Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Connecticut Supreme Court
State v. Buie
Under the apparent authority doctrine recognized by the United States Supreme Court, a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not have such authority. The trial court in this case denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement’s warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment based on the apparent authority doctrine. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. On appeal, Defendant contended that although the apparent authority doctrine is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement under the federal constitution, it is inconsistent with Conn. Const. art. I, 7. The Appellate Court concluded that application of the doctrine does not offend the right of Connecticut citizens to be free from unreasonable searches under article first, section 7. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court’s opinion was a proper statement of the applicable law on this issue. View "State v. Buie" on Justia Law
Rodriguez v. Comm’r of Corr.
After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of several offenses in connection with an incident involving Petitioner’s estranged girlfriend. Petitioner later filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that his counsel’s criminal prosecution shortly before Petitioner’s criminal trial constituted a conflict of interest. The habeas court denied Petitioner’s petition. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s claim failed on the merits. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether there was a constitutionally impermissible risk that a jury would attribute the conduct of Petitioner’s trial counsel to Petitioner when his counsel had been acquitted of a dissimilar crime in the same judicial district in which Petitioner faced criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his trial counsel’s performance. View "Rodriguez v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law
State v. Shaw
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by improperly precluding Defendant from introducing, on relevancy grounds, evidence of prior sexual conduct that was admissible under the rape shield statute, in violation of Defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation; and (2) the trial court’s preclusion of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Shaw" on Justia Law
State v. Elson
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that, during sentencing, the trial court deprived him of his due process rights by improperly considering that Defendant decided to proceed to trial rather than accept a plea bargain. The Appellate Court declined to review Defendant’s sentencing claim on the grounds that it was unpreserved and that Defendant had not properly made an “affirmative request” for review in his main brief under State v. Golding. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the requirement that a defendant must “affirmatively request” Golding review in his main brief in order to receive appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims is overruled, and therefore, the Appellate Court improperly declined to review Defendant’s constitutional claims on that ground; (2) Defendant failed to establish that the trial court penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial; but (3) the use of the Court’s supervisory authority was warranted to prevent adverse effects on the public’s perception of the inherent fairness of the criminal justice system that may arise when a trial judge could appear to have considered a defendant’s decision to exercise his right to a trial during sentencing. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Elson" on Justia Law
State v. Baltas
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the trial court as to Defendant’s convictions for the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree and burglary in the first degree, holding that certain evidence relating to the potential impeachment of a key prosecution witness should have been admitted at trial, and that the failure to admit the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to those counts; and (2) affirmed the trial court in all other respects, holding that the court did not err in its instructions to the jury and that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct. View "State v. Baltas" on Justia Law
Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc.
Plaintiff, who worked for Defendant as a plumber, brought this action seeking payment of overtime wages for, among other things, his daily commute between his home and the job sites. The trial court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to overtime compensation for his travel time between home and work because the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) preempted the relevant Connecticut laws and regulations governing overtime and travel time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 31-60-10 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, as applied to the facts of this case, confers lesser benefits on employees than those afforded under the FLSA, federal preemption applies, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his commuting time.
View "Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc." on Justia Law
State v. Williams
Defendant pled nolo contendere to possession of narcotics with intent to sell to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school, and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress with respect to the narcotics and handgun found in a plastic bag inside the trunk of his vehicle. Specifically, Defendant argued that the search of bags inside the trunk of his vehicle could not be conducted within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Connecticut constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state constitution does not prohibit the warrantless search of a closed container located in the trunk of a vehicle conducted during an otherwise constitutional warrantless search of a vehicle. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law
State v. Pierre
Upon responding to a 911 call from a tenant of a rooming house reporting a disturbance involving a gun, police officers entered an unlocked attic space in the house and retrieved marijuana and a gun. After a jury trial, Defendant, who resided in a room on the third floor of the house, was convicted of attempt to commit criminal possession of a firearm, criminal possession of a pistol, and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police as products of an unlawful search, claiming he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the attic. The appellate court affirmed, holding that, because of Defendant’s lack of control over the access of others to the attic, Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in that space that society would recognize as reasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellate court properly resolved the issue by virtue of its well-reasoned decision. View "State v. Pierre" on Justia Law
State v. DeMarco
Upon following up on complaints from Defendant’s neighbor relating to Defendant’s keeping of animals in his residence, a police officer concluded that a “welfare check” was necessary and made a warrantless entry into Defendant’s home. Defendant subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of cruelty to animals. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress on the ground that the warrantless entry was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the evidence did not permit a finding that the police reasonably believed that a warrantless entry was necessary to help a person inside the dwelling who was in immediate need of assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances present in this case, a police officer reasonably would have believed that an emergency existed inside Defendant’s home. View "State v. DeMarco" on Justia Law
Edgerton v. Town of Clinton
Walter Hopkins was severely injured as a result of the second of two vehicle collisions. Hopkins was the passenger in an Infiniti, which struck the side of a vehicle driven by Matthew Vincent, a volunteer firefighter. Vincent pursued the Infiniti at high speeds in his vehicle, at which time he relayed information via cell phone regarding the Infiniti and its location to Ellen Vece, a 911 dispatcher employed by the Town of Clinton. The Infiniti eventually crashed into a tree. Hopkins required permanent care as a result of his injuries. An action was filed on Hopkins' behalf against the Town, among others. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, finding (1) the Town was liable under the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity; and (2) Vece’s failure to act was a proximate cause of Hopkins’ injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity did not apply in this case because the circumstances would not have made it apparent to Vece that her failure to instruct Vincent to stop following the Infiniti likely would have subjected Hopkins to imminent harm. View "Edgerton v. Town of Clinton" on Justia Law