Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the former town clerk of the town of Watertown, was removed from her position after she failed to report for work. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against the town and certain of its officials (1) seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Defendants to restore her salary and benefits from the time they were discontinued and to continue such payments for the duration of her term, (2) claiming Defendants had violated her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (3) seeking recovery of her lost salary. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on counts one and three. The court, however, rendered judgment in favor of defendants on count two of the complaint based upon the jury's finding that there had not been a constitutional violation of due process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings on counts one and three, holding that the trial court improperly concluded that Plaintiff had a clear legal right to be paid for the balance of her elected term unless or until she was removed from office.

Plaintiffs, the town of Bozrah and the town's zoning enforcement officer, brought an action seeking a temporary and permanent injunction to enjoin Defendants, owners and residents of certain property, from refusing to consent to an inspection of their property for zoning violations. The trial court granted a temporary injunction preventing Defendants from refusing to allow the inspection, concluding that pursuant to Camara v. Municipal Court, the reasonable governmental interest in stabilizing property values and promoting the general welfare justified an inspection in the present action. Defendants appealed, claiming that the trial court's order violated their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a zoning official may inspect a single property pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-12 if the official first obtains an injunction issued upon probable cause by a judicial officer; and (2) because the trial court failed to make a preliminary determination of probable cause to believe that a zoning violation existed on the property, its order permitting a search of Defendants' property violated the Fourth Amendment. Remanded.

Defendant Rafael Crespo was convicted of one count of assault in the third degree and two counts of sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant's conviction stemmed from allegations that he had forcibly engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim and physically assaulted her on several occasions during their relationship. The appellate court affirmed. After analyzing the case under State v. Golding the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly excluded impeachment evidence regarding the victim's prior sexual conduct and that the exclusion of this evidence did not clearly violate Defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense.

After a jury trial, Defendant Leotis Payne was convicted of, inter alia, felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and attempt to tamper with a juror. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court improperly joined for trial the felony murder and jury tampering cases against the Defendant for trial, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of one of the state's witnesses regarding an alleged threat made by Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (3) three statements by the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal arguments were improper, but those improprieties did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to the prosecutorial improprieties. In affirming the judgments of the trial court, the Court also overruled State v. King and its progeny, which recognized a presumption in favor of joinder in criminal cases.

Defendant Osibisa Hall pleaded guilty to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and two counts of violation of a protective order. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate the judgments of conviction, claiming that the trial court did not fulfill its obligation to address him personally and determine that he understood the immigration consequences of his pleas. The court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court failed to comply substantially with Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-1j when it neglected to personally address Defendant regarding the potential immigration consequences of his pleas. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) substantial compliance with section 54-1j can be established even if the court does not address the defendant personally; and (2) the trial court substantially complied with section 54-1j in the present case.

In an underlying employment dispute, Employee sued Employer for discrimination. After the jury issued a verdict in favor of Defendant, Plaintiff moved for a new trial, alleging that Defendant had engaged in discovery misconduct. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion. The appellate court affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a party seeking a new trial on the basis of alleged knowing and deliberate discovery misconduct must show that the result at a new trial would likely be different. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the rule set forth in Varley v. Varley to determine whether a new trial should be granted on the basis of allegations that the judgment was obtained through fraud, as reframed in this decision, applies to motions for a new trial based on the discovery misconduct of the nonmoving party.

Plaintiff, while in the course of employment as a uniformed police officer of the City's police department, was involved in a shooting and was later criminally charged in connection with the shooting. The City suspended Plaintiff without pay pending the outcome of the criminal matter. After being acquitted of all charges, Plaintiff brought an action against the City seeking reimbursement for legal fees, lost wages and lost employment benefits. The trial court awarded Plaintiff $562,277, which included Plaintiff's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's finding of a contract between Plaintiff and his lawyer in which Plaintiff incurred legal fees beyond the retainer was not clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages to Plaintiff for attorney's fees, and the award was not excessive; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to damages for economic loss during his entire suspension, and the trial court's award of damages for economic loss in this case was proper.

Defendant Gary Gibson was convicted, after a jury trial, of failure to appear in the first degree. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that improper statements by the prosecutor during closing argument had deprived Defendant of his constitutional due process right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial prosecutor's two uses of the words 'I think' while marshaling the evidence during closing argument did not constitute an improper expression of personal opinion and therefore did not amount to prosecutorial impropriety. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of conviction on the charge of failure to appear.

After a vehicle Defendant Tricia Coccomo was driving collided with another vehicle, killing all three occupants, Defendant was convicted of three counts each of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle and misconduct with a motor vehicle, and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. The appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Defendant had transferred certain real property that she owned for less than fair value as proof of consciousness of guilt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence that Defendant had transferred, after the collision, certain property for less than its fair value to her mother to prove consciousness of guilt; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting the results of a blood alcohol test that, according to the Defendant, was performed on someone else's blood. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant in this case issued health care insurance policies to provide coverage for medical services and entered into contracts with practitioners of the healing arts to provide those services. Plaintiffs, three individual podiatrists and the Connecticut Podiatric Medical Association, brought an action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's practice of reimbursing individual podiatrists at a lower rate than medical doctors for the same service constituted unfair discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CUIPA, by prohibiting unfair discrimination, bars the denial of reimbursement on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts, but does not preclude setting different reimbursement rates on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts.