Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Defendant appealed, contending that the appellate court erred in concluding that the trial court's failure to give a Ledbetter instruction, sua sponte, did not present the type of extraordinary circumstance that warranted reversal under the plain error doctrine. Under State v. Ledbetter, trial courts are required to provide a jury instruction regarding the increased risk of misidentification when an eyewitness is not advised that the perpetrator of a crime may or may not be present in the identification procedure in cases in which the identification procedure administrator had failed to provide such a warning. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded the failure to give a Ledbetter instruction in this case was not plain error. View "State v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the sale of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-278a(b). Defendant appealed, arguing that criminal liability under section 21a-278a(b) did not attach in his case because the drug transaction began within 1500 feet of a school but culminated elsewhere. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction because section 21a-278a(b) required the state to prove that Defendant had effected a delivery of drugs within 1500 of the school, and the state had failed to prove that the physical transfer occurred within that 1500 foot zone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court construed the statutory definition of sale of a controlled substance under Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-240(50) too narrowly, and therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction in this case; and (2) Defendant waived his claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the intent element of the offense. View "State v. Webster" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminally possessing a firearm and several drug-related crimes. The appellate court affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant appealed. After noting that the appellate court properly resolved the issues Defendant brought up on appeal with a concise and well reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court (1) properly concluded that Defendant's right to due process under the Connecticut constitution was not violated by the state's inability to produce audio recordings of certain drug transactions; and (2) properly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree and attempt to commit assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's request that the jury be instructed on the theory that Defendant was acting in defense of another. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on the defense of others was improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support Defendant's request to have the jury instructed on the defense of others, and therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury as requested. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Bryan" on Justia Law

This litigation was the latest chapter in the efforts of Plaintiffs, including the commissioner of environmental protection, to close and remediate an area known as the "tire pond," a solid waste disposal area on land owned by Defendants, an individual and various corporate entities he owned or controlled. The nonparty plaintiff in error, Corporation, which conducted its business on land leased from an industrial park that contained a portion of the tire pond, brought this writ of error from the judgment of the trial court ordering it to vacate that land in order to effectuate the environmental remediation that the trial court had ordered in the action underlying this writ of error. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that the trial court properly ordered Corporation to vacate where (1) the trial court had the authority to enforce the injunctions ordered in the underlying action against Corporation; (2) such an order was necessary to effectuate the remediation; and (3) the trial court's enforcement of the injunctive orders rendered in the underlying action against Corporation did not violate Corporation's due process rights. View "Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. Farricielli" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aiding and abetting murder, felony murder, home invasion, and burglary in the first degree. Defendant elected a trial to a three judge court. The panel found Defendant guilty on all of the charges. Defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aiding and abetting murder and that he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part with respect to Defendant's conviction of aiding and abetting murder, as the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant on that count; and (2) concluded that Defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial was valid. Remanded. View "State v. Bennett" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, capital felony, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, raising three claims relating to testimony and demonstrative evidence of his flight from police after the commission of the crimes, which were admitted as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the prejudicial impact of the admission of the evidence of flight did not outweigh its probative value; and (2) Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the trial court improperly failed to give the jury a limiting instruction on uncharged misconduct evidence, and Defendant was not entitled to relief on this claim under the plain error doctrine or under the Court's supervisory authority. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

Pictometry International Corporation was engaged in the business in selling specialized aerial photographic services. Pictometry contracted with the department of information technology to license the department of environmental protection (DEP) to use certain aerial photographic images and associated data that were owned and copyrighted by Pictometry. Stephen Whitaker requested that the DEP provide him with the images and data. The DEP indicated that it would provide copies of the images for a fee provided for in the licensing agreement. Whitaker filed a complaint against the DEP with the freedom of information commission (commission). The commission determined that, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), the DEP was required to provide Whitaker with the images at minimum cost but was not required to provide the associated data. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the commission improperly ordered the DEP to provide copies of the images without first determining whether it was feasible for the DEP to provide such copies and whether doing so would pose a public safety risk; and (2) if the commission determined on remand that Whitaker is entitled to copies of the images, Whitaker was required to pay a $25 per image fee. View "Pictometry Int'l Corp. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Juvenile entered a plea of guilty to robbery in the second degree. The superior court found Juvenile to be delinquent and ordered him to be committed to the custody of the department of children and families (department) in an out-of-state facility. The department subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the matter, arguing that the court's orders exceeded the court's placement authority pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-140. The court denied the motion to intervene. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order, concluding that section 46b-140 does not give the superior court the authority to place a juvenile in an out-of-state facility. While this appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the trial court modified Juvenile's probation to permit him to return to Connecticut from his placement out-of-state. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal as moot and not capable of repetition, yet evading review, as the legislature's most recent amendment to section 46b-140 firmly establishes that the statute does not authorize the superior court to order the direct placement of a child committed to the department in an out-of-state residential facility. View "In re Jeffrey M." on Justia Law

The vehicle Plaintiff was driving collided with a parked fire truck that was responding to an accident, and Plaintiff sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action against the Town and others, alleging that the Town was negligent in that the fire truck and lane closures were inadequately marked and the positioning of the fire truck constituted a nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike the negligence counts of the basis of governmental immunity. The court also granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiffs' nuisance counts on the basis of Himmelstein v. Windsor and entered judgment in favor of the Town. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that its decision in Himmelstein did not bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. The appellate court drew a distinction between the present case and Himmelstein, noting that the nuisance claim in Himmelstein was barred by the exclusivity provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' nuisance claims here were clearly distinguishable from those asserted in Himmelstein, as in the instant case, Plaintiffs' nuisance counts did not fall within the scope of section 13a-149. View "Kumah v. Brown" on Justia Law