Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant Francisco Pascual was convicted of several charges relating to his alleged attempt to sexually assault a twelve-year-old girl from El Salvador after the victim illegally crossed the border from Mexico into the United States. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly (1) admitted hearsay evidence that, several days before the charged events, the victim was told about a threat made by an unidentified third party, and (2) instructed the jury that the threat evidence was admitted to show that the victim reasonably feared Defendant in order to prove sexual assault and kidnapping charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the trial court improperly admitted the evidence and gave improper instructions to the jury, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the purported improprieties were not harmful.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Kenneth John Otto, Sr. was convicted of murder and tampering with evidence. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove the element of specific intent necessary to support the murder conviction; and (2) in closing arguments the prosecutor did not improperly invite the jury to apply an incorrect legal standard or improperly suggest that the jury could find Defendant guilty of murder even if it did not find that he had the requisite intent to kill, simply to punish him for destroying evidence.

Defendant Victor Jordan was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) Defendant's request to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal, and (2) Defendant's right to cross-examine a witness was not improperly restricted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant in this case clearly and unequivocally asserted his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and the trial court's denial of Defendant's request without canvassing him was a violation of that right; and (2) the trial court did not improperly restrict Defendant's cross-examination of the witness. Remanded for a new trial on the charge of reckless endangerment in the first degree.

Defendant Torrence Benton was convicted on charges of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search incident to his arrest. Specifically, Defendant contended that police seized him prior to his arrest without reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the totality of the circumstances in this case furnished sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity to justify the police stopping him.

Plaintiff, an LLC, owned and managed a commercial office building, and Defendant, an LLC, leased and occupied space in the building. A dispute arose between Plaintiff and Defendant over the scope of the lease and payment of rent. This dispute resulted in two people who had ownership interests in Plaintiff bringing the present action, in the name of Plaintiff, against Defendant to enforce the lease and to collect rent. Barbara Levine, who had fifty percent interest in Plaintiff and was the wife of a part owner of Defendant, disapproved of the lawsuit. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action, since one of its member's votes should not have been excluded pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 34-187(b) on the ground that she had an interest in the outcome of the suit that was adverse to the interest of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff properly excluded Levine from voting her interest in determining whether to bring the present action because her interest in the outcome of the action was adverse to that of Plaintiff's in light of her husband's ownership interest in Defendant.

Plaintiff Luis Patino commenced this action against Defendant, his former employer, claiming that Defendant engaged in a discriminatory employment practice when it permitted his coworkers to harass him based on his sexual orientation over a period of many years. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-81c(1) provides for hostile work environment claims where employees are subject to sexual orientation discrimination; (2) Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a hostile work environment; and (3) the award of damages was supported by the evidence.

Plaintiff G. Berry Schumann, a twelve year employee of Defendant, Dianon Systems, brought a complaint against Defendant alleging a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and common-law wrongful termination of employment for an adverse employment action Defendant took against Plaintiff in response to speech made during the course of Plaintiff's job duties. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. At issue on appeal was whether the rule in Garcetti v. Ceballos, which states that public employees who make statements pursuant to their official duties are not insulated from employer discipline for First Amendment purposes, is applicable in an action brought against a private employer pursuant to section 31-51q. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the rule in Garcetti applies to claims under section 31-51q grounded in the First Amendment that are brought against private employers; and (2) Plaintiff's speech was in the course of his employment duties for Defendant and, therefore, was not entitled to First Amendment protection under Garcetti. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendant on the claim under section 31-51q and for a new trial limited to Plaintiff's common-law wrongful termination claim.

Plaintiff Carmen Perez-Dickson brought this action claiming that Defendants, the city board of education, the former assistant superintendent of the school district, and the former acting superintendent of the school district, disciplined her for exercising her right to free speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and 17a-101e, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and intentionally caused her severe emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not violate section 31-51q because any relevant speech by Plaintiff had been pursuant to her official job duties and such speech is not protected by the First Amendment; (2) Plaintiff failed to prove her claim of racial discrimination; and (3) Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on her. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendants.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Sheri Paige, then an attorney, was convicted of nine charges relating to the theft of assets from an elderly client, including one count of perjury. With respect to the perjury instruction, although Defendant had submitted a request to charge the jury that it must decide whether a particular statement at issue was material and the State had conceded that it was improper for the trial court to have instructed the jury that the State had proven this element as a matter of law, the appellate court determined that Defendant had waived her right to challenge the instruction that was given. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part, holding that the appellate court erred in determining that Defendant had waived her right to challenge the instruction. Remanded for a new trial on the charge of perjury.

After a jury trial, Defendant John Jackson was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in denying (1) Defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence seized by the police without a search warrant, as Defendant had abandoned his expectation of privacy with respect to the seized items; (2) Defendant's motion to preclude certain evidence that the state had disclosed in an untimely manner, as Defendant established neither that there were exceptional circumstances requiring preclusion nor that he would have been prejudiced by the late disclosure; (3) Defendant's motion to suppress certain statements that he gave to the police, as Defendant was not in custody when he made the statements and the statements were voluntary; and (4) denying Defendant's request to give a jury instruction on third party culpability, as the evidence did not support the instruction.