Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of murder as an accessory and conspiracy to commit murder. She waived her right to a jury trial and opted for a trial by a three-judge panel. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that her waiver of a jury trial was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the canvassing court failed to explain that the three-judge panel did not need to be unanimous to convict. Additionally, she claimed that the panel improperly began deliberations before the close of evidence.The trial court found the defendant guilty based on evidence including her tumultuous relationship with the victim, her presence near the crime scene, and her inconsistent statements to the police. The defendant had initially claimed she was at home during the shooting but later admitted to being picked up by her cousin near the scene. Phone records also showed she contacted her cousin multiple times shortly before the murder.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. The court noted that the defendant’s presence at the scene, her actions during the crime, and her inconsistent statements provided a reasonable basis for the panel’s verdict.However, the court invoked its supervisory authority to require that trial courts must specifically advise defendants who waive their right to a jury trial in favor of a three-judge panel that only two of the three judges need to agree to convict, unlike a jury which must be unanimous. The court concluded that this new rule should apply to the defendant’s case, reversed her conviction, and ordered a new trial.The court also addressed the defendant’s claim regarding premature deliberations by the panel, concluding that unlike juries, three-judge panels are not constitutionally prohibited from discussing the case before the close of evidence. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, parents of minor children, challenged a public act that eliminated the religious exemption from vaccination requirements for school enrollment. They argued that the act violated their constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and a free public education, as well as their statutory rights under Connecticut law. The defendants, state and municipal officials, moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity.The trial court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims satisfied the substantial claim exception to sovereign immunity, and their statutory claim under Connecticut law satisfied the statutory waiver exception. The defendants appealed this decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the trial court must assess the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations to determine whether they have asserted a substantial claim of a constitutional violation. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims failed as a matter of law. The act was deemed a neutral law of general applicability, rationally related to the state's interest in protecting public health. The court also found that the act did not violate the plaintiffs' right to a free public education, as it imposed a reasonable vaccination requirement.However, the court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs' statutory free exercise claim under Connecticut law satisfied the statutory waiver exception to sovereign immunity. The court found that the scope of the waiver extended to free exercise challenges to the enforcement of legislation and that applying the statute to the public act did not violate any constitutional principles.The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing the dismissal of the constitutional claims, but affirmed the decision regarding the statutory claim, allowing it to proceed. View "Spillane v. Lamont" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree after an altercation with a friend, during which he stabbed the friend multiple times. Following the incident, the defendant sought medical treatment at a hospital for injuries sustained during the fight. While at the hospital, he was questioned by several police officers without being advised of his Miranda rights. The defendant moved to suppress the statements made during these interactions, arguing that he was in custody and subject to interrogation without proper Miranda warnings.The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital questioning. The court noted that the defendant was not handcuffed, was coherent despite his intoxication, and was not subjected to prolonged or aggressive questioning. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years of incarceration, suspended after seven years, with five years of probation.The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by the police at the hospital. The court reasoned that the presence of multiple officers, the defendant's physical condition, and the nature of the questioning created a custodial environment. The Appellate Court held that the trial court should have suppressed the statements and remanded the case for a new trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital interactions. The court emphasized that the defendant was not physically restrained by the police, the questioning was not aggressive or prolonged, and the defendant was informed that he was free to leave for police purposes. The court concluded that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the police were not required to administer Miranda warnings, and the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State v. Garrison" on Justia Law

In 1990, the petitioner was convicted of murder, largely based on two cross-racial eyewitness identifications. Both witnesses initially identified another person as the shooter but later identified the petitioner, who was the only Black man at the defense table during a probable cause hearing. The petitioner challenged the identification procedures and jury instructions on appeal, but the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld his conviction.The petitioner filed a habeas petition in 2016, claiming that the admission of unduly suggestive and unreliable eyewitness identification evidence violated his due process rights. He also argued that advances in the science of eyewitness identification since his conviction called into question the validity of his conviction. The habeas court dismissed these claims, concluding they were barred by res judicata and that the decisions in State v. Guilbert and State v. Dickson did not apply retroactively. The court also dismissed and denied other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the principles set forth in Dickson, which addressed the suggestiveness of first-time, in-court identifications, must apply retroactively on collateral review. The court reasoned that the rule in Dickson was a result of scientific developments that significantly improve the accuracy of convictions and that the petitioner had raised similar claims in his direct appeal. The court reversed the Appellate Court's decision and remanded the case for a trial on the petitioner's due process and actual innocence claims, directing the lower court to apply the holding of Dickson retroactively. View "Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

A man convicted of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child appealed his conviction, arguing that he was entitled to access the content of handwritten journals authored by the complainant. The complainant had revealed the existence of these journals during the trial, stating that they were created as part of her therapy following the abuse and contained details about her relationship with the defendant and the abuse he had inflicted. The defendant claimed that these journals constituted a "statement" under relevant rules of practice and that his rights were violated as the prosecutors did not personally review the journals for exculpatory information.The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the defendant had waived his claim to the journals and that the prosecutors were not constitutionally required to personally review the journals. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which agreed with the state's alternative argument that the journals were not subject to disclosure because they did not constitute a statement that was adopted or approved by the complainant. The court also concluded that the Brady review of the journals by a nonlawyer member of the state’s attorney’s office was constitutionally adequate. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "State v. C." on Justia Law

In this case, two candidates for state legislative offices in the 2014 general election, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, were fined by the State Elections Enforcement Commission for violating state statutes and regulations governing campaign financing. The candidates' campaign committees had received public funding grants and published communications that criticized the then-governor, who was running for reelection. The commission found that the candidates had violated the applicable statutes and regulations by using their campaign funds to pay for communications that criticized the governor while promoting their opposition to his policies.The candidates appealed to the trial court, arguing that the statutes and regulations violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their ability to speak about other, non-opposing candidates. The trial court upheld the commission's decision, agreeing that the candidates had violated the statutes and regulations and concluding that the restrictions did not infringe on the candidates' First Amendment rights.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the candidates argued that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations violated their First Amendment rights. The court held that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations imposed an unconstitutional condition in violation of the First Amendment. The court found that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations penalized the candidates for mentioning the governor's name in a manner that was not the functional equivalent of speech squarely directed at his reelection campaign. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to sustain the candidates' administrative appeal. View "Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission" on Justia Law

The defendant, Dwayne Sayles, was convicted of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, among other crimes, in connection with his role in the robbery of a convenience store and the shooting death of the store clerk. On appeal, Sayles challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence of his cell phone and the data contained therein. He argued that the police had violated his rights under Miranda and the Connecticut constitution when they continued to interrogate him after he had invoked his right to counsel, and that the seizure of his cell phone violated the fourth amendment to the U.S. constitution and the Connecticut constitution.However, the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that any error in the admission of the contents of Sayles' cell phone was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming wealth of evidence against him. This evidence included surveillance footage from inside of the convenience store, detailed testimony from a co-conspirator about Sayles' and his own involvement in the events, testimony from a jailhouse informant that Sayles had confessed to his involvement in the crimes, and a corroborating statement made to the police by a friend of Sayles. The court also noted significant evidence of Sayles' consciousness of guilt, such as testimony that he had directed his cousin to assault a potential witness to force him to recant his testimony. Physical evidence, including a ski mask and gloves found during the search of Sayles' residence and cell phone location data, further corroborated the testimony and statements. Given this, the court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment and declined to address Sayles' constitutional challenges. View "State v. Sayles" on Justia Law

The case involves Alico, LLC, a Massachusetts-based company with offices in both Massachusetts and Connecticut. The company's vehicles, used for business, were registered in Massachusetts, and taxes were paid in that state. However, the vehicles were primarily used and garaged in Somers, Connecticut, where the company's sole member and his wife, who also works for the company, reside. In 2018, the tax assessor in Somers, Connecticut, became aware of the presence of these vehicles and retroactively placed them on the town's 2017 and 2018 grand lists, assessing property taxes on them. The plaintiffs, Alico and its sole member, appealed this decision, arguing it was unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause of the United States constitution. They claimed that because the vehicles were used in interstate commerce and already taxed in Massachusetts, the Connecticut property tax led to impermissible double taxation.The Supreme Court of Connecticut disagreed with the plaintiffs' arguments. The court ruled that the property tax authorized by Connecticut's statute did not violate the dormant commerce clause. The court applied the test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, which determines the constitutionality of a state tax that is facially neutral but may impose a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce. The court found that the Connecticut tax was applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the state, was fairly apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and was fairly related to the services provided by the state. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment declaring the assessments unconstitutional. The court also noted that any double taxation was not the result of a discriminatory tax scheme, but rather the plaintiffs' business decisions. View "Alico, LLC v. Somers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court finding Defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a motor vehicle.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) any claimed error on the part of the trial court in violating Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment by allowing the chief medical examiner to testify about the results of the victim's autopsy, which the chief medical examiner had not performed himself, was harmless; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a vehicle in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 29-38(a). View "State v. Robles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain testimony pursuant to the constancy of accusation doctrine; (2) the trial court did not err in excluding impeachment evidence of pending criminal charges against the State's key witness; and (3) the first degree of sexual assault charge was not ambiguous and therefore did not violate Defendant's right to jury unanimity under the Sixth Amendment. View "State v. Velasquez-Mattos" on Justia Law