Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of larceny in the second degree by embezzlement from a person who is sixty years of age or older. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the ownership of funds in a jointly held account is a factual issue for the jury to resolve. Defendant argued that the instruction was improper because a joint holder of an account, as a matter of law, jointly owns the funds in the account and, consequently, cannot be charged with stealing those funds. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court's jury instruction was legally correct, where the ownership of a joint account, as between its coholders, is not controlled by statute, but, rather, is a question of fact dependent on the intent of the joint account holders and all of the circumstances surrounding the joint account's creation and maintenance. View "State v. Lavigne" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent. Defendant entered the plea after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his recreational vehicle, which was parked on the property of Edward Jevarjian, and of Jevarjian's home and garage. The plea was conditioned on Defendant's right to appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that the contested search was not unlawfully premature; and (2) the appellate court properly determined that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of Jevarjian's home and garage. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent. Defendant's plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home and of a recreational vehicle not belonging to him, which was parked on Defendant's property at the time of the search. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction, determining that Defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the recreational vehicle. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the appellate court properly determined that the judge issuing the search warrant made a scrivener's error as to the time of execution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the issue of whether Defendant had standing to contest the search of the recreational vehicle was not before the Court, the resolution of the certified issue could yield no practical relief, and therefore, Defendant's appeal was moot. View "State v. Jevarjian" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the findings and order of the trial court, which committed Defendant to the custody of the commissioner of mental health and addiction services and required Defendant to submit to periodic competency examinations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined (1) Conn. Pub. Acts 98-88, 2, which amended Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-56d(m) by authorizing a court to order periodic competency examinations in certain circumstances, applied retroactively; (2) the trial court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over Defendant when it conceded that Defendant had no notice of the proceeding that resulted in an arrest warrant for failure to appear; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering periodic competency examinations when there was not a substantial probability that Defendant would regain competence. View "State v. Custodio" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence on the ground that the sentence was imposed without the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Conn. Const. art I, 8. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court improperly concluded, in connection with accepting his nolo contendere pleas to numerous offenses and sentencing him to fifty-four months of imprisonment, that he had waived his right to counsel and was not indigent and therefore did not qualify for the services of a public defender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly determined that Defendant's decision to waive counsel was competently made, and knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (2) the trial court's conclusion that Defendant failed to carry his burden of proving his eligibility for public defender services was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, convicting him of one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-21(a)(1) and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of section 53-21-(a)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted into evidence a video recording and transcript of a forensic interview of the victim as a prior inconsistent statement under the rule set forth in State v. Whelan, and Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the victim appeared a testified at trial, where she could have been subjected to cross-examination; and (2) the record was inadequate for review of Defendant's unpreserved double jeopardy claims. View "State v. Cameron M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Republican Party of Connecticut, brought a declaratory judgment action in which it sought a determination that, because its candidate for the office of governor in the 2010 election received the highest number of votes under the designation of the Republican Party line on the ballot, Defendant, the secretary of the state, was required to list the candidates of the Republican Party first on the ballots for the 2010 election pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-249a(a). The trial court granted the joint request of the parties to reserve questions regarding the statute for the Supreme Court. The Court answered, (1) Plaintiff had an available administrative remedy in the present case, which it exhausted; (2) Plaintiff's complaint was not barred by sovereign immunity; and (3) section 9-249a requires that the Plaintiff's candidates for office be placed on the first line of the ballots for the November 6, 2012 election. View "Republican Party of Conn. v. Merrill" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to a variety of criminal charges on the advice of counsel. After he was sentenced, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel had failed to advise him adequately regarding the state's offer of a plea bargain and that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court rendered judgment granting the petition and ordered the trial court to vacate Petitioner's guilty plea and to allow Petitioner the opportunity to accept the original plea offer. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that although the appellate court properly affirmed the judgment, it did not properly affirm the habeas court's order for relief. Remanded to the habeas court so it may issue an order directing the trial court to determine whether Petitioner should receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he received, or something in between. View "Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty on various charges in two informations, both involving the physical assault of a female victim, which had been joined for trial pursuant to the state's motion. The first case regarded the victim Larrisha Washington (Washington case), and the second case regarded the victim Diana Hazard (Hazard case). Defendant appealed, claiming he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault in the first degree in the Hazard case and a new trial in the Washington case. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment in the Hazard case and remanded that case to the trial court with direction to render judgment of acquittal on all counts, holding (i) the trial court improperly instructed the jury in the Hazard case that "a fist can be a dangerous instrument" with regard to Defendant's conviction of assault in the first degree, and (ii) therefore, the state presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed assault in the first degree; and (2) affirmed the judgment of the Washington case but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, as the reversal of Defendant's convictions in the Hazard case affected the sentencing in the Washington case. View "State v. LaFleur" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, both of which require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim, at the time of the offense, was physically helpless. After the state presented its case at trial, and again following the close of evidence Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming the state had failed to offer sufficient evidence that the victim was physically helpless. The trial court denied the motions. The appellate court reversed after considering the sole issue of whether the jury reasonably could have found that the state introduced sufficient evidence to prove that the victim was unable to communicate her lack of consent to Defendant's sexual advances and concluding that the state had failed to sustain its evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state failed to produce any credible evidence that the victim was either unconscious or so uncommunicative that she was physically incapable of manifesting to Defendant her lack of consent to sexual intercourse the time of the alleged sexual assault. View "State v. Fourtin" on Justia Law