have allowed the district court’s restitution order to survive Johnson’s death. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because the General Assembly did not clearly abrogate the doctrine as to restitution, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision in Colorado v. Johnson, 487 P.3d 1262, vacating the district court’s restitution order. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding filed to the Colorado Supreme Court, at issue were the final legislative redistricting plans for the Colorado Senate and House of Representatives, adopted and submitted to the Court by the Colorado Independent Legislative Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”). Under article V, section 48.3, the Court's jurisdiction was limited to whether the Plans complied with the criteria listed in section 48.1 of article V, and the Court had to approve those Plans unless the it concluded the Commission abused its discretion in applying or failing to apply those criteria in light of the record before it. Finding no such abuse of discretion here, the Colorado Court approved the Plans and ordered the Commission to file those Plans with the Colorado Secretary of State as required by article V, section 48.3(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Legis. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Roddy and his ex-wife have been embroiled in post-decree domestic-relations litigation for more than a decade. In exchange for dismissal of the original criminal charges, Roddy pled guilty to first degree criminal trespass, a crime that he committed in his ex-wife’s home. He received a deferred judgment and sentence, and the court ordered him to pay restitution to his ex-wife as the victim. Roddy contended that the district court erred when it: (1) entered the restitution order beyond the ninety-one-day time limit prescribed by statute; and (2) included losses proximately caused by conduct related to the dismissed charges as well as the charge to which he pled guilty. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to enter the order after the ninety-one-day limit had expired. But the division also limited restitution to only “the losses caused by the conduct to which [Roddy] pleaded guilty.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that though the trial court exceeded the statutory ninety-one-day period for ordering restitution, the trial court made a good cause finding, albeit, well after the ninety-one-day window had closed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for findings on whether the trial court’s late good cause finding was adequate in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Colorado v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, __ P.3d __. View "Colorado v. Roddy" on Justia Law