Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found Defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge on the ground that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to prevent the liberation of the victim for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which was necessary to commit the sexual assault as required by State v. Salamon. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to the kidnapping charge, holding (1) the trial court improperly improperly granted Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and rendered judgment of not guilty on the kidnapping charge, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that Defendant's restraint of the victim was not merely incidental to the sexual assault; (2) the judgment may not be affirmed on the alternate ground that the kidnapping statute, as applied to Defendant's conduct, was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court's instruction on the kidnapping charge was not misleading. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of capital felony, two counts of murder, and conspiracy to commit murder, and he was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Supreme Court upheld all four convictions on appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel based on his claim that counsel failed to complete an adequate pretrial investigation. The habeas court granted petitioner's petition, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner established by a preponderance of he evidence both that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance and that the alleged ineffective assistance was prejudicial to Petitioner.

The named plaintiff, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, brought this action against defendant city (Defendant), claiming that her son incurred injuries when a fellow student pushed him into a broken locker. Defendant filed its its answer and a special defense claiming municipal immunity. Plaintiffs denied the special defense but failed to plead that any exception to the defendant's immunity applied to them. The court instructed the jury on principles of negligence but made no reference to the special defense. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiffs. The trial court then granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of governmental immunity and rendered judgment for Defendant. The appellate court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to plead the identifiable victim, imminent harm exception to municipal immunity in their reply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiffs did not have adequate notice of this alternative basis or sufficient opportunity to address it, the appellate court improperly decided the case on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to plead the imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity.

A jury found Defendant guilty of reckless driving. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the reckless driving conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the street on which Defendant was driving was a public highway, as required under Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-222(a). The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the evidence was sufficient to permit a finding that Defendant was operating his motor vehicle on a public highway; and (2) affirmed in all other respects.

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court's preliminary instruction to the jury regarding posttrial sentencing procedures and the trial court's final instruction to the jury regarding the minor victim's credibility were improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court (1) properly determined that mentioning sentencing proceedings in the preliminary instructions did not affect the overall fairness and integrity of the proceeding as a whole; and (2) properly determined that the trial court's jury instructions regarding the victim's credibility, read as a whole, did not clearly violate Defendant's constitutional rights or clearly deprive him of a fair trial.

A jury found Defendant guilty of capital felony, two counts of murder, and assault in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding (1) State v. Kemp and State v. McClendon, which state that expert testimony on the issue of reliability of eyewitness identification is disfavored, are expressly overruled; (2) accordingly, testimony by a qualified expert on the fallibility of eyewitness identification is admissible when that testimony would aid the jury in evaluating the state's identification evidence; (3) therefore, the trial court improperly precluded the defense from presenting certain expert testimony on the issue of eyewitness identification, but the impropriety was harmless; and (4) the trial court properly denied Defendant's motions for a mistrial and for a new trial, which stemmed from the state's delayed disclosure of certain allegedly exculpatory evidence, as Defendant was not so prejudiced by the late disclosure that he did not receive a fair trial.

Under Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-lj(c), when a noncitizen defendant has not been properly advised about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea, the court is mandated to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea of the defendant files a motion not later than three years after the acceptance of the plea. At issue in this case was whether the trial court has jurisdiction under section 54-lj to vacate the judgment and permit withdrawal of the plea, as a matter of discretion, if the motion to vacate is filed more than three years after the court's acceptance of the plea. Defendant in this case appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his motion to vacate his judgment of conviction and to withdraw his plea. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction to consider Defendant's motion but held that the present case was not one in which the court should exercise its discretion to vacate the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion to vacate because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Defendant's motion because the motion was filed outside the permit under section 54-lj(c). Remanded.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of failing to comply with the sex offender registry requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-251 stemming from his failure to notify the sex offender registry unit of his change of residence in accordance with the terms of that statute. In count one, the state charged that on December 31, 2007, Defendant failed to notify the appropriate authority of his change of residence. In count two, the state charged that on January 22, 2008, in another town, Defendant failed to notify the commissioner of public safety of his change of residence. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly determined that there was sufficient evidence to prove he violated the statute. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant on either count of the information.

After a jury trial Defendant was convicted of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the third degree, and robbery in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed. At issue in this certified appeal was whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the statutory exception to the duress defense set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-14, when the State claimed that Defendant had intentionally or recklessly placed herself in a situation in which it was probable that she would be subjected to duress by voluntarily resuming her relationship with an abusive boyfriend. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court on the ground that, even if the trial court's instruction on the statutory exception to the duress defense was improper, any impropriety was harmless.

Defendant Gary Weddle and the intervening Defendant, the conservation commission of the town of Fairfield, appealed from the trial court's decision granting the writ of quo warranto filed by Plaintiffs, certain concerned taxpayers of the town of Fairfield, and ordering Weddle's removal from the office of wetlands compliance officer. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the procedural and substantive requirements for maintaining a quo warranto action. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding (1) plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient interest to establish standing to pursue the quo warranto action; and (2) the trial court properly granted Plaintiffs' writ of quo warranto on the basis that Weddle's appointment to the wetland compliance officer position violated the town charter by usurping the office of the conservation director.